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3Summary
The experience of negative or positive moods is ubiquitous in everyday life. Moods
shape decisions, but often remain unnoticed in the background. This dissertation
systematizes the theory of mood influence and shows how the effects of moods un-
fold in different domains of decision-making. The multitude of emotion theories is
organized in this thesis along the three frameworks. First, content-related theories
assume that moods influence the content of thoughts by incorporating new infor-
mation into the decision-making process. Secondly, process-related theories focus
on changes in information processing. Thirdly, regulation-related theories concern
the study of the motivation to maintain positive and avoid negative moods. With
regard to the empirical work, the dissertation comprises four experimental studies
that manipulated the mood of the participants and examined the differences in their
decisions or decision-making strategies.
The first project was dedicated to the study of decision strategies in a multi-
attribute decision task. The experiment was designed to measure the use of com-
pensatory and non-compensatory strategies in different moods and with different
types of information representation (open and closed information boards). The fin-
dings supported the mood-as-information theory in the way that positive mood was
associated with the use of non-compensatory strategies and negative mood with the
use of compensatory strategies. These results suggest that mood impacts the in-
tegration of information by signaling the current state of the environment and the
processing efforts required for the task.
The second project extended the research question to decisions based on expe-
rience. The foraging paradigm was applied to investigate how mood is related to
exploration decisions. The participants of the experiment played the foraging task,
where they had to decide whether to exploit the current depleting patch of resources
or explore a new one. The mood was manipulated in a between-subjects design with
the music, pictures, and cover story. The results showed that the informational value
of mood influenced decisions whether to explore or exploit the current environment,
as the negative mood was generally associated with higher exploration. These fin-
dings also support the mood-as-information theory, which considers the mood as a
source of information about the current state of the environment.
The third project examined the mechanisms of mood regulation in relation to
the default bias. In the experiment, participants in different moods faced different
types of defaults: maintaining the status quo or introducing changes. The results
demonstrated that the mood-regulating motivation influenced the acceptance of the
default option. The preference for the status quo was stronger among people in the
positive mood, while people in the negative mood preferred a change of tasks. This
finding suggests that only the mood-as-information theory of mood is not sufficient
to explain behavior, but the mood-regulating motivation should also be taken into
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account in emotion research.
The fourth project applied the ideas of mood regulation to the methodologi-
cal question of non-compliance in online studies. The participants of the online-
experiment watched mood-inducing videos while the time spent on the web page
was measured. It was found that people avoided the negative mood manipulation
more often than the positive one, which, in turn, influenced the reliability of mood
induction. This project demonstrates that objective behavioral measures of the time
in Internet-based experiments can be used to improve the quality of methods.
In summary, this work has combined decision paradigms and mood theories to
clarify mechanisms of interaction between affect and cognition. The thesis concludes
that mood influences the decision-making through the informational value of mood
and the mood-regulating motivation. The informational value of mood can cause the
congruency effect – more favorable judgments in a positive than in a negative mood
state. At the same time, mood can influence the way of information processing. In
particular, the amount of information integrated into a decision is higher in negative
than in positive mood. Finally, mood-regulating strategies can impact decisions in
a way that people in positive mood want to protect their mood, while people in
negative mood want to repair their mood. By specifying the mood mechanisms
with regard to decision contexts, this thesis contributes to an increasing volume of
research that integrates affect-related topics into the field of cognitive psychology.
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Introduction and theoretical
background
Moods in decision research have been ignored for many years, although decisions
made in an emotional state are ubiquitous in daily life. The areas of emotion and
decision-making research have remained mostly unfamiliar to each other if one consi-
ders the coverage of topics in journals and conferences. Whereas decision researchers
have designed sophisticated paradigms and constructed cognitive models, emotion
researchers have focused on affective states per se, often without applying them to
a decision. This work is an attempt to develop an interdisciplinary study that not
only connects theories of both fields but also combines paradigms of decision-making
and methods of mood manipulation from emotion research.
The influence of mood on decision-making is an important question to study
given the pervasiveness of mood in everyday life. Mood does not spur an immediate
action, as intense emotions, such as anger and fear, can do, but it changes the way
people think (Martin and Clore, 2001). Thus, the effect of mood is less visible but
more enduring and complex. In addition, many decisions are made in contexts that
elicit intense positive or negative affects. For instance, euphoria on the stock market
can create overconfidence and fuel the growth of financial bubbles (Shiller, 2015). On
the other hand, mood swings caused by illness or the perception of future risks can
bias health-related decisions (Salovey and Birnbaum, 1989). By applying paradigms
of decision-making, this work expands knowledge of the mechanisms by which mood
can influence behavior. The results of this dissertation can be generalized to other
situations, which can stimulate the development of new hypotheses.
The current state of the field is that no overarching theory explains how moods
impact decisions. The effect of mood can take different paths depending on many
factors including the type of decision and cognitive activity that the decision re-
quires. As will be argued in this dissertation, mood can influence the content of
thoughts, the way of information processing, and the motivation of mood regula-
tion. Understanding some mechanisms underlying this influence is the goal of this
work. Three different decision-making paradigms are at the heart of this thesis: the
multi-attribute decision task, the exploration-exploitation trade-off, and the default
heuristic. Three empirical studies characterize the influence of positive and negative
mood in each of these paradigms. An additional study addresses the methodological
problem of inducing mood on the Internet.
The introductory chapter gives an overview of the concept of mood and presents
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three major theoretical frameworks: content-, process-, and regulation-related in-
fluence of mood. Furthermore, methodological questions such as mood induction
and mood measurement are discussed in order to establish a basis for the empirical
studies. Finally, the last section describes the online-experiment methodology in
relation to mood induction techniques.
1.1 Mood
Emotion research is notoriously known for the confusion of different definitions of
affective experience. In order to create a shared conceptual framework for the em-
pirical studies, this section reviews the definition of mood and compares it with
other affective phenomena: traits and emotions. Moreover, the distinction between
positive and negative moods is discussed, as the effects of these two moods are
contrasted in this work.
1.1.1 Defining mood and emotion
Affective states are characterized as reactions to significant life events (e.g., los-
ses, frustrations, or dangers) that co-occur on different levels: subjective feelings,
physiological activation and facial expressions, and help people to adapt to the envi-
ronment (Lazarus, 1991; Reeve, 2009). A better adaptation is possible, for example,
through the capacity of affect to facilitate learning and prediction of future situati-
ons (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). The synchronization of cognitive, somatic and
motivational responses is underlined in many emotion theories as a critical feature of
affect, e.g., in the component process model (Scherer, 2005). How the components of
affect relate to each other is a matter of debates between theories. The “bottom-up”
and “top-down” approaches can be delineated to describe the subjective affective
experience (Keltner and Lerner, 2010). The bottom-up approach emphasizes the
role of the physiological system that detects significant changes in the environment
and restores homeostasis (Damasio and Carvalho, 2013). Somatic alterations serve
as an input for the ongoing evaluation of the environment and generate subjective
emotional experience (Craig, 2002). On the contrary, the top-down approach consi-
ders the cognitive system as the main driver of emotional experience, where emotions
are constructed through processes based on language and knowledge representation
(Russell, 2003). The confrontation between “top-down” and “bottom-up” approa-
ches seems obsolete in view of the neuroscience findings that both descending and
ascending connections in the brain are important for affective experiences (Derry-
berry and Tucker, 1992). Descending paths shape the affective experience through
cognitive processes such as attribution and appraisal. Ascending connections, on the
other hand, allow the affect to influence cognition. From this perspective, the focus
of this work on how moods influence decision-making behavior is more compatible
with the ascending, or “bottom-up” approach.
The range of affective phenomena is broad and diverse. An optimistic person
may feel gloomy on a particular day but can be cheered up after meeting a friend.
For research purposes, the affective phenomena can be classified into traits, moods,
and emotions as different levels of affect (Rosenberg, 1998). Whereas affective traits
are stable predispositions for certain types of emotional reactions, moods and emo-
tions are transient states that fluctuate depending on the environment. In contrast
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to traits, which set the threshold in the background for the occurrence of certain af-
fective states, moods and emotions can be consciously experienced in the foreground.
Emotions are intense, acute, and short-lived experiences, whereas moods are weak,
diffuse, and stable in time affective states (Cohen et al., 2008). While emotions are
evoked by an event, moods usually lack specific triggers in the environment and
represent a more general evaluation of the current state. In an experimental study,
the effect of an emotion on behavior should be examined during or immediately after
the emotion induction. The changes in mood, on the contrary, could have a more
lasting impact and influence decisions even after some time.
As far as the effect of moods and emotions on behavior is concerned, one would
expect people to be more affected by stronger emotions than diffuse moods. Howe-
ver, since emotions are more focused and consciously present, their effect could be
limited in time (Rosenberg, 1998) or downgraded by self-regulation strategies (for
a review, see Gross, 1998). For instance, a detached, analytical attitude toward an
event can decrease stress and arousal in reaction to threats (Dandoy and Goldstein,
1990). Moods, on the other hand, are expected to have an indirect but more far-
reaching influence on decisions due to their spread and the lack of an obvious trigger
to which they can be attributed Rosenberg (1998).
1.1.2 Types of mood
There are two rival theoretical approaches to classifying affective experience. One is
the dimensional approach that characterizes affective states as values along one or
more continua. An example of the dimensional approach is the circumplex model of
affect (Russell, 1980). This model suggests that affects emerge from two basic sys-
tems, one of which is the valence (a pleasure – displeasure continuum) and the other
is arousal. Any affect can be seen as a mixture of these two dimensions. The alter-
native approach of “basic emotions” considers affects as discrete and independent
entities. A number of basic affective states should have their unique facial expres-
sions (Ekman, 1992) or neurophysiological representation in the brain in the form
of neural structures and pathways (Panksepp, 2004). The “basic emotions” appro-
ach was criticized for not showing a one-to-one correspondence between a discrete
affective state and an underlying neural system (Posner et al., 2005). Instead, the
dimensional approach assumes that people interpret their physiological experience
of valence and arousal, and this interpretation evokes an affect. With cognitive de-
velopment and acquisition of experience, people learn to differentiate affective states
on a finer scale. Empirically, this approach is supported by psychometric studies
(e.g., factor analysis of subjective reports), which yield models with two dimensions
of affective experience that correspond to valence and arousal (Feldman Barrett and
Russell, 1998).
Following the dimensional approach, moods can be placed along the valence
continuum and described as negative, aversive or positive, satisfying experience.
However, the second dimension of arousal is not applicable to moods, since moods are
characterized as slightly intense, diffuse affective states (Rosenberg, 1998; Schwarz,
2012). In fact, the induced mood in the previous research was mostly positive or
negative (Westermann et al., 1996). Although some authors criticized the exclusion
of the arousal dimension (e.g., Han et al., 2007; Raghunathan and Pham, 1999;
Tiedens and Linton, 2001), this criticism pertains to the analysis of emotions, but
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not moods. Furthermore, the positive vs. negative continuum corresponds to such
fundamental evaluation of the current situation as benevolent or harmful, so that
this core appraisal does not imply awareness or the principle of rationality (Lazarus,
1982).
This thesis focuses on the impact of mood on decision-making in contrast to
studying the effects of specific emotions. The permeation of mood into the spheres
of cognition makes it socially relevant to study the interaction between cognitive and
emotional aspects of decision-making. Identifying mechanisms of this relationship
can contribute to a better understanding how people make decisions in emotionally
challenging situations: e.g., health-related choices, personal investments. In order to
define research questions and hypotheses for the empirical studies, the next section
reviews major theories of the influence of mood on decisions.
1.2 Theoretical frameworks of mood influence
There is an ample number of theories that explain how mood influences decision-
making. In order to organize them, this thesis distinguishes between three the-
oretical frameworks. First, the distinction between informational and processing
style accounts (Keltner and Lerner, 2010) is used to describe the mechanisms of the
content- and process-related influence of emotions. Content-related theories assume
that moods influence the content of thoughts by allowing new information to enter
the decision-making process. Process-related influence theories, on the other hand,
focus on changes in the way information is processed. The third theoretical approach
concerns the study of mood-regulating strategies that aim to maintain positive and
avoid negative moods. These theoretical frameworks emphasize different aspects
of decision-making (e.g., judgment criteria, decision-making strategies, and motiva-
tion), which are not mutually exclusive and can occur together. In the following,
each theoretical framework is considered in more detail.
1.2.1 Content-related influence of mood on decision-making
The content-related influence is a generic term used in this work for theories that
assume that mood directly influences the judgment of the object as positive or
negative. There are theories that emphasize memory retrieval processes (Bower,
1981) and informational theories that consider mood as a source of information
about the object to be judged (Martin et al., 1993; Schwarz and Clore, 1983; Slovic
et al., 2004).
The congruency effect is a robust finding in emotion research. People in positive
mood make more favorable judgments than people in negative mood. For instance,
subjective well-being is influenced by the current mood (Schwarz and Clore, 1983),
so that people in a positive mood state are more satisfied with their lives. The
congruency effect was demonstrated in various domains: e.g., consumer behavior
(for a review, see Cohen et al., 2008) and political judgments (Forgas and Moylan,
1987).
The mechanism explaining the congruency effect is less clear than its empirical
demonstration. One of the first theories, which emerged from memory research, was
an associative network theory of memory and emotion (Bower, 1981). The theory
assumes that memories can have associative connections with affective experience.
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For example, memories of the first kiss can have a link to the joy that was experienced
at the event. Later, the activation of an emotion node also distributes the activation
to the memories to which it is connected, so that the emotion of joy can evoke
memories of the first kiss. Empirical support for this theory was provided by studies,
which demonstrated that people tend to recall information from memory that is
consistent with their current mood (Bower, 1981). With regard to mood, this theory
assumes that positive and negative moods also have connections with memories.
When people are in a certain mood, it is easier for them to access memories of the
same valence.
However, the general premises and applicability of the associative network theory
for decision-making were questionable (e.g., Niedenthal and Setterlund, 1994). The
theory assumes an automatic influence of mood on cognitive processes (Bower, 1981).
However, the study of Schwarz and Clore (1983) showed that the congruency effect
depends on awareness about the source of the mood. The authors proposed a simpler
explanation, which was originally coined as feeling-as-information theory, but was
also known as the mood-as-information model with respect to moods (Schwarz and
Clore, 1983). People use their mood as a source of information about the current
situation. If it is positive, then the judgment will also be positive. As soon as people
realize that their mood has nothing to do with the object of evaluation, they can
correct and adjust their judgments.
Why are people affected by an incidental mood and take their current feelings
for granted? Humans perceive their current experience as being related to what is
happening at the moment (Higgins, 1998). Although it is not always rational, the
reliance on feelings could be adaptive, since feelings based on previous experience
are typically relevant to a decision (Damasio, 1994). Furthermore, in a complex
decision situation, the use of an emotional response (i.e., whether I like it or not)
is a heuristic that allows comparing values of different decision options without the
need for extensive elaboration of features, weights, or probabilities (Slovic et al.,
2004). Other metacognitive experiences, such as feelings of effortlessness or physical
arousal, can be used in a similar way as an additional input of information for a
decision (Schwarz, 2012).
The further development of the mood-as-information theory has shown that the
use of mood as a source of information depends on the question or the judgment
criteria: e.g., whether a person enjoys the task or is satisfied with the result (mood-
as-input theory, Martin et al., 1993). When happy people had to judge how sad a
story was, they evaluated it more negatively since they did not feel touched (Martin
et al., 1997).
The idea that people see and judge the world through the lenses of their emotional
state is also reflected in the basic emotions approach, which studies specific effects
of each emotion. From the perspective of the appraisal-tendency framework, it is
not sufficient to measure the valence of an emotion to explain its predispositions
(Angie et al., 2011; Han et al., 2007). Specific emotions influence judgments in a
way that is consistent with their underlying appraisal tendency but only in domains
that are related to the appraisal (Keltner and Lerner, 2010; Lazarus, 1991). Anger,
for example, affects judgments of guilt and fairness, since the origin of anger is
insult and injustice. The application of the appraisal theory has been studied, for
example, in political judgments. Here, anger consequently leads to more support
for punitive policy because of the appraisal of individual control and the tendency
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to take action against the responsible party. In contrast, fear results in a preference
for more protective measures, and sadness increases the support of social welfare
(Angie et al., 2011).
In summary, the content-related theoretical framework emphasizes the informa-
tional value of moods and examines how people use and reflect on their moods in
decision-making. Although the appraisal-tendency framework demonstrated bene-
fits of studying specific emotions, this thesis focuses on moods that vary on the
valence dimension.
1.2.2 Process-related influence of mood on decision-making
Mood not only influences what people think about the object to be evaluated but
also how they think about it (e.g., how much information is taken into account).
Previous research has been characterized by the debate between theories regarding
positive mood as a benevolent booster of information processing (Fredrickson, 2001;
Isen, 2001) and theories emphasizing the more frequent use of heuristics in a positive
mood (Bless et al., 1996; Schwarz, 2000).
Isen (1984) argued that the impact of positive vs. negative affect is asymme-
tric since positive memories have a broader network of associations than negative
ones. As a result, positive mood primes more diverse and unusual associations (Isen
et al., 1985). In subsequent research, Isen (2001) regarded positive emotions as
a benevolent and enhancing factor that leads to a more efficient decision-making
process.
In the broaden-and-build theory of Fredrickson (2001), the influence of positive
emotions is explained by evolutionary mechanisms – whereas negative emotions
restrict attention to a problem, positive emotions, such as joy, interest, and con-
tentment, expand attention. The broader attention focus increases the repertoire of
possible behavioral reactions and promotes creativity and playfulness.
The effect of positive mood was not always seen as benevolent. As Mackie
and Worth (1989) argued, broader associations in the positive mood could impair
cognitive capacity. Too many associations could distract people in a happy mood
from careful information processing. As supporting evidence for this theory, it was
found that people in a positive mood did not differentiate strong and weak arguments
under the exposure to persuasive messages for a limited amount of time (Mackie and
Worth, 1989).
The extension of the mood-as-information theory explored the effect of mood
not only on the judgment but also on the style of information processing (cognitive
tuning hypothesis, Schwarz, 2000). Since the mood indicates the current state of the
environment, cognitive processes are tuned to the requirements of the present situa-
tion. Sad moods signal that something is going wrong, which is why the processing
style is more systematic than usual, and specific details of the apparently proble-
matic situation are carefully considered (i.e., bottom-up processing style). Happy
moods, on the other side, provide information about a benign environment so that
people can use routines, heuristics, and existing knowledge structures (i.e., top-down
processing style). In this way, happy people may have less focused attention, but
higher playfulness and creativity that allow exploring new situations.
Similar ideas were proposed by Frijda (1988) that mood can signal the safety
of the current situation (safety-signal theory). Also, in the control theory of self-
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regulation (Carver and Scheier, 1990), mood indicates whether additional efforts are
needed to reach a goal. The positive mood signals that progress is being made so
that resources can be used for other tasks. The negative mood shows that progress
remains unsuccessful, which is why additional efforts should be applied to reduce
the discrepancy between the goal and the current state.
The idea of limited cognitive capacity in the positive mood (Mackie and Worth,
1991) and the different processing abilities in positive and negative moods (Schwarz
and Bless, 1991) was later empirically refuted by showing that being in a good
mood does not decrease cognitive capacity but rather improves performance on the
secondary task in the dual-task situation (Bless et al., 1996). As Schwarz (2012)
noted, task requirements or goals can also activate more analytic processing in happy
people, so that the mood-as-information theory does not imply that happy people
are unable or unwilling to engage in more elaborate or systematic decision-making
strategies.
An alternative view of moods was proposed in the dual-force framework (Fiedler
et al., 2003). Here, positive or negative moods are regarded as conditioned stimuli
that evoke learning states, which are similar to actual appetitive and aversive condi-
tions. Behavior in pleasant situations is distinguished by exploration and curiosity,
which drives assimilation – the imposition of internalized structures on the environ-
ment. On the other hand, aversive situations elicit avoidance behavior and error
minimization that causes accommodation – the gathering of new information and
changing existing structures.
To summarize, the process-related theories agree that a positive mood does not
necessarily presuppose the “lazy” processing of information. However, the mood-as-
information approach expects happy moods to promote the use of heuristics, while
the broaden-and-build theory emphasizes the extended attention span in a positive
mood. These assumptions may conflict in situations where heuristic decision-making
implies limited information processing. In order to test these contradictory hypot-
heses, the first study of this thesis has used a multi-attribute decision task paradigm
and analyzed the differences in decision-making strategies in positive and negative
moods.
Furthermore, if one considers both content- and process-related effects of mood,
the relationship between these mechanisms is not clear: if mood biases the judgment
according to the congruency effect, does it also change the way of information proces-
sing? In particular, the combination of these mechanisms should play an important
role in decisions from experience, as these decisions involve the accumulation, inte-
gration, and evaluation of continuously collected, emotionally charged information.
Previous studies have shown that the mechanisms of experience-based decisions can
differ from description-based decisions (Hertwig et al., 2004). Therefore, the second
study of this dissertation used the foraging task to examine the assumptions of the
content- and process-related frameworks.
1.2.3 Regulation-related influence of mood on decision-making
In general, the philosophy of hedonism views humans as creatures that seek plea-
sure and avoid pain. Although the general premises of hedonism were criticized as
misleading for building a psychological theory (Erber and Erber, 2000), they were
fruitful for the development of motivational theories. Already in early studies, the
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self-regulation aspect of emotions was underlined, e.g., through the “negative-state
relief” mechanism (Cialdini et al., 1973). Since the experience of an aversive nega-
tive state motivates people to feel better again, the altruistic behavior can be a way
to achieve the goal of mood improvement.
Isen (2000) points out the ability of positive affect to trigger mood-regulating
behavior. Together with many other beneficial effects of increased flexibility, cog-
nitive elaboration, creativity, and variety-seeking, positive emotions also elicit a
tendency toward self-protection and safeguarding of the state of happiness. In em-
pirical studies, the mood-maintenance idea was supported by the finding that if the
situation was dangerous and a participant could lose something important, happy
people preferred not to engage in the task (for review, see Aspinwall, 1998). For
decision-making, it means that a person may avoid a decision as a consequence of
mood regulation motivation. Therefore, it is important to analyze the relationship
between moods and decision avoidance biases such as status quo bias, omission bias,
and choice deferral (Anderson, 2003).
The extent to which the mood protection effect expands is unclear. In the
hedonic contingency framework (Wegener and Petty, 1994), people in positive mood
are motivated to avoid processing potentially depressive messages. On the contrary,
Isen (2000) emphasizes that these cautious or avoidant reactions to negative material
are the result of rational decisions of happy people, but not an automatic process
or a blinding bias. As soon as a task requires attention to the negative content, the
mood-maintenance effect should disappear.
The further development of the self-regulation ideas consisted in examining the
effect of additional factors to reconcile previous contradictory empirical results. In
the moderated hedonic contingency hypothesis (Aspinwall, 1998), the attention of
people in positive mood to negative information is moderated by the usefulness of
the information with regard to their goals. In other words, people in a positive mood
would not consider negative information unless it is related to their aims.
The motivation to regulate the mood also depends on age and personality traits
of participants (Larcom and Isaacowitz, 2009). Older adults might be better in
emotion regulation compared with younger adults. Previous research has shown
that older participants show preferences for attending to positive information and
are more efficient in using positive reappraising for negative stimuli (Phillips et al.,
2008). Moreover, people with a lower anxiety trait and a higher level of optimism are
better in emotion regulation (Larcom and Isaacowitz, 2009). According to resource-
based approaches to self-regulation, another factor that can play a role in personally
relevant decisions is the level of subjective self-worth (Aspinwall, 1998). If the
self-worth has fallen below the threshold (hedonic deficit), people are motivated
to engage in mood-repairing and esteem-enhancing behavior. On the contrary, if
the self-worth is above the threshold (hedonic surplus), people can use resources to
consider negative goal-relevant information.
In a study of the impact of positive and negative moods on decision-making in
consumer research, Andrade (2005) proposed the integrative framework for evalua-
tion and regulation processes. The evaluation process denotes the congruent use of
mood during a judgment (by associations or inferential reasoning) and changes in
the processing style, which is similar to the content- and process-related mechanisms
described in this thesis. The regulation process, on the other side, represents the
tendency to pursue or protect a good mood. In the experimental study, Andrade
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(2005) has demonstrated that the presence of a mood-changing cue can trigger the
affect regulation process. For example, if the mood-changing cue was present (i.e.,
participation in a tedious survey in return for receiving a product), the willingness
to try the product decreased both in negative and positive affect conditions. In
this way, evaluation and regulation processes took place: people in the negative
mood were reluctant because they rated the product less favorably, and people in
the positive mood refused the offer since they wanted to protect their mood.
Following the idea of examining process- and regulation-related effects of mood,
the third study of this thesis focuses on heuristic decision-making, i.e., the default
and status-quo biases. While the mood-as-information theory predicts that people
in a positive mood are more susceptible to take a default option regardless of its
consequences, the mood-maintenance approach expects them to pay attention to
the emotional outcomes of the decision and reject defaults that induce changes more
often than defaults that maintain status quo.
The introduction has presented three main theoretical approaches for studying
the impact of mood on decision-making. To facilitate the comparison between the
theories, the main ideas and their relevance to the current research are summarized
in Table 1.1. The next section of the dissertation will introduce the methodology of
emotion research relevant to the empirical studies.
Table 1.1: Theoretical frameworks of mood influence
Theory Main idea Relevance to the
current research
Content-related influence of mood on decision-making
Associative network
theory of memory
and emotion (Bower,
1981)
Memories have associa-
tive connections with af-
fective experience. The
activation of a mood
node distributes the acti-
vation to the memories to
which it is connected.
Mood-as-information
theory (Schwarz and
Clore, 1983, 2003)
People use their mood
as a source of informa-
tion about the current si-
tuation. Positive mood
engenders more favorable
judgment than negative
mood.
The assumption of this the-
ory (i.e., congruency effect)
was investigated in Study
2 to find out the relati-
onship between exploration
and mood.
Mood-as-input theory
(Martin et al., 1993)
The use of mood as a
source of information de-
pends on the question or
the judgment criteria.
Continued on next page
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Theory Main idea Relevance to the
current research
Process-related influence of mood on decision-making
The theory of the be-
neficial effect of posi-
tive mood (Isen, 2001;
Isen and Daubman,
1984)
Positive mood is a be-
nevolent and enhancing
factor of the decision-
making process.
The assumptions of this the-
ory were tested in Study 2
to determine whether posi-
tive mood increases the effi-
ciency of exploration.
Broaden-and-build
theory (Fredrickson,
2001)
Whereas negative mood
restricts attention to a
problem, positive mood
broadens attention and
increases the repertoire
of possible behavioral re-
actions.
This theory was tested
against the mood-as-
information theory in
Study 1 and Study 2 to find
out how mood influences
information processing in
the multi-attribute decision
and in the foraging task.
Limited cognitive ca-
pacity theory (Mackie
and Worth, 1989)
Positive mood impairs
cognitive capacity be-
cause of distraction from
a wider range of associa-
tions with positive emo-
tions.
The extension of the
mood-as-information
theory (cognitive
tuning hypothesis,
Schwarz, 2000)
Negative moods signal a
problem, which is why
the processing style tends
to be more analytic and
systematic. On the con-
trary, positive moods in-
form about a benign en-
vironment so that people
can use routines and exis-
ting knowledge structure.
This theory was tested
against the broaden-and-
build theory in Study 1.
In addition, the assumpti-
ons of this theory (i.e., pro-
cessing differences between
moods) were examined in
Study 2 and Study 3.
Safety-signal theory
(Frijda, 1988)
Mood signals the safety
of the current situation.
Control theory of self-
regulation (Carver
and Scheier, 1990)
Mood indicates whether
additional efforts are nee-
ded to reach a goal.
Continued on next page
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Theory Main idea Relevance to the
current research
The dual-force frame-
work (Fiedler et al.,
2003)
Moods are conditioned
stimuli that evoke appe-
titive or aversive learning
states. Behavior in plea-
sant situations is distin-
guished by exploration
and curiosity, while un-
pleasant situations elicit
avoidance behavior and
error minimization.
Regulation-related influence of mood on decision-making
Negative-state relief
theory (Cialdini et al.,
1973)
Aversive negative states
motivate altruistic beha-
vior in order to reduce
the negative affect.
Mood-maintenance
theory (Isen, 2000)
Positive emotions elicit
a tendency toward self-
protection and safeguar-
ding of the state of hap-
piness.
Hedonic contingency
framework (Wegener
and Petty, 1994)
People in positive mood
are motivated to avoid
processing potentially
depressive messages.
Moderated hedonic
contingency hypot-
hesis (Aspinwall,
1998)
The attention of people
in positive mood to nega-
tive information is mode-
rated by the usefulness of
the information with re-
gard to their goals.
Resource-based
approach to self-
regulation (Aspinwall,
1998)
The level of subjective
self-worth moderates the
effect of mood on the
mood-repairing motiva-
tion. If the self-worth has
fallen below the thres-
hold, people are motiva-
ted to engage in mood-
repairing and esteem-
enhancing behavior.
Continued on next page
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Theory Main idea Relevance to the
current research
Affect regulation the-
ory (Andrade, 2005)
The presence of a mood-
changing cue in a deci-
sion situation can trigger
the affect regulation pro-
cess, i.e., protecting the
current mood in the posi-
tive state and improving
the mood in the negative
state.
This theory was tested in
Study 3 in contrast with
the mood-as-information
theory to find out how
mood impacts the default
bias. Also, the assumptions
of this theory were in-
vestigated in Study 4 with
regard to non-compliance in
Internet-based experiments.
1.3 Methods
The aim of the following section is to describe the methods used in the empirical
studies for mood induction and mood measurement. Realizing that description of the
methods could easily evolve into a thorough and lengthy report, the following section
illustrates chosen methods and explain their rationale rather than fully reviews them.
1.3.1 Mood induction
Three of the four experimental studies induced mood through the use of short movie
clips before the experimental task where decision-making processes were measured.
The rationale, which is further explained in detail, is that the film method is one
of the most efficient mood induction methods. A different mood manipulation was
used in Study 2 due to the nature of the foraging task, which lasted for 20 minutes.
In this experiment, we combined music and images to change the mood during the
task.
To elicit moods and emotions in experiments, researchers have invented a number
of techniques, including reading a story, listening to music, watching images or
videos, or engaging in social interactions. According to the meta-analysis done by
Westermann et al. (1996), one of the most effective methods to influence the mood
is to show a short movie clip. Movies are good at getting participants’ attention,
and they can generate strong emotional reactions. In addition to its efficiency, the
video method is also a fast way to change the current mood – a movie clip is usually
1-3 minutes long. To compare different mood conditions, videos are matched on the
dimensions of the length of the clip, its intensity, complexity, core themes, presence
and number of people, color, brightness, picture motion, and theoretically critical
categories, such as arousal level (Rottenberg et al., 2007). Nature scenery, animals,
or travel movies are used in a baseline, neutral condition. As an additional control
variable, it is recommended to ask participants whether they have ever seen the
video before. A disadvantage of the film method is that priming effects can occur
when the experimental task is semantically related to the content of the video.
The method also has similar concerns as other mood induction techniques: i.e.,
specificity of induced affect, individual differences in sensitivity to different mood
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induction contents, and demand effects. In addition, the changes in mood after
positive and negative mood manipulation are not symmetrical, as the induction of a
negative mood has a larger effect size than a positive mood across different methods
(Westermann et al., 1996).
The music method causes less semantic priming since it is not as object and event-
oriented as films or images. The music can also be played during the decision task
to ensure continuous mood manipulation. Among musical compositions, classical
compositions of 2-6 minutes are usually chosen, which can be presented one after
the other in an experiment. Researchers can rely on pre-selected samples or give
participants the opportunity to select music that they associate with a particular
mood. The disadvantage of music induction is that it takes more time than with
images or films to change the mood, e.g., 15-20 minutes on average (Eich et al., 2007).
For this reason, the combination of music with other mood induction techniques can
be used to increase the impact. For example, Kim et al. (2004) combined background
music with a narrated story, light and color changes to elicit sadness, anger, stress,
or surprise.
The images method has been used more often to induce a discrete emotion than
positive or negative moods (Kory and D’Mello, 2015). The advantage of the method
is the high level of experimental control and standardization that can be achieved
with validated images: e.g., International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Bradley
and Lang, 2007), Geneva Affective Picture Database (GAPED, Dan-Glauser and
Scherer, 2011). However, since emotional reactions to pictures are shorter and more
transient, the effect size of the image method is smaller than that of the film method.
Therefore, the combination of music and image methods enables a more consistent
and lasting change of mood during the experimental task.
Although the validated mood manipulation techniques were implemented in the
empirical studies, a manipulation check was required to ensure that the desired
mood has been successfully induced. For this purpose, mood measurement methods
were used.
1.3.2 Mood measurements
Objective and subjective methods can be applied to measure the effect of mood
manipulations (for a review, see Quigley et al., 2014). The objective measurements
in the brain and body provide information about emotional processes, although
with some methodological limitations. The activity of the autonomic nervous sy-
stem, such as heart rate or skin conductance, can reflect the effect of emotions on
the energy balance and homeostasis, but cannot exactly represent the affect itself.
Quigley et al. (2014, p. 236) expressed this idea as follows: “peripheral physiology
was not engineered to help us express emotion – it evolved for homeostasis and me-
tabolic regulation”. In addition, facial expressions (measured as muscle activity or
observer ratings) are developed evolutionarily as communicative symbols, but not
(solely) as an indicator of emotions. The facial expressions depend on the social
context such as the real or implied presence of another person (Russell et al., 2003).
Measuring the activity of the central nervous system can provide informative data
on the processes that can be detected with a very high temporal (e.g., EEG, MEG)
and local resolution (e.g., fMRI). However, objective methods of measurements show
smaller effect sizes than self-report data, which may be due to measurements errors
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(Westermann et al., 1996). To evaluate the content of feelings, there is no other way
than to ask people to characterize their subjective experience.
There are a number of questionnaires used to assess the subjective experience:
e.g., Multiple Affect Adjective Check List (MAACL, Zuckerman and Lubin, 1965),
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck et al., 1961), Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM,
Bradley and Lang, 1994), or two-dimensional affect grid (Russell et al., 1989). One of
the most common methods is to present a series of adjectives and ask participants to
evaluate how well each word describes their current emotional state: e.g., Positive
and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS-X, Watson and Clark, 1999), Differential
Emotions Scale (DES, Izard et al., 1993).
When applying a self-report measure, a researcher must solve a dilemma – the
mood manipulation check is necessary to claim that a mood change has taken place,
but it may potentially alter the effect. Subjective scale ratings can reduce the pre-
sent emotion by drawing attention to it, or even modify the experience by assigning
it to an emotion category. The careful design of rating scales must take into account
the ability of participants to access their feelings, understand and discriminate emo-
tions (e.g., downhearted, sad, and gloomy). In the case of surveying participants’
emotions after the experiment, memory-based biases should be taken into account.
The demand effects, which cause potential distortions in responses, can be treated
with deception about the purpose of the experiment (Westermann et al., 1996).
In the experiments, we have used rating scales as a method of measuring mood.
To reduce the possible effect of measurements on subjective experience, a two-step
procedure was used. First, the participants evaluated their general mood; then, they
rated different emotions. In this way, the assessment of mood was not influenced by
drawing attention to more specific emotional categories.
We have also used Internet-based experiments along with laboratory studies to
collect data. The development and design of online experiments required resolving
problems related to the reliability of mood induction techniques. The idea that
participants of a web experiment can easily avoid mood manipulations motivated
a separate methodological study. To clarify this motivation, the following section
introduces the methodology of online experiments in emotion research.
1.3.3 Online-experiments in emotion research
Emotion research was no exception to respond to the technological development
of recent years. The advancement of computers has led to new areas of scientific
interest, as affective computing – computational modeling of the link between affect
and machine-readable bodily/physiological responses (D’Mello et al., 2017; Picard,
2010). The ability to track behavioral and physiological data with portable devices
in the real world has contributed to the development of the new study paradigm – the
modeling of data patterns of individuals and clustering similar emotional experiences
in everyday life (Picard, 2010).
With the development of the Internet, psychological research has broken away
from the laboratory to be carried out wherever there are a computer and an Internet
connection (Reips, 2002). With increasing flexibility and widespread access to the
population, researchers should address the lack of control over the devices that
people use or the context in which they find themselves. For example, results of a
person taking a reaction test on the train can be very different from those of another
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person performing the same test on a large monitor computer at home.
Previous emotion research examined the expression of emotions on the Internet,
e.g., among Skype users (King-O’Riain, 2013). Schweitzer and Garcia (2010) have
suggested to study the emergence and spread of emotions in online communities by
modeling the behavior of online users. New methods for measuring the subjective
emotional experience of Internet users were proposed: e.g., automated text analysis,
subjective and physiological measures (Ku¨ster and Kappas, 2013). At the same
time, less attention was paid to the issue of mood induction in an online experiment
(for a meta-analysis, see Ferrer et al., 2015). Online studies mostly reproduced the
techniques that induced moods in the laboratory: e.g., video (Gilman et al., 2017;
Mills et al., 2017), texts (Verheyen and Go¨ritz, 2009), or photographs (Go¨ritz and
Moser, 2006). The ability of the design and structure of websites to evoke emotions
has also been investigated. For example, Ha¨nggi (2004) showed that stress caused
by time pressure and a non-functioning feature of the website could reduce the
ability to recognize emotions in facial expressions. On the other hand, the use of
round shapes and warm colors in the visual design can evoke positive emotions that
enhance comprehension in the online educational environment (Plass et al., 2014).
Methodological aspects such as the reliability and validity of mood induction
methods still require clarification. If emotions on the Internet influence people, how
does this change the effectiveness of mood manipulation in an online experiment?
Since the studies included in this thesis have induced moods in online samples, an
additional methodological study was necessary to address the concern of reliability.
Therefore, Study 4 has applied theoretical ideas from the domain of emotions (i.e.,
the regulation-related influence of mood) to elucidate mechanisms that can influence
the non–compliance behavior in online experiments.
In summary, the effect of positive and negative moods on decision-making is
the subject of this dissertation. Contrary to emotions that are specific and acute
reactions to some events, moods are diffuse, weak, but persistent affective states.
By applying one of the mood manipulation techniques (film, music, or images), we
manipulated the mood of the participants and examined the differences in their
decisions or decision-making strategies. The next chapter describes in more detail
the results of the empirical studies.
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2.1 Decision-making strategies in a multi-attribute
decision task
Shevchenko, Y., & Bro¨der, A. (2018). The effect of mood on integration of informa-
tion in a multi-attribute decision task. Acta Psychologica, 185, 136-145.
The multi-attribute decision task is a choice from a range of alternatives defined
by a set of attributes (Payne et al., 1993). This experimental paradigm allows the
inference of participants’ underlying decision strategies by analyzing processing cha-
racteristics (e.g., response time, confidence level) and decision outcomes (Bro¨der and
Schiffer, 2003). The strategies differ in the amount of information that is taken into
account: People who apply a compensatory strategy consider all available informa-
tion, while those who use a non-compensatory strategy selectively process informa-
tion. In the compensatory strategy, a good value of one attribute can compensate
for a bad value of another, whereas this is not the case for the non-compensatory
strategy (Luce et al., 1997).
The inference about decision strategies is important for process-related theo-
ries of mood influence, as it allows to specify the mechanisms of mood impact.
The mood-as-information theory predicts that a positive mood promotes the use of
heuristics, while a negative mood triggers more systematic information processing
(Schwarz, 2000). For decision-making strategies, this means that the negative mood
will lead to compensatory strategies, which are characterized by more extensive pro-
cessing of all attributes (Payne et al., 1996). A heuristic processing in the positive
mood will be correlated with the use of less extensive non-compensatory strategies,
i.e., making a decision as soon as an attribute can discriminate between alternatives.
In the article, we contrast the mood-as-information theory with the broaden-and-
build theory, which emphasizes the effect of mood on attention (Fredrickson, 2001).
The broaden-and-build theory assumes that the positive mood broadens attention
so that people can encompass and process more information at once. In regard
to decision-making strategies, this will lead to the use of a compensatory strategy.
People in a negative mood, on the other hand, will focus their attention on a subset
of the information, which should result in a higher selectivity and application of a
non-compensatory strategy.
The mood-as-information and broaden-and-build theories have been selected
from different emotion theories since their presumptions permit to formulate speci-
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fic predictions. Isen’s theory of positive emotions, on the contrary, is very flexible
with respect to the decision-making strategies that people can apply. The theory
assumes that positive moods cause more efficient information processing, but does
not identify any precise differences in the processing styles between moods (Isen,
2001).
The relationship between moods and decision-making strategies was previously
examined in Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015), where the authors used the
decision paradigm with open information boards, i.e., simultaneously available in-
formation about attributes. We went further to investigate whether the mood effect
is also present in the closed information board paradigm, or the closed Mouselab
(Payne et al., 1993). In the closed Mouselab, participants should open the boxes
with information and can only see one box at a time. The decision task with open
information boards allows fast integration of information, so it is particularly suit-
able for studying information integration processes. The closed Mouselab provides
the data about information search so that we can examine processing differences
between the moods. In addition, a closed Mouselab task is more cognitively de-
manding than a task with open information boards. The need to memorize the
information in the closed Mouselab burdens the working memory and can lead to
more systematic decision-making. Therefore, we hypothesized that the type of in-
formation presentation (open information board vs. closed Mouselab) could interact
with mood effects.
In two experiments, the mood was induced before the multi-attribute decision
task with either open or closed information boards. In order to ensure reproducibility
of results, the design of the task in the open information board condition followed the
design of Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015). In the closed Mouselab condition,
participants had to click on the boxes to see the information (see Figure 2.1). As
soon as they left the box with the mouse cursor, the information disappeared. In
each trial (15 trials in Experiment 1, 30 trials in Experiment 2), participants had to
choose which movie raised more money at the box office. The recommendations of
5 experts were presented in the order of their validity. The percentage score next to
each expert indicated how many times the expert had been correct in the past. No
feedback was given to avoid influence on the strategies that people spontaneously
adapted during the task. The task was incentivized by the lottery in Experiment 1
and by a money reward in Experiment 2. Experiment 1 was conducted online, and
Experiment 2 in the laboratory.
The results of Experiment 1 showed that the participants had preferred a com-
pensatory strategy over a non-compensatory one: 64% of the participants were
classified as users of the Weighted-additive rule (WADD) and 36% of the partici-
pants were users of the “Take-the-best” rule (TTB). There were no significant group
differences in the use of the compensatory strategy between moods or information
presentation conditions. The lack of the mood effect could be a result of unrelia-
ble mood manipulation in the online study. First, there were no mood differences
between the neutral and positive mood groups. Secondly, the variability of sad-
ness scores was high in all groups. Addressing the individual differences in mood,
a correlation analysis showed a significant positive relationship between the level
of self-reported sadness and the use of the compensatory strategy, but only in the
open information board condition. Therefore, we argue in the article that the cor-
relation was supportive for the mood-as-information theory. Additionally, the type
2.1. Decision-making strategies in a multi-attribute decision task 25
Figure 2.1: Open information board and closed Mouselab multi-attribute decision
tasks.
of information presentation also played a role, as mood effects were not present in
the closed Mouselab with sequential information search. Experiment 2, which was
carried out in the laboratory, confirmed the correlation found in Experiment 1. The
use of decision-making strategies was characterized by the interaction between the
type of information presentation and the mood: The participants made less com-
pensatory choices in the open information board task when they were in the positive
mood.
In the article, we conclude that the results of both experiments supported the idea
that negative moods are associated with more systematic decision-making while po-
sitive moods elicit heuristic decision-making. This conclusion is consistent with other
studies that have found that negative mood induces systematic information proces-
sing (Bless et al., 1996; Mohanty and Suar, 2014; Park and Banaji, 2000). However,
it contradicts the original study by Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015), which
demonstrated that a negative mood could increase the use of the non-compensatory
strategy. Some of the possible reasons for this controversy are discussed in the
article.
In both experiments, there were no strategy differences between the moods con-
ditions in the closed Mouselab task. In the article, we propose that the activation of
a more systematic and deliberate processing style can be one of the explanations for
these results. No differences in the length and order of information search can also
be an indication that mood primarily influences the process of information integra-
tion, but not the search for information. Since the induction of mood was applied
in a similar way in online and laboratory experiments, we analyzed the efficiency of
mood manipulation on the Internet. The results showed that the online experiment
was less efficient in creating positive and negative moods. We hypothesize that one
of the possible reasons for efficiency differences is the non-compliance behavior in
an online study, i.e., avoiding or skipping part of the mood manipulation. Since
the reliability of online mood induction methods is an essential concern for emotion
studies, we conducted a separate study (Study 4) to explore this question further.
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2.2 Exploration-exploitation tradeoff in decisions
from experience
Shevchenko, Y., & Bro¨der, A. (2018). The effect of negative mood on exploration in
decisions from experience. Manuscript submitted for publication.
The experimental paradigm of Study 2 was a foraging task (Hutchinson et al.,
2008; Mata et al., 2009). The decisions in the foraging task differ from decisions from
description, which were traditionally studied in previous research. In decisions from
description, people face different options with the information about the outcomes
and their probabilities. The foraging decisions, on the contrary, are decisions from
experience that are based on the information obtained as feedback from previous
decisions. This implies that decision-makers without prior knowledge of the payoff
distribution must choose one of the options and learn the distribution through the
trial-and-error approach. In the foraging paradigm, participants have to decide
whether they want to harvest a depleting resource or move to a new one, which
represents the choice between exploitation and exploration (Constantino and Daw,
2015).
The study of the role of mood in the foraging task is important for several rea-
sons. First, the foraging type of problem is ubiquitous in everyday life: e.g., Internet
search, search for a job or a partner, purchasing decisions. Secondly, previous re-
search has shown that the behavior of people in decisions from experience could
be very different from decisions from description. For instance, people can under-
weight the likelihood of rare events since they rely on a small sample of information
or overweight recently collected information (Hertwig et al., 2004). Thirdly, since
decisions from experience are based on continuous feedback from the environment,
people are more often relying on their cumulative assessment of the situation rather
than on explicit rule-based strategies. In this situation, mood should have a higher
propensity to influence the evaluation of the current condition.
The decision to explore or exploit (i.e., the exploration-exploitation tradeoff)
can be affected by many factors (for a review, see Mehlhorn et al., 2015). The role
of mood in exploration was not specifically addressed in previous research. Howe-
ver, there is indirect evidence that a positive mood can be associated with higher
exploitation and a negative mood with higher exploration. In clinical samples, de-
pression can increase exploration in a sequential decision task (von Helversen et al.,
2011). Since the foraging task is also an established paradigm in ethology, some
of the supporting findings come from animal studies. It was demonstrated that
scarce resources (i.e., negative energy budget) increase the preference for variable or
unknown outcomes in bird species (Bacon et al., 2010). High dopamine is associa-
ted with exploitation and low dopamine with exploration, presumably through the
mechanism of goal-directed cognition (Hills, 2006).
Based on the theoretical approaches outlined in the introduction to the disserta-
tion, we expected that the mood would have content- and process-related influence
on the exploratory decision. We did not consider the regulatory influence of mood,
as the experimental task in Study 2 did not indicate that exploration could change
the mood of participants. Previous research has shown that the presence of a mood
changing cue can be a critical factor that activates mood-regulating strategies (An-
drade, 2005). Since mood manipulation has remained constant within the conditions
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regardless of the exploratory decision, we did not expect that the mood management
mechanism would impact the exploration.
In the article, we argue that the congruency effect of mood can be hypothesized
on the basis of the mood-as-information theory. People in a negative mood should
evaluate the current situation more negatively, which can lead to a higher explo-
ration. On the other hand, people in a positive mood should be more optimistic
about the current environment and explore less. Additionally, the informational
theory of mood presupposes the differences in the information processing style (i.e.,
cognitive tuning hypothesis in Schwarz, 2000). People in a negative mood should
process information more systematically and pay more attention to the details of
the environment. Thus, people in the negative mood should react more sensitively
to the distribution of resources in the foraging task. On the contrary, people in a
positive mood should adopt a top-down approach, resulting in the use of heuristics.
Their exploration behavior will, therefore, be less dependent on the distribution of
resources in the environment.
We operationalized the theoretical hypotheses in such a way that the main effect
of the mood and the interaction between the mood and distribution of resources were
tested in the foraging task. We assumed that these predictions were not mutually
exclusive so that one could observe the main effect together with the interaction
effect. Nevertheless, the test of the hypotheses was not trivial since there are theories
that would predict opposite results: broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001)
and the theory of positive emotions (Isen, 2001). The broaden-and-build theory
predicts that a positive mood will lead to more efficient exploration as it will expand
attention and broaden the repertoire of possible behaviors. Isen’s theory of positive
emotions also expects that people in a positive mood will react more sensitively to
the distribution of resource since positive emotions generally enhance the efficiency
of decision-making and lead to creative solutions.
We conducted three experiments, two of which were online and one in the labora-
tory. In order to measure the exploration behavior, we have designed the emotional
version of the foraging task (Mata et al., 2009). As in the classic version of this
task, participants stayed at a pond and clicked on the fish that appeared on the
pond, which was considered exploitation. People could learn about the quality of
the current pond by experiencing the frequency of fish. Since the resources of the
pond were running out, participants had to decide when to switch to a new pond
with an unknown amount of fish. This transition, which also took waiting time,
represented the exploration decision.
The emotional impact of the fishing task was made possible by the use of music,
images, and a cover story (see Figure 2.2). Several mood manipulation techniques
were combined to increase the likelihood of creating a target mood. There were
two between-subjects conditions for negative and positive mood induction. In the
negative mood group, the task was to collect dead fish, a dirty pond was presented
on the screen, and sad music was played in the background. In the positive mood
group, the instruction to fish was supplemented by pleasant music and cheerful
pictures.
Since we have used combined methods of mood manipulation, one might be
skeptical about confounding the mood manipulation with the cover story of the
fishing task. In order to have a pure mood manipulation, we used only the music
to induce the mood in Experiment 3. The task was devoid of any fish content
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Figure 2.2: The fishing task in negative and positive mood groups.
and became a vigilance task – participants had to click circles and switch between
boards. In other respects, the task logic was identical to Experiment 2.
In all three experiments, we tested the main effect and the interaction model
by using the time that participants had spent at a pond as a dependent variable.
The mood manipulation and resource quality of the current pond were independent
variables. Since the data were nested within the subjects and were unbalanced
(i.e., people visited a different number of ponds/boards), we used the hierarchical
approach. In the article, we argue that we also had to control for other variables
(e.g., fish/circle misses, initial mood) to make the models more robust.
In Experiment 1, we found tentative evidence for the congruency hypothesis, so
that people in the negative mood explored more than people in the positive mood.
There were no indications for the processing differences between moods. Regarding
the mood manipulation check, there were clear differences in the negative emotions –
only the negative condition induced the negative emotions. We observed the decline
in the positive emotions in both conditions, but the decline in the negative group
was more significant. Thus, the higher exploration could be interpreted in relation
to the effect of the negative mood. To validate the results in the task with a different
distribution of resources, we conducted Experiment 2. Experiment 2 confirmed that
negative mood manipulation leads to higher exploration, regardless of the distribu-
tion of resources. In Experiment 3, we found no significant difference between the
moods, which can be caused by the absence of negative emotions in the negative
mood group (i.e., the music was not sufficient to generate negative emotions). Ho-
wever, the initial negative emotions increased the exploratory behavior in the task,
supporting the congruency hypothesis. Analyzing the datasets from three experi-
ments together, we showed that both negative mood manipulations and negative
emotions at the beginning of the task increased the exploratory behavior. In regard
to the process-related hypotheses, there was no evidence of significant interaction
between mood and resource distribution.
We concluded that the findings from all the experiments were sufficient to sup-
port the idea that people in the negative mood tend to explore more than people
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in the positive mood. In addition, the higher exploration was independent of the
resource quality of the environment. This means that negative moods do not acti-
vate a more detailed, bottom-up strategy that sensitizes people to the distribution
of resources in the foraging task. On the contrary, the mechanism of mood influence
appears to be more universal. As we argue in the article, this mechanism can be
described by the mood-as-information theory, which assumes the use of mood as a
source of information about the current state of the environment.
2.3 Change and status quo in decisions with de-
faults
Shevchenko, Y., von Helversen, B., & Scheibehenne, B. (2014). Change and status
quo in decisions with defaults: The effect of incidental emotions depends on the
type of default. Judgment and Decision Making, 9(3), 287.
Being in a certain mood can motivate people to make strategic decisions with
regard to their feelings – trying to improve their mood when they feel bad and main-
tain their positive feelings when they feel good. As described in the introduction,
not every decision will be consistent with the goals of mood management, but cues
that point to the possibility of mood changes may activate this type of behavior
(Andrade, 2005).
The third study was conducted to test the mood maintenance theory with respect
to one of the most prominent heuristics in decision-making – the default bias. The
default bias is a preference for a default option, i.e., the option that takes place if
a decision-maker does not make an active choice. At the moment of writing the
article, we used the organ donation policy as an example of a default bias. Until
now, in 2018, the issue is still on the agenda. At the moment, the Netherlands is in
the middle of the law transition that implements a new “donor by default” policy
in 2020 (Lieber, 2018). The implementation will be done by sending a letter to all
persons over the age of 18 who are not yet registered as donors. This time, not
responding to the letter will result in that person will be considered a donor. The
new policy is expected to increase the number of donors and, at the same time,
to preserve the freedom to change the donor status at any time. However, even
in this example, not everyone is satisfied with the new policy. During one week
in October 2016, a month after the Dutch Parliament introduced the amendments,
87% of registered people explicitly stated they did not want to be organ donors
(Pieters, 2016).
As we discuss in the article, there are various mechanisms of the default bias:
implied recommendations, the status-quo bias, and action inertia. To disentangle
the action inertia and the status-quo mechanisms, we designed two types of default
options in the experiment: the default option, which maintained the status quo, and
the default option, which led to changes. In the article, we explain how predictions of
the mood-as-information and mood-maintenance theories would differ for these two
default options. If people adhere to the informational value of their mood, people in
a positive mood should follow the defaults more often regardless of whether it leads
to changes of preserve the status quo. These predictions follow the premises of the
cognitive tuning hypothesis, which are described in more detail in the introductory
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chapter on the process-related influence of mood.
On the other hand, if people make decisions that take emotional consequences
into account, acceptance of the default will depend on the type of default: people
in a positive mood should prefer default options that uphold the status quo, but
people in a negative mood should prefer default options that implement changes.
We have derived this prediction from previous studies that showed that positive
moods support the preference for the familiar option, while negative moods promote
variety-seeking behavior (Lin and Lin, 2009; Yen and Chuang, 2008).
We conducted an online experiment in which we varied the mood (sad, happy,
or neutral) and the type of decision (changes by default, status quo by default, or
free choice) in a between-subjects design. As we argue in the article, the choice had
consequences for participants – either they continued to work on the same task or
they switched to the other task. The mood was induced by short film clips. As
the mood manipulation check demonstrated, the happy group was happier than the
neutral group, and the sad group was sadder than the neutral group.
The results showed that the change default was as effective as the status-quo
default in the neutral condition. However, when people changed their mood, their
choices were in line with the mood-maintenance hypothesis: sad people actively
rejected the status-quo default, and happy people rejected the change default. Al-
ternatively, one might interpret the findings as evidence of the congruency effect:
i.e., people in the positive mood evaluated the old task more favorably than people
in the negative mood, which is why they rejected the change default more often. If
it were true, then we should observe the differences between positive and negative
moods in answer to the question of how much the participants preferred the new
task to the old one, which was asked after the decision but before the second task.
However, the answers did not differ between positive and negative conditions. Furt-
hermore, in the free choice condition, there was no difference between the number
of people who preferred the new task in the negative (44%) and positive condition
(46%). Only when the defaults were used, the choice was different between the
moods.
We concluded that mood plays a role in the acceptance or rejection of defaults.
People in a positive mood may exhibit more support for defaults that preserve
status quo in order to avoid risks of potential negative consequences. On the other
hand, a negative mood may shift preferences to defaults that bring changes, as the
change can be seen as a way to improve the situation and mood. In this way, the
results of Study 3 corroborate the findings of Study 2 that a negative mood prompts
exploration (changes), while a positive mood leads to exploitation (status quo).
2.4 Non-compliance with online mood manipula-
tions using film clips
Shevchenko, Y., & Bro¨der, A. (2018). Non-compliance with online mood manipula-
tions using film clips: How to detect and control for it. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
In all the studies presented in this dissertation, we have elicited positive and
negative moods in online experiments. In Study 1, we applied the identical mood
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induction paradigm both in the laboratory and in the Internet experiment and
found that the effect size on the Internet was smaller than in the laboratory. This
finding was in line with previous studies that showed that online methods are less
efficient than laboratory methods, although mood effects are still significant in online
experiments (for a meta-analysis, see Ferrer et al., 2015). Study 4 was designed to
investigate participants’ non-compliance as one of the reasons for less intense mood
effects in an Internet-based experiment. We tested whether the participants of an
online experiment would follow the instructions to watch a mood induction video
to the end and either interrupt the video or let themselves be distracted by other
activities during the video.
The distraction can be caused, for example, by multitasking, i.e., working on
more than one task at the same time. Research on multitasking on a computer
has shown that switching between tasks can happen at intervals of several minutes
(Judd and Kennedy, 2011; Yeykelis et al., 2014). In addition, emotional factors play
a role in the task-switching behavior: Yeykelis et al. (2014) discovered that people
experienced an increase in arousal prior to switching to different content.
We argue in the article that non-compliance in online studies was not properly
addressed in previous research. For instance, Reips (2000) discussed the problem
of dropouts and suggested using a warm-up phase or the high entrance barrier
technique to ensure that the dropout occurs before the experimental manipulation.
However, the problem of non-compliance differs from dropouts, as even a motivated
participant who has completed an entire experiment could ignore the instructions for
mood manipulation. In the article, we discuss other control measures (e.g., accuracy
questions) that have been proposed but are not sufficient to control for the level of
non-compliance.
We suggest the time spent on a web page as an objective and more reliable
indicator of the non-compliance. Any decrease in the residence time can interfere
with mood manipulation if the time is shorter than the length of the film clip. The
available experimental software, which mostly runs in an Internet browser, allows
two sources of deviation from the intended residence time. First, if the experiment
permits to proceed without completing the mood manipulation, participants can
take the chance to interrupt the procedure. Secondly, participants can switch be-
tween browser’s tabs, windows, or applications during the mood manipulation. In
this case, the web page will be out of focus for some time. While the interrup-
tion depends on the accessibility of a continue button or an equivalent option, the
temporary leave cannot be prevented due to the security settings of a browser. To
investigate these two routes for non-compliance, we conducted two online experi-
ments. In Experiment 1, both interruption and temporary leave were possible. In
Experiment 2, only temporary leave was feasible, as the continue button was hidden
until the end of the mood manipulation.
We posed several theoretical and methodological questions. Does non-compliance
differ between positive and negative moods? Does non-compliance reduce the ef-
ficiency of mood manipulation? If so, how can a researcher prevent or control for
non-compliance? In particular, does hiding the continue button improve mood ma-
nipulation or does it provoke people to switch between pages more often? To answer
the first question, we have proposed the theory that highlights the regulation-related
influence of mood. As discussed in the introduction to the dissertation, the mood-
maintenance theory predicts that people will avoid negative moods and try to sustain
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positive moods. First, this theory suggests that people in a negative mood should
show a higher degree of non-compliance behavior than in a positive mood. Secondly,
non-compliance should only attenuate the effect of mood manipulation in the nega-
tive group, while people in the positive group should retain their positive emotions
regardless of non-compliance.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that 30% of the participants either interrupted the
video or temporarily left the web page. The leaving rate was not different between
the conditions and had no influence on the mood ratings. However, the interruption
was more frequent in the negative condition and mitigated the effect of the negative
mood manipulation. On the contrary, the cases of an interruption in the positive
mood condition did not impair the positive mood manipulation effect. In Experi-
ment 2, where the participants could not interrupt the experiment, we observed the
increase in the leaving rate (from 16% of participants in Experiment 1 to 21% in
Experiment 2). The leaving rate was higher in the negative than in the positive
condition, but it did not influence the mood changes, probably because the absence
time was relatively short for most of the participants. Although we asked the parti-
cipants the open-ended question whether they were distracted during the video, we
received very few positive answers. Perhaps, more precise multiple choice questions
can help to gain more information in future research. In addition, the participants
in the negative condition left the web page later than the participants in the posi-
tive condition, which we interpreted as a sign that the participants reacted to the
emotional content of the video clip in the negative mood group.
We conclude in the article that the results of both experiments supported the
mood maintenance hypothesis. This means that participants in a negative mood
condition are more likely to avoid mood manipulation than in a positive condition.
However, not every form of non-compliance is equally detrimental to the efficiency
of mood manipulation. The opportunity to interrupt the mood manipulation proce-
dure by using a continue button may lead to a drop in mood effects. In the article,
we recommend hiding the continue button until the end of mood manipulation, since
it has improved the engagement rate in our experiments. Although undesirable, the
use of the continue button may be demanded by an ethics committee. In this case,
a researcher can measure the residence time to filter the participants or include the
time as an additional variable in the analysis.
The fact that participants can leave the web page for some time seems to be
less harmful to the mood manipulation effect. Nevertheless, measuring the time a
participant spends outside the web page is a very interesting technique for further
research, as it enables testing hypotheses about reactions to certain fragments of
the mood induction procedure (e.g., emotional episodes in a film). In addition, a
researcher can use temporary leave measures as covariates in the analysis or filter
the participants who completely missed the mood manipulation.
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Chapter 3
General discussion and outlook
The central research question of this dissertation was how mood influences decision-
making. The following section is a summary of the results of each empirical study,
which were described in more depth in the previous chapter. The most important
conclusions of the dissertation are then presented. Finally, the last section outlines
the prospects for future studies.
3.1 General discussion
Study 1 showed that mood influenced decision strategies in the multi-attribute deci-
sion task. Positive mood was associated with the use of non-compensatory strategies
and negative mood with the use of compensatory strategies. These results support
the idea that mood impacts the integration of information by signaling the current
state of the environment and the processing efforts required for the task. On the
contrary, no differences in the information search between moods indicate that more
deliberate strategies, which are required for the sequential information search, can
reduce the influence of mood.
In Study 2, the use of foraging paradigm extended the research question to
decisions from experience. The results showed that the informational value of mood
influenced decisions whether to explore or exploit the current environment, as the
negative mood was associated with higher exploration. This finding also points to
the mood-regulating motivation as the other potential explanation of the effect –
negative mood could motivate people to explore in order to improve their current
state.
The mood management mechanisms were examined in more detail in Study 3
and Study 4. Study 3 demonstrated that the mood-regulating motivation influenced
the acceptance of the default option. The preference for the status quo was stronger
among people in positive mood, while people in negative mood preferred a change
of task. This finding suggests that the informational theory of mood is not sufficient
to explain behavior, but the mood-regulating motivation should also be taken into
account in emotion research.
In Study 4, the ideas on mood regulation were applied to the methodological
question of non-compliance in online studies. As predicted, we found that people
avoided the negative mood manipulation more often than the positive one, which,
in turn, influenced the reliability of mood induction. Study 4 shows that objective
behavioral measures of the residence time on a web page can be used to improve the
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quality of methods.
The presented results lead to the following three conclusions. First, in order
to predict what effect the mood will have on behavior, we must consider both the
informational value of the mood and the mood-regulating motivation. Secondly, the
informational value of mood can create the congruency effect, but also influence the
way information is processed. In particular, differences in information processing
between moods may relate to the amount of information integrated into the decision.
Lastly, mood-regulating strategies have a higher chance of occurring in situations
where there is a possibility of changing the mood through a decision.
3.2 Outlook
This work has combined decision paradigms and mood theories to elucidate mecha-
nisms of interaction between affect and cognition. Thus, this thesis contributes to a
growing body of research that brings affect-related topics into the field of cognitive
psychology. The methods and results presented in the empirical studies may foresee
the prospects for future studies: experiential decision-making, online studies, and
affective computing.
Experiential paradigms of decision-making, which are underrepresented in rese-
arch at the moment, can be an interesting approach for future affective studies. In
the field of risky decisions, the experiential paradigm allows participants to observe
outcomes of the probability distribution and experience the risk associated with the
decision. The idea of experiencing instead of reading a description can be also ap-
plied to other areas of affective decision-making: e.g., the affect heuristic (Slovic,
Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007), risk-as-feeling theory (Loewenstein, Hsee,
Weber, & Welch, 2001). The development of new experiential paradigms and mo-
dels will allow to examine the affective mechanisms at different stages of decision:
e.g., learning, representing the situation, or planning an action.
The development of Internet technologies can extend beyond just conducting
online studies. Over the last ten years, the Internet has spawned the variety of on-
line survey services: e.g., SurveyMonkey, Unipark, SoSci, LimeSurvey. Nowadays,
complete experiments can be carried out online with the help of programming frame-
works: e.g., jsPsych, PsyToolkit, lab.js. In the future, we will see further integration
of research in everyday life, for example, through wearable computing devices de-
veloped in the MIT Media Lab. This will not only provide more behavioral and
physiological data from more participants but also shift the research methods from
controlled experiments to intervention designs (Picard, 2010).
Affective computing research takes decision-making to a new level, where know-
ledge about human decision-making processes is used to create artificial intelligence
(AI) agents capable of interacting and making decisions. The emotional compo-
nent of AI is acknowledged by large companies such as Google (Boston Dynamics)
and Facebook, which invest in robotics. The research field also follows the trend of
affective computing. For instance, the journal IEEE Transactions on Affective Com-
puting (TAC) has recently announced the special issue on computational modeling
of emotion, which is expected to appear in 2019. However, emotion researchers and
computer scientists do not work closely together and, at best, remain customers for
each other. Hopefully, the future will also bring more cooperation between these
fields.
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A B S T R A C T
The exact eﬀect of diﬀerent moods on choosing strategies in multi-attribute decision tasks is yet unknown since
previous work has found apparently contradicting results. Furthermore, diﬀerent theoretical accounts lead to
opposite expectations. While the “mood-as-information” theory states that a positive mood leads to heuristic
processing of information and application of non-compensatory strategies, the “broaden-and-build” theory ex-
pects more non-compensatory decision-making in a negative mood. To test the predictions of those two theories,
we conducted two experimental studies, in which both the mood and the type of information search were
manipulated. The results rather support “mood-as-information” theory, so participants in the positive mood
made non-compensatory choices more often than participants in the negative mood. The eﬀect was only present
in the open information board, where the information was presented simultaneously, but not in the closed
Mouselab, where the information had to be searched in a sequential manner.
1. Introduction
When it comes to taking an important decision, do you prefer to be
in a good or a sad mood? While hedonism postulates that people prefer
positive over negative emotional states, there may also be beneﬁts of
making a decision in a sad mood (for a review, see Forgas, 2013): being
more attentive to the strength of arguments (Sinclair, Mark, & Clore,
1994) and more accurate in judgments (Sinclair & Mark, 1995). Being
too positive, on the contrary, could lead to more stereotypical decisions
(Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and increase the reliance on the
ease of retrieval heuristic (Ruder & Bless, 2003).
To investigate the systematic diﬀerences between how people make
a decision in diﬀerent moods, the current research focuses on the im-
pact of negative mood on the use of decision-making strategies in a
multi-attribute decision task. A multi-attribute decision involves the
choice between at least two options based on the comparison of their
attributes (Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993). A decision-maker may
apply compensatory or non-compensatory strategies to reach a decision
(Bröder & Newell, 2008). To apply a compensatory strategy means to
combine all available information about attributes' values of each op-
tion, such as a negative value of more important attributes can be
compensated by positive values of other attributes. The attributes can
be weighted equally (Equal-weight rule, EQW), or diﬀerently in ac-
cordance with their importance (Weighted-additive rule, WADD, Payne
et al., 1993). The other strategy, that is non-compensatory, is to
consider the most important attribute that diﬀerentiates between op-
tions and to ignore less important attributes (so a negative value of the
important attribute cannot be compensated by positive values of other
attributes, “Take-the-Best” rule, TTB, Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996).
The diﬀerences between strategies can be outlined in a choice of
which movie to watch based on recommendations of friends. If a person
applies a compensatory strategy, she can consider all recommendations
(either watch or not to watch) and sum them up (EQW) or apply dif-
ferent weights indicating the trust into opinions of diﬀerent friends and
choose the movie with the highest (weighted) sum score (WADD). In
the case of using the non-compensatory strategy (TTB), the decision-
maker chooses the movie preferred by the friend who has the highest
trust rating among others.
Numerous studies were dedicated to ﬁnding determinants of the
strategy selection process: memory (Bröder & Schiﬀer, 2003), attention
(Bröder, Glöckner, Betsch, Link, & Ettlin, 2013), time pressure
(Rieskamp & Hoﬀrage, 2008), information costs (Bröder, 2000b), and
emotional stress (Wichary, Mata, & Rieskamp, 2016; Wichary &
Rieskamp, 2011). At the same time, there is a lack of studies that bridge
strategy selection and mood. Although there has been research on mood
eﬀects on judgments (see review in Bless & Fiedler, 2006), studies of the
inﬂuence of positive or negative moods on the strategy selection are
underrepresented.
Previous research found contradicting results that support diﬀerent
theories. The ﬁrst theoretical approach based on the “mood-as-
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information theory” (Schwarz & Clore, 1996) considers negative mood
as a trigger of more analytical and systematic processes, which leads to
detail-oriented attention and consideration of all available information.
The second approach of “broaden-and-build theory” (Fredrickson,
1998) emphasizes the ability of people in a positive mood to integrate
all available information in a more eﬃcient way. In the following, we
outline mechanisms and predictions of both approaches. Additionally,
the role of information search in the multi-attribute decision task is
discussed.
2. Mood-as-information theory
According to the “mood-as-information” theory (Schwarz & Bless,
1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1996), a negative mood provides a stop signal
that informs people that they may be in a problematic environment that
demands a careful examination. On the other hand, a positive mood
signals that the current environment is benign and therefore no careful
information processing is required. This line of research is summarized
in the literature as emotion eﬀects on depth of thought (Lerner, Li,
Valdesolo, & Kassam, 2015), where positive aﬀective states are asso-
ciated with the use of heuristic cues and negative states are related to
systematic decision-making strategies. However, the diﬀerence be-
tween positive and negative states in depth of processing could ad-
ditionally result not only from the valence of emotions but from the
sense of conﬁdence that those states convey: happiness has a high
certainty appraisal, whereas sadness has a low certainty appraisal
(Tiedens & Linton, 2001). The high certainty can lead to heuristic
processing of information, but low certainty demands a more sys-
tematic way of processing. Empirical studies found that people in a
positive mood prefer simple heuristics over detail oriented judgmental
strategies (Bless et al., 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1996) and base their
judgments on a smaller amount of evidence in a choice task with self-
truncated information sampling (Fiedler, Renn, & Kareev, 2010). In line
with that, a state of depression leads to longer information search in a
sequential decision task than a non-depressed state (von Helversen,
Wilke, Johnson, Schmid, & Klapp, 2011).
The use of the compensatory strategy in the multi-attribute decision
task requires processing of all cues about given options. Since people in
a negative mood apply more systematic and detail-oriented strategies,
the prediction of the “mood-as-information” theory is that they would
use compensatory strategy more often than people in a positive mood.
3. Broaden-and-build theory
The “broaden-and-build theory”, formulated by Fredrickson (1998),
emphasizes the adaptive value of emotions and states that negative
emotions promote and support speciﬁc actions, or speciﬁc action ten-
dencies that were described by Frijda (1986). By contrast, behavioral
consequences of positive emotions (such as joy, interest, contentment,
pride, or love) are vague, as far as they are not related to any problems
in the environment. For instance, fear is linked with the desire to escape
and anger motivates to attack, but joy is associated with aimless acti-
vation, interest with attending, and contentment with inactivity (Frijda,
1986). As a consequence of non-speciﬁc action tendencies, positive
emotions broaden the scope of attention more than negative emotions
(Fredrickson, 1998). Applied to multi-attribute decision making,
broaden-and-build theory therefore predicts that people in a positive
mood should incorporate more information into their decisions than
people in a negative mood.
Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) found that a positive mood ex-
pands attention in the adapted version of the global-local visual pro-
cessing task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982), such as people in the positive
mood group more often based their comparison judgments on a con-
ﬁguration of elements (instead of a shape of each element) relative to
people in a neutral state. The broaden-and-build theory is also sup-
ported by ﬁndings that people in a positive mood produce patterns of
thoughts that are unusual, ﬂexible, and creative (Isen, Daubman, &
Nowicki, 1987).
The same line of reasoning may lead one to expect more compen-
satory decision-making in a positive mood since the use of the com-
pensatory strategy requires the integration of all available information.
In line with that, Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015) found sup-
port for this hypothesis using a multi-attribute decision task, in which
participants had to select which movies were more successful at the box
oﬃce. In an online experiment, the authors provided the participants
with all information about the options on an open decision board
without the need for search. The authors interpreted the ﬁnding that
positive mood increased the use of compensatory decision strategies as
evidence for a broader focus of attention. The current study employs the
same multi-attribute decision task and replicates as well as extends
Scheibehenne and von Helversen's (2015) procedure by comparing it to
a task involving active information search.
4. Role of information search
We conjecture that the inﬂuence of mood on strategy selection in
decision making also depends on how information search is structured.
Glöckner and Betsch (2008b) suggested that immediate access to in-
formation triggers more automatic decision-making characterized by
the ability to integrate a large amount of information in short time.
Constraints on information search, on the contrary, lead to more sys-
tematic information acquisition behavior (Lohse & Johnson, 1996).
Demand for information search might activate rather analytic processes
of decision-making, which operate through the use of logic and evi-
dence (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2007) and reduces the
reliance on emotions.
Diﬀerences in information search can be experimentally studied in
two diﬀerent paradigms: open information boards, where all informa-
tion about options is presented at once, and a closed “Mouselab”, where
only one piece of information on the board can be inspected at a time
(Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). The open information board
paradigm focuses on studying the integration of information, whereas
the closed Mouselab paradigm is primarily used to study information
search processes. It was found that in open information boards people
can quickly integrate information without deliberative calculation of
weighted sums (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Söllner, Bröder, &
Hilbig, 2013). On the other hand, the closed Mouselab produces a serial
mode of information search and fosters the application of deliberate,
rule-based decision strategies (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). Additionally,
higher costs in the closed Mouselab paradigm increase the probability
to use a non-compensatory strategy (Bröder, 2003; Bröder & Schiﬀer,
2003). Therefore, decision-making strategies in both paradigms might
be aﬀected by the type of information presentation, which would
consequently moderate the inﬂuence of mood.
The mood-as-information and broaden-and-build theories do not
make speciﬁc predictions regarding the eﬀect of positive and negative
moods dependent on the way how information is presented in the task,
and multi-attribute decision research has often relied on search data to
infer decision strategies (see critique by Bröder, 2000a). Hence,
building on Glöckner & Betsch’s (2008a) important distinction between
tasks that require a sequential search or not, an additional question of
the current research is to analyze the interaction between the inﬂuence
of mood and the type of task (open information board vs. closed
Mouselab).
To investigate the potential role of mood and information search in
strategy selection, we conducted two experiments, where the type of
information processing and the mood were manipulated in a between-
subject design. Experiment 1 was conducted as a web-study, and
Experiment 2 was run in the laboratory.
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5. Experiment 1
The goal of Experiment 1 was to analyze the inﬂuence of mood and
the type of information search on the selection of decision-making
strategies. To achieve a larger sample size of a diverse population, the
study was carried on as a web-experiment.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Design and materials
The online study used a between-subjects experimental design
varying induced mood (negative, neutral, or positive) and the type of
information search (open information board or closed Mouselab). The
participants were randomly assigned to one of six experimental groups.
5.1.1.1. The multi-attribute decision task. The multi-attribute decision
task consisted of choices between two movies named “Movie A” and
“Movie B”. The task structure was designed on the basis of the
experiment of Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015). Whereas the
original experiment consisted of 30 trials with two emotionally similar
movie clips shown at the beginning and after 15th trial, the current
study used only one movie clip at the beginning of the task and the ﬁrst
15 trials from the original dataset (see Table A1, set 1). The current
experiment also diﬀered in the visual design of cues (a thumbs-up sign
instead of a star) and experts (names instead of cartoon faces).
The task of participants was to select the more successful movie
based on recommendations of movie experts (see Fig. 1). Each of ﬁve
experts either recommended a movie (a thumbs-up sign in the box) or
did not give any recommendation (a dash line in the box). The advisers
diﬀered in their level of expertise. Each expert was presented with a
name and a percentage value, which indicated how often this adviser
had been correct in the past. For example, “Eric 80%” meant that Eric's
tips had been correct in 80% of the cases in the past. The experts were
always presented in the same order of decreasing validity, and per-
centage values of their expertise remained ﬁxed.
In the open information board condition, all information on the
decision board was present. In the closed information board condition,
the boxes were closed, and participants had to click on a box in order to
see the recommendation of an expert. The information remained
opened until participants moved a mouse pointer away. After each
choice participants rated how conﬁdent they felt about their answer.
The conﬁdence scales were presented with screenshots from diﬀerent
movies, which emotional content matched the mood manipulation
condition. The number of correct choices was shown after the mood
manipulation check at the end of the experiment. The correct option in
each trial was a choice that corresponded to the compensatory strategy
(Table A1, set 1). The conﬁguration of cues and the position of options
on the screen were both randomized across trials, but the cues were
composed in the way that the choice of one option always followed the
compensatory strategy (Movie B on Fig. 1) and the choice of the other
option followed the non-compensatory strategy (Movie A).
5.1.1.2. Mood induction. 3-Minute video clips were used as a mood
induction method. All clips were pre-tested before either in our pilot
studies or published reviews (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot,
2010). In the positive mood condition, the scene with Scrat chasing nuts
from the movie “Ice Age: Continental Drift” (2012) was used. In the
negative mood condition, the participants saw an excerpt from the
movie “Lion King” (1994) (the scene with the death of Mufasa). In the
neutral condition, we used a movie clip consisting of traveling scenes.
To maintain the mood manipulation during the task mood-congruent
pictures were used when the participants rated their conﬁdence after
each choice. The screenshots from movies of diﬀerent genres which
matched the mood condition (comedy in the positive, drama in the
negative, and scenes of diﬀerent objects in the neutral condition) was
placed under the conﬁdence rating scale.
Fig. 1. Screenshot of the task.
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5.1.1.3. Mood manipulation check. After the main task, a mood
manipulation check was done by asking participants to characterize
their current emotional state on a visual analog scale from “very
depressed” to “very elated”. On the next page, the participants were
asked to rate their emotions on 10 diﬀerent emotion items taken from
the expanded version of the Positive and Negative Aﬀective Schedule
(PANAS-X, Watson & Clark, 1999). Participants had to indicate to what
extent they felt at the present moment using separate analogous scales
for each item. The instruction on the top of the page showed ﬁve marks
of the scale: “very slightly or not at all”, “a little”, “moderately”, “quite
a bit”, and “very much”. The ratings were averaged for the scales of
happiness (“happy”, “delightful”, and “joyful”) and sadness (“sad”,
“downhearted”, and “gloomy”). Four additional items were used to
control for anger (“angry”), interest (“interested”), stress (“distressed”),
and arousal (reversed “relaxed” scale). To facilitate the comparability
of results with other studies, all ratings were transferred into the
original PANAS-X scale from 1 to 5.
5.1.2. Procedure
The participants started the experiment by reading the informed
consent form on the ﬁrst web-page. After ﬁlling in their demographic
data (gender, age, education, and country of residence) and answering
the control question about their intention to participate in the experi-
ment, the participants read the instruction to the main task. People in
all experimental conditions saw an example of the open information
board. Additionally, the participants in the closed information board
group were told that during the task each box with information would
remain closed until the participant clicks on it with the mouse and
would be closed again, as the mouse pointer leaves the box.
The performance in the task was incentivized by a lottery for the 20
best players with the chance to win one of ﬁve 20 Euro online retailer
vouchers. Three control questions with immediate feedback were given
to make sure that the participants understood the instruction. After the
instruction, the participants saw a 3-minute video clip related to their
emotion condition. Immediately after the mood induction, the partici-
pants proceeded to the multi-attribute decision task. After making a
choice in each trial, the additional window with a conﬁdence scale and
a picture matched to the emotion condition popped up on the screen. In
case of skipping a question, the participants were politely asked to re-
turn and answer the question.
After all 15 trials were ﬁnished, the participants were asked about
their mood: ﬁrst, with a general question and then with 10 diﬀerent
scales of the PANAS-X. After the mood manipulation check, the parti-
cipants were asked about their ideas of the goal of the experiment. At
the last page of the web-experiment, they were allowed to leave their
comments and email address in case if they wanted to participate in the
lottery.
5.1.3. Methods of data analysis
All data exclusions, manipulations, and measures are reported in
this study. The use of either non-compensatory or compensatory deci-
sion-making strategies was measured by actual choices of participants
which could either conﬁrm to TTB or WADD/EQW. To test the hy-
pothesis about the diﬀerences in strategies between positive and ne-
gative mood, a multi-level logistic regressions model with a binary
dependent variable was applied. The dependent variable was either a
WADD/EQW-compatible or WADD/EQW non-compatible choice in
each trial. Additionally, the length of information search in the closed
Mouselab group was measured and compared across mood conditions.
5.1.4. Participants
The web-based experiment was conducted in October–November
2016. Both German and English versions were available online.1 383
people (median age 21 years, 289 female, 91 male, and 3 unknown)
took part in the study. Among all participants, 182 people (48%) were
students of the University of Mannheim recruited by the local partici-
pation management system. Others were recruited from diﬀerent web-
sites: “Psychologie Heute” (81), “Psychological research on the net”
(79), “Circle” (16), “Call for participants” (10), and others (18).
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Ensuring data quality
Since the data were collected in the web-experiment, concerns
about data quality should be addressed. We used the control question
about participants' intention to participate in the experiment and time
measurements to detect cases of inappropriate behavior, such as
making a big pause between the mood induction and the main task or
taking unrealistically long time to ﬁnish the decision-making task. 5
people either did not answer on the question “How do you intend to
browse the Web pages of the study?” or chose the option “I would like
to look at the pages only”. We also discarded 17 people who took>
5min to watch a movie clip, since the mood eﬀect might dissipate or
the participant was distracted by something else during that time. For
the time spent on the main task, we used the threshold of 20min that
excluded 2 people. Overall, 24 participants were ﬁltered out leaving
359 participants for the ﬁnal analysis (see Table 1 for the number of
people in diﬀerent experimental groups).
5.2.2. Mood manipulation check
337 participants ﬁlled out all scales of the mood questionnaire.2 The
average scores for happiness and sadness were computed for each
participant. Using the scores of positive mood (asked in the ﬁrst general
question), happiness, sadness, anger, stress, arousal and interest, we
applied one-way between-subjects ANOVAs with the factor mood group
(see Table 2). As far as the mood valence is a continuum between ne-
gative and positive mood with the neutral condition in the middle, we
used the mood group as a linear predictor in the model.3 As expected,
the main linear eﬀect of the mood manipulation was found for the
sadness score, F (1, 335)= 10.8, MSE=9.9, p < .01, but also for the
arousal and interest, F (1, 335)= 5.5, MSE=5.7, p= .02 and F (1,
335)= 4.4, MSE=4.4, p= .04. However, the main linear eﬀect of the
mood manipulation was not signiﬁcant for the positive mood scale,
happiness, stress, and anger.
A post hoc Tukey test showed that the participants in the negative
mood group were feeling more sad (M=2.4, SD=1.1) than the par-
ticipants in the neutral group (M=2.0, SD=0.9) and the participants
in the positive mood group (M=2.0, SD=0.9). However, there were
no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between neutral and positive mood groups for
each of the scales. Therefore, the mood manipulation was successful
with respect to the sadness score in the negative mood group, but did
not elicit diﬀerences in the neutral and the positive mood groups.
Furthermore, the mood manipulation in the positive mood group did
not induce more positive emotions in comparison with the neutral
group.
1 The study was programmed in JavaScript and installed on the personal website of the
(footnote continued)
ﬁrst author http://yuryshevchenko.com/evaluation-of-movies/.
2 22 participants had at least one missing value and were excluded from the mood
eﬀects analysis. Among them, 7 participants did not answer on any item, 11 participants
answered on the ﬁrst question, but ignored all PANAS-X items, and remaining 4 parti-
cipants missed some PANAS-X items.
3 The between-subjects ANOVA with the main eﬀect of the mood manipulation was
also applied. The main eﬀect of the mood manipulation was found for the positive mood
scale, F (2, 334)= 4.0, MSE=2.4, p= .02, the sadness score, F (2, 334)= 6.9,
MSE=6.2, p < .01, arousal, F (2, 334)= 3.1, MSE=3.2, p= .045, interest F (2,
334)=3.1, MSE=3.1, p=.046, and stress, F (2, 334)=3.8, MSE=4.5, p= .02. There
were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences for the happiness scale, F (2, 334)= 1.6, MSE=1.64,
p= .20, and anger, F (2, 334)= 0.3, MSE=0.2, p= .74.
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5.2.3. Decision-making strategies
Since the data were nested inside of the participants, we applied
multi-level logistic regressions with the binary choice (compensatory or
non-compensatory) in each trial as the dependent variable (lme4
package in R, Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The multi-level
approach with random eﬀects for subjects is recommended over ag-
gregation since it accounts for variation within participants (Woltman,
Feldstain, MacKay, & Rocchi, 2012) and increases the statistical power
of a test (Krzywinski, Altman, & Blainey, 2014). Whereas the baseline
model included only random intercepts for each participant, the main
eﬀects model also contained the ﬁxed eﬀects of mood condition and the
type of information board. Additionally, the third model included the
interaction between mood condition and the type of information board.
The log-likelihood ratio test showed that the main eﬀects model is not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the baseline model, χ2(2)= 2.62, p= .27.
The interaction model was also not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the main
eﬀects model, χ2(1)= 0.11, p= .74. In terms of predictions, the
baseline model expected all participants to make a compensatory
choice in 9 out of 15 trials (57%) on average (see Fig. 2). Hence, in the
decision outcome data, we neither found a strategy diﬀerence based on
mood nor on the information presentation.
We also classiﬁed participants as TTB or WADD users based on the
majority of choices (see Table 3). The proportion of WADD users was
higher than the proportion of TTB users in all groups, on average 64%
vs. 36%. Using this dependent variable in a chi-square test of in-
dependence, there was also neither a strategy diﬀerence between mood
groups (χ2 (2, N=359)= 0.49, p= .78) nor between presentation
formats (χ2 (1, N=359)=0.04, p= .85).
The lack of signiﬁcant group diﬀerences can be attributed to po-
tential problems with the mood manipulation in the online environ-
ment of the experiment. Although the participants of the negative mood
group were sadder than the participants of the other two groups, there
was high individual variability in the sadness and happiness scores in
all groups. To account for individual diﬀerences in the level of sadness
and happiness, we computed the correlations between the sadness and
happiness scores and the number of compensatory choices of each in-
dividual. There was a small, but marginally signiﬁcant positive corre-
lation between the sadness score and the number of compensatory
choices, t (336)= 1.94, r=0.10, p= .054, suggesting that people who
were more sad at the end of the experiment made more compensatory
choices. The separate analysis of correlations in the diﬀerent versions of
information boards paradigms showed that the correlation was only
present in the open information board condition, t (168)= 2.51,
r=0.19, p < .05, but not in the closed Mouselab, t (166)=−0.21,
r=−0.02, p= .83. There was no correlation between the happiness
score and the number of compensatory choices, t (336)= 0.01,
r=0.001, p= .99.
5.2.4. Reaction time analysis
The median time (in seconds) spent in a trial was computed for each
participant. 2× 2 between-subjects ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of the type of information board paradigm, F (1, 353)= 120.15,
MSE=3379, p < .001, so people in the closed Mouselab condition
(M=12.67, SD=6.29) spent more time in a trial than in the open
information board condition (M=6.50, SD=4.17). There was a
marginally signiﬁcant main eﬀect of mood, F (2, 353)= 2.96,
MSE=83, p= .053, but subsequent post-hoc Tukey tests showed no
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between diﬀerent mood conditions, all p > .10.
There was no signiﬁcant interaction between mood and the type of
information board, F (2, 353)= 0.22, MSE=6, p= .80.4
5.2.5. Length of information search in the closed Mouselab
Additionally, we compared the number of opened information boxes
in closed Mouselab paradigm (N=175) between diﬀerent mood
Table 1
Number of people in diﬀerent experimental groups.
Closed Mouselab Open information board
Negative mood group 53 60
Neutral group 60 61
Positive mood group 62 63
Table 2
Mood scores in the negative, neutral and positive mood groups (N=337). The scores are
reported on the PANAS-X scale from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“very much”),
and standard deviations are given in the parentheses.
Negative
mood group
Neutral
group
Positive
mood
group
ANOVA test of a linear
eﬀect of mood
df (1, 335)
F MSE p
Positive mood 2.9 (0.8) 3.2 (0.7) 3.1 (0.8) 2.3 1.4 .13
Happiness 2.6 (1.0) 2.8 (1.0) 2.8 (0.9) 2.3 2.3 .13
Sadness 2.4 (1.1) 2.0 (0.9) 2.0 (0.9) 10.8 9.9 < .01
Anger 1.6 (0.8) 1.5 (0.8) 1.5 (0.9) 0.4 0.2 .55
Stress 2.5 (1.1) 2.1 (1.0) 2.3 (1.2) 1.9 2.3 .17
Arousal 3.0 (1.1) 2.7 (1.0) 2.6 (1.0) 5.5 5.7 .02
Interest 3.2 (1.1) 3.5 (0.9) 3.5 (1.0) 4.4 4.4 .04
Fig. 2. The predicted probability of compensatory choice based on the parameters of the
baseline model with only random intercepts for each participant (N=359). The group
means and 95% CI are shown.
Table 3
Number of people in each condition classiﬁed as TTB or WADD strategy users (N=359).
Proportions of strategy users for each group are written in the parentheses.
Paradigm Mood TTB WADD
Closed Mouselab Negative 21 (40%) 32 (60%)
Neutral 21 (35%) 39 (65%)
Positive 21 (34%) 41 (66%)
Open information board Negative 18 (30%) 42 (70%)
Neutral 26 (43%) 35 (57%)
Positive 24 (38%) 39 (62%)
131 (36%) 228 (64%)
4 Conﬁdence ratings were averaged for each participant. A 2× 2 ANOVA with a
conﬁdence score as a dependent variable showed no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of the type of
information board condition (F (1, 352)= 0.30, MSE=79.00, p= .59) and mood (F (2,
352)=0.16,MSE=41.60, p= .85). The interaction of the type of information board and
mood was also not signiﬁcant (F (2, 352)= 1.55, MSE=410.60, p= .21). The average
conﬁdence judgment was 58.97% (SD=16.23).
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conditions. The median number of opened cues was computed for each
subject, and then a one-way ANOVA was used. There was no signiﬁcant
main eﬀect of mood, F (2, 172)= 2.25, MSE=55, p= .11. The length
of information search was not diﬀerent between negative mood
(M=9.68, SD=4.34), neutral (M=10.00, SD=4.76), and positive
mood conditions, (M=11.48, SD=5.57).
5.3. Discussion
We did not ﬁnd any diﬀerences in decision-making strategies (as
assessed by the probability of the compensatory choice) dependent on
the mood manipulation. The lack of an eﬀect may probably be attrib-
uted to the only partially successful mood manipulation in the web-
experiment. People in the negative mood group were sadder than the
participants of the other two groups, but there were no mood diﬀer-
ences between the neutral and the positive mood groups. One potential
reason for that is that the neutral condition was positive as well.
However, the movie clip in the neutral condition did not show an in-
crease in positive emotions in a separate pilot-study (N=50). The
second reason for no diﬀerences between neutral and positive condi-
tions is that positive emotions are harder to elicit than negative ones
(Ferrer, Grenen, & Taber, 2015). This disproportion of eﬀects could be
the result of self-selection in an online-study: If people were already in a
negative mood, they might choose to avoid participation in the study.
Given the initial positive mood state of the remaining participants, it
was easier to upset them than to make happier. Moreover, the web-
study settings allowed participants to avoid the mood manipulation by
temporary leaving or switching to another web-page that could inter-
fere with the desired mood state.
Although the experimental manipulation of mood in this study did
not work as expected, drawing on the natural mood variation between
participants yielded evidence that overall, sadness was correlated with
more compensatory choices as expected by mood-as-information
theory. A closer look, however, revealed that this correlation was ab-
sent in the closed Mouselab (involving search), but more pronounced in
the open information board (focusing on information integration). This
ﬁnding provides an insight into diﬀerences between simultaneous and
sequential ways of information processing and supports the “mood-as-
information” account that predicts that people in the negative mood
apply more detailed-oriented and analytical strategies. Since the feed-
back to the main task was shown only after the mood manipulation
check, we can rule out the possibility that performance in the task in-
ﬂuenced the reported emotions. However, the link between compen-
satory decision-making and reported sadness in the open information
board paradigm remains correlational and should be interpreted cau-
tiously.
As a conclusion of Experiment 1, we found preliminary support for
the “mood-as-information” hypothesis in the open information board
paradigm. In order to increase the eﬀect of the mood manipulation and
to avoid problems of self-selection, we replicated the study in a la-
boratory setting in Experiment 2.
6. Experiment 2
The aim of Experiment 2 was to test the eﬀect of mood and type of
information search in the laboratory environment, which allowed
probably a more eﬃcient mood manipulation because of reduced op-
portunities to be distracted from the mood-inducing ﬁlm-clips. To
maintain a decent statistical power with a smaller sample, the theore-
tically less important neutral condition was left out.
6.1. Method
6.1.1. Design and materials
The multi-attribute decision task was the same as in Experiment 1,
but the length of the task was extended to 30 trials to increase the
reliability of measuring the dependent variables. A second mood ma-
nipulation was added after the 15th trial. Hence, this lab study was
structurally identical to Scheibehenne and von Helversen's (2015) web-
based study. The cues in each trial were composed in the way that the
choice of one option always corresponded to the compensatory strategy
and the choice of the other option corresponded to the non-compen-
satory strategy (Table A1). The display order of options was rando-
mized in each trial.
6.1.1.1. Mood induction. 3-Minute video clips were presented in a
random order at the beginning of the main task and after the 15th
trial. In the positive mood condition, “Ice Age: Continental Drift”
(2012) (the scene of Scrat chasing nuts) and “The Visitors” (1993)
(two characters from the medieval time crashing a car) were used. In
the negative mood condition, “Lion King” (1994) (the death of Mufasa)
and “Léon: The Professional” (1994) (separation of two main
characters) were shown.
6.1.1.2. Mood manipulation check. The mood manipulation check was
identical to the questionnaire in Experiment 1 and consisted of the
general mood question and 10 emotion scales.
6.1.2. Procedure
The experiment was run as a laboratory study that used a between-
subjects experimental design varying induced mood (negative or posi-
tive) and the type of information search (open information board or
closed Mouselab). The participants were randomly assigned to one of
four experimental groups.
Upon arrival to the lab, the participants were seated in front of one
of 8 computers and read the informed consent form. The following
instructions appeared in the web-browser application. The participants
could choose whether they want to receive money or a certiﬁcate of
participation (for course credit) at the end. In both scenarios, the per-
formance in the main task was incentivized: either by giving 10 cents
for each correct answer or by ﬁve 20 Euro online retailer vouchers for
winners of the lottery among 20 best performers. The rest of the pro-
cedure was identical to the procedure in Experiment 1. At the end, the
participants were remunerated either with money or participation
certiﬁcates.
6.1.3. Participants
121 people (median age 23 years, 82 female and 39 male) took part
in the laboratory experiment at the University of Mannheim in
November 2016.
6.2. Results
6.2.1. Ensuring data quality
This time, no one was ﬁltered out based on the criteria that we
established in Experiment 1: participation intention, a pause between
the movie and the decision task, or time spent in the task. Therefore,
121 participants were selected for the ﬁnal analysis.
6.2.2. Mood manipulation check
The participants in the negative mood group were feeling more sad,
angry, distressed, and aroused and less positive, happy, and interested
than the participants in the positive mood group (see Table 4).
Since the same mood questionnaire was used in both Experiments,
we compared the mood manipulation eﬀects in the online study
(Experiment 1) and in the laboratory (Experiment 2). The eﬀect on
diﬀerent emotion scales was tested in a linear regression where ex-
perimental mood condition (positive or negative as a dummy variable),
experiment (online or laboratory as a dummy variable) and their in-
teraction were included as predictors. The dependent variable was a
score on the PANAS-X scale (1–5). The laboratory experiment was more
eﬃcient in inducing positive mood and happiness in the positive mood
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group (the interaction eﬀect between Mood and Experiment: b=0.52,
SE=0.18, t=2.97, p < .01 and b=0.59, SE=0.21, t=2.73,
p < .01). For the ratings of sadness and stress, the interaction eﬀect
between Mood and Experiment was marginally signiﬁcant, b=−0.36,
SE=0.21, t=−1.66, p= .098 and b=−0.47, SE=0.25, t=−1.89,
p= .059. The presence of interaction eﬀects suggests that the labora-
tory setting was more eﬀective in eliciting both positive and negative
mood as intended.
6.2.3. Decision-making strategies
The speciﬁcation of models was identical to Experiment 1, so we
tested the main eﬀects model against the baseline model with random
intercepts for each participant, and the interaction model against the
main eﬀects model. The log-likelihood ratio test showed that the main
eﬀects model was not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the baseline model,
χ
2(2)= 3.24, p= .20; however, the model with the interaction be-
tween ﬁxed eﬀects was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the main eﬀects
model, χ2(1)= 3.85, p < .05 (see Fig. 3 for predicted probabilities of
compensatory choice). The parameter estimates of the interaction
model were not signiﬁcant for main eﬀects of mood, b=0.12, z=0.36,
p= .72, and the type of information board, b=0.20, z=0.58, p= .56,
but signiﬁcant for the interaction between mood and the type of in-
formation board, b=−0.94, z=−1.98, p < .05. In terms of predic-
tions, the interaction model expected the participants in the positive
mood group and open information board condition to make a com-
pensatory choice in 11 out of 30 trials (38%) on average, whereas the
general rate for all other participants was 16 out of 30 trials (52%).
Classiﬁcation of participants as TTB or WADD users was based on
the majority of choices (more than in 15 out of 30 trials) yielding three
categories of participants: TTB, WADD, and random strategy users who
had an equal number of TTB and WADD choices. The proportion of
WADD users in the positive mood was lower than in negative mood in
the open information board condition (χ2 (1, N=55)=4.11,
p < .05), whereas there was no diﬀerence in the closed Mouselab (χ2
(1, N=58)= 0, p=1) (see Table 5).5
To account for individual diﬀerences in the level of sadness and
happiness, we computed the correlations between the sadness and
happiness scores and the number of compensatory choices. This time,
there was no signiﬁcant correlation between the sadness score and the
number of compensatory choices, t (119)= 1.33, r=0.12, p= .18.
The separate analysis of correlations in the diﬀerent versions of in-
formation boards paradigms showed no signiﬁcant correlations neither
in the open information board condition, t (58)= 0.97, r=0.13,
p= .34, nor in the closed Mouselab, t (59)= 0.86, r=0.11, p= .39.
Concerning the happiness score, there was no signiﬁcant correlation
between the happiness and the number of compensatory choices, t
(119)=−0.19, r=−0.02, p= .85.
6.2.4. Reaction time analysis
The median time (in seconds) spent in a trial was computed for each
participant. 2× 2 between-subjects ANOVA showed a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of the type of information board paradigm, F (1, 117)= 99.29,
MSE=984.90, p < .001, so people in the closed Mouselab condition
(M=10.98, SD=3.69) spent more time in a trial than in the open
information board condition (M=5.28, SD=2.42). There was neither
a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of mood, F (1, 117)= 0.03, MSE=0.20,
p= .88, nor an interaction between mood and the type of information
board, F (1, 117)= 0.21, MSE=2.10, p= .65.6
6.2.5. The length of information search in closed Mouselab
Additionally, we compared the number of opened information boxes
in closed Mouselab paradigm between mood conditions. The median
number of opened cues was computed for each subject, and then t-test
was applied. There was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the positive
Table 4
Mood scores in the positive and negative mood groups (N=121). The scores are reported
on the PANAS-X scale from 1 (“very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“very much”), and
standard deviations are given in the parentheses.
Negative
mood group
Positive
mood group
Independent groups t-
test (df=119)
Cohen's d
t p
Positive mood 2.8 (0.8) 3.5 (0.7) −5.3 < .001 0.96
Happiness 2.5 (0.9) 3.3 (0.8) −5.1 < .001 0.92
Sadness 2.5 (1.0) 1.7 (0.7) 4.9 < .001 0.89
Anger 1.7 (0.9) 1.3 (0.6) 2.3 .02 0.42
Stress 2.6 (1.1) 1.9 (0.9) 3.7 < .001 0.68
Arousal 3.0 (1.0) 2.3 (0.8) 4.0 < .001 0.73
Interest 3.3 (0.9) 3.8 (0.7) −3.1 < .01 0.56
Fig. 3. The predicted probability of compensatory choice based on the parameters of the
interaction model with random intercepts for each participant, ﬁxed eﬀects of mood and
type of information board and their interaction (N=121). The group means and 95% CI
are shown.
Table 5
Number of people in each condition classiﬁed as TTB or WADD strategy users (N=121).
Proportions of strategy users for each group are written in the parentheses.
Paradigm Mood TTB WADD Random strategy
Closed Mouselab Negative 14 (45%) 15 (48%) 2 (7%)
Positive 14 (47%) 15 (50%) 1 (3%)
Open information board Negative 12 (40%) 15 (50%) 3 (10%)
Positive 20 (67%) 8 (27%) 2(6%)
60 (50%) 53 (44%) 8 (6%)
5 As pointed out by one of the reviewers, one could interpret the ﬁnding that positive
mood leads to more non-compensatory strategies as an attentional eﬀect so that parti-
cipants in a positive mood made more errors in the experiment. One way to address this
problem is to consider only those participants who were clearly classiﬁed as using one
strategy. The problem is, however, where to draw the line between non-classiﬁed and
classiﬁed participants facing the trade-oﬀ between strictness of criteria and the sample
size as a stricter criterion decreases the amount of subjects for analysis. For example,
when 80% of choices should be in line with a strategy, 12 people are classiﬁed as TTB
users, 8 people are classiﬁed as WADD users, and the proportion of WADD users in the
positive mood (n=2) was lower than in negative mood (n=6) in the open information
board condition (χ2 (1, N=20)= 4.85, p < .05). This suggests that the found eﬀect was
not only driven by participants who made more errors in the positive mood condition.
6 Regarding conﬁdence ratings, a 2× 2 ANOVA with a conﬁdence score as a dependent
variable showed no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of the type of information board condition (F
(1, 117)= 1.36, MSE=308.50, p= .25) and mood (F (1, 117)=2.08, MSE=472.80,
p= .15). The interaction of the type of information board and mood was also not sig-
niﬁcant (F (1, 117)=0.15, MSE=35.10, p= .70). The average conﬁdence judgment
was 59.16% (SD=15.12).
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mood group (M=11.67, SD=3.63) and the negative mood group
(M=11.27, SD=4.63), t (59)=−0.37, p= .71, d=0.09.
6.3. Discussion
More non-compensatory decision making was present in the posi-
tive mood than in the negative mood in a situation with simultaneous
information presentation. At the same time, there were no diﬀerences
between moods in the closed Mouselab group. These data are in line
with the correlational pattern found in Experiment 1 and rather support
the “mood-as-information” theory that states that a positive mood
triggers a heuristic mode and negative mood induces a more systematic
mode of information processing. Furthermore, it shows that mood af-
fects decision making only when information is presented simulta-
neously, whereas the impact of mood is reduced during the sequential
way of processing the information.
The observed eﬀects of mood on strategy selection may be attrib-
uted to a more eﬃcient mood manipulation in the laboratory
(Experiment 2) than in the web-experiment (Experiment 1). The par-
ticipants of the laboratory experiment diﬀered in the positive mood
measured by the general question and on all of the emotion dimensions,
so the people in the negative group were more sad, stressed, aroused,
and angry, and less happy and interested than the people in the positive
group. The comparison of mood eﬀects in Experiment 1 and Experiment
2 showed that the mood manipulation in the laboratory was sig-
niﬁcantly more eﬃcient in inducing positive mood and happiness.
7. General discussion
7.1. Strategy selection
The current research investigated how mood and type of informa-
tion presentation (either simultaneous in the open information board or
sequential in closed Mouselab paradigm) might aﬀect the selection of
decision-making strategies. The results of two experiments suggest that
the eﬀect of mood depends on the type of information presentation in
the task. Mood plays a role in the task with the open information board,
where the information is presented simultaneously. However, if the
information is hidden and has to be searched for in a sequential
manner, the eﬀect of mood on the decision-making strategy is wea-
kened. The reason for that is diﬀerent ways of information processing in
the open information board and closed Mouselab paradigm. The closed
Mouselab paradigm promotes deliberate decision making and applica-
tion of controlled cognitive operations, so people become aware of their
strategies and can verbalize them (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). More-
over, a step-by-step decision strategy hinders the activation of auto-
matic processes, which are more closely related to emotions (Kahneman
& Frederick, 2002). The simultaneous presentation of information in
the open information board, on the contrary, does not impose restric-
tions and allows mood diﬀerences to aﬀect the way of information in-
tegration rather than information search.
In both experiments we found that people in the positive mood
processed information in a more non-compensatory manner in the open
information board than people in the negative mood. We interpreted
this as evidence in line with mood-as-information theory, but contra-
dicting broaden-and-build theory. According to the “mood-as-in-
formation” account, the negative mood is used as an informative signal
about a problematic state of the environment that requires the use of
more systematic strategies. Positive mood, on the contrary, as an in-
dicator of the benign state of the environment, might trigger the ap-
plication of available heuristics.
The results of the current study are in line with ﬁndings of Bless
et al. (1996) that happy people are more likely to rely on general
knowledge structures, whereas sad individuals more systematically
elaborate presented information. Park and Banaji (2000) found that the
processing diﬀerences between positive and negative moods aﬀect
social categorization judgments as a positive mood increases the use of
stereotypes. In the domain of risky choices, Mohanty and Suar (2014)
showed that people in a negative mood process information with more
ﬂuency, originality, and ﬂexibility than people in a positive mood.
However, the results of the current study are opposite to ﬁndings of
the online experiment of Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015) that
positive mood increases the probability to use a compensatory strategy.
A potential reason for the contradiction of results is currently un-
explained. One might search for the cause of contradictory ﬁndings in
the diﬀerences in the visual design of the task or the type of the en-
vironment in which the experiment was carried out (laboratory vs.
online experiment). Although there is no explanation of why the dif-
ferences in the visual presentation should be responsible for the results,
previous research has found that even subtle variations of context
factors can inﬂuence the strategy selection process, presumably by
guiding visual attention to speciﬁc aspects of a task (Bröder et al.,
2013). As another possible reason for diﬀerences in the results one
could suspect the way of data analysis: while Scheibehenne and von
Helversen (2015) used the Bayesian approach, the current study em-
ployed multi-level modelling. However, even the conventional analysis
of the original experiment would show the trend that is opposite to the
current result – the average proportion of non-compensatory choices in
the positive mood condition was 38% in the original study versus 67%
in the current study. Alternatively, since the positive mood activates
heuristic processing of information according to the “mood-as-in-
formation” account, the availability of heuristics in a sample could have
an impact on the results. As previous studies have shown that people
can learn how to apply decision-making strategies (Rieskamp & Otto,
2006), participants with more experience in decision experiments
might use a compensatory strategy as a default strategy.
Regarding the choice of strategies in the open information board
and Mouselab paradigms, we did not ﬁnd any diﬀerences in decision-
making strategies. It was expected that the non-compensatory strategy
would be used more often in the closed Mouselab if people had higher
cognitive costs of storing the cue information in working memory
(Bröder & Newell, 2008). However, the absence of diﬀerences may be
the result of a relatively moderate number of cues to remember in our
experiments (eight pieces of advice). Additionally, cues were presented
as pictorial stimuli, which might help people to store information more
eﬃciently. We would still expect the diﬀerences in strategies if the
closed Mouselab condition had more options or cues with a more
complex representation of values (Queen, Hess, Ennis, Dowd, & Grühn,
2012).
7.2. Mood manipulation in online studies and in the laboratory
Mood manipulation eﬀects are considered to be not very stable and
having relatively small eﬀect sizes. Therefore, replication studies are
required to ﬁgure out the potential role of diﬀerent settings (online,
laboratory) or moderators (e.g., information search) in mood manip-
ulation. As expected, we found that laboratory settings were more ef-
ﬁcient in inducing both positive and negative emotions than an online
experiment. One potential reason for that is that people can avoid the
mood manipulation by switching between web-pages in an online
study. This confounding variable can be measured and controlled in
further studies by applying an algorithm to detect the absence behavior.
7.3. Further research
Further research is required to identify mechanisms and practical
implications of the eﬀect of moods on the information integration
process. One suggestion of a more powerful experiment to detect
strategy changes at ﬁrst glance would involve a within-subjects para-
digm measuring individual diﬀerences in strategy preference before a
mood manipulation and again after the manipulation. However, we
recommend to be cautious with a within-subject design as it introduces
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strong eﬀects of routinization (Bröder & Schiﬀer, 2006) that interfere
with expected eﬀects of mood. Another set of unpublished studies from
our lab (N=122) with a within-subject design showed no systematic
eﬀect of mood in the closed Mouselab, but the question whether the
eﬀect is present in open information boards remains open.
As a conclusion, the current study shows that mood inﬂuences
strategy selection and the way how people integrate information. This
ﬁnding contributes to the body of research on the eﬀect of emotion on
decision-making processes, such as investigating the role of emotion in
consumer behavior (Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008), identifying
neural mechanisms underlying the relation between emotions and de-
cisions (Phelps, Lempert, & Sokol-Hessner, 2014), or building one
general model of emotional inﬂuences on decision making (Lerner
et al., 2015). Answering the question which mood is more beneﬁcial for
making an important decision, our results suggest that the eﬀect of
mood might be mitigated in the environment that demands sequential
information search. However, if the information is processed simulta-
neously, the propensity of a positive mood for the non-compensatory
decision-making strategy might lead to the disregard of less important
information.
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Appendix A
Table A1
The task structure is taken from the supplemental materials of Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015) (Table A1) from http://scheibehenne.de/
onlineSupplementScheibehenneVonHelversen2014.zip.
Set Option 1 Option 2 Predictions
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 LEX WADD EQW
1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 –
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 2
1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 2
1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 –
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1
2 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 2
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 2
2 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 2 –
2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 2 2
2 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 2 2
2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 1
2 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 1 1
2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 –
2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 1 1
2 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 1
2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 1 1
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Abstract
This research examines the effect of negative mood on the exploration decision in
foraging behavior. Two potential mechanisms of mood influences are investigated:
incorporation of a mood into a summary evaluation of a currently available object and
impact of mood on the processing of information. We conducted three experimental
studies that used tasks with exploration-exploitation dilemmas. In two web-based
experiments participants played the Fishing pond task, in which they could either
collect fish at the current pond or switch to a new one which incurred opportunity
costs. Mood was manipulated by music, pictures, and the cover story. In the third
laboratory experiment the task was devoid of semantic content, and mood was
manipulated only by music. The results showed that negative mood promotes a general
tendency to explore rather than to exploit. At the same time, there was no evidence for
the impact of the mood on the processing of information. This finding supports the idea
that emotions influence the exploration behavior by changing the perceived value of the
current environment.
Keywords: negative mood, exploration, decision making, online-experiment, mood
manipulation
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The Effect of Negative Mood on Exploration in Decisions from Experience
Introduction
For thousands of years our ancestors have sustained themselves by gathering food
from their natural environment. To survive, particularly as hunters and gatherers,
humans should have developed the ability to decide when to stay longer at the current
place of foraging and when to move further. The dilemma between exploitation and
exploration is also familiar to modern gatherers: if you ever picked mushrooms or did
fishing, you know the choice between staying on your favorite route or spot and moving
to a new place. As it was a long time ago when our ancestors were searching for
nutrition, you decide whether to stay in a known area or take the risk of trying
something new (Mehlhorn et al., 2015).
The foraging problem can be understood as a problem of utility maximization in a
situation where choices are initially unknown, but can be explored (Hills & Hertwig,
2010). It is a tradeoff between exploration, which can be potentially rewarding but is
risky and costs energy and time, and exploitation, which takes advantage of currently
available resources but eventually depletes them and elicits boredom (J. D. Cohen,
McClure, & Yu, 2007). Modeling of foraging behavior can be applied to various
domains, such as Internet browsing (Pirolli & Card, 1999), dating behavior (Saad, Eba,
& Sejean, 2009), memory search (Hills & Pachur, 2012), or shopping behavior (Riefer &
Love, 2015).
The emotional regulation of tradeoffs in exploration and exploitation is not yet
well understood, although, from an evolutionary perspective, one might speculate that
emotional mechanisms to regulate foraging behavior have evolved before explicit
cognitive strategies. Researchers agree that the purpose of the affective system is to
monitor the exterior environment of the human body, signal changes and maintain
homeostasis (Damasio & Carvalho, 2013). The subjective component of an affective
reaction is a feeling that has the adaptive value of forcing an organism to care about its
current state and facilitate learning and predicting future situations (Scherer, 2005).
Affective reactions, known as emotions, are intense and short-lived experiences triggered
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by an event (J. B. Cohen, Pham, & Andrade, 2008). Moods, on the other hand, are
vague, diffuse and long-lasting affective states. The most important dimension for
distinguishing affective states is their valence, which ranges from negative to positive
(Russell & Pratt, 1980). In the current research we investigate how exploration behavior
is influenced by negative mood. The predictions for the exploration behavior are
derived from theoretical approaches that address two aspects of the decision-process:
evaluation of a currently accessible object and processing of information.
Impact of Mood on the Evaluation of an Object
The impact of mood on the evaluation of an object (content-related influence of
mood) is associated with the incorporation of a mood into a summary evaluation of a
currently accessible object and described by the mood-as-information theory, which
considers mood as a source of information for inferences about the current situation
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983). The typical finding in studies of the relationship between
mood and judgment is the congruency effect: people in a negative mood evaluate
currently available objects less favorably than people in a positive mood. Evidence of
the congruency effect has been demonstrated in studies on the evaluation of brand
products (Barone, Miniard, & Romeo, 2000), political candidates (Isbell & Wyer, 1999),
perceived risks (Johnson & Tversky, 1983), and future consumption episodes (Gilbert,
Gill, & Wilson, 2002).
Since mood influences the evaluation of objects in the current environment, the
mood-as-information theory assumes that participants in a negative mood evaluate the
current state more negatively than participants in a better mood. Therefore, people in
a negative mood are expected to explore more than others.
The alternative hypothesis that people in a negative mood will be less explorative
than others is justified by studies showing higher risk aversion in negative moods
(Johnson & Tversky, 1983). In this way, the congruency effect is produced by the match
between the negative mood and the more pessimistic evaluation of a possible future
state following the exploration decision.
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Impact of Mood on Information Processing
Previous research has shown that mood states also affect the way how information
is processed (Bless & Fiedler, 2012). The extension of the mood-as-information theory,
cognitive tuning hypothesis (Schwarz & Clore, 2007), proposes that mood can influence
the processing style by informing the individual about the nature of the current
situation. Positive mood signals that the current environment is benign and therefore
does not require careful information processing. In line with that, it has been found
that a positive mood promotes superficial thinking, for example, in a persuasion task
(Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992). On the other hand, negative mood provides a stop
signal alerting people that they are in a problematic environment that needs a careful
and detailed examination. Therefore, people in a negative mood may search for more
information and have higher thresholds to accept options (von Helversen, Wilke,
Johnson, Schmid, & Klapp, 2011).
According to the cognitive tuning hypothesis, the demand for careful information
processing in a negative mood results in changes in decision-making strategies, such as a
more thorough search for information. For this reason, people in a negative mood
should be more sensitive to the actual distribution of resources in the environment than
people in a better mood. As a result, people in the negative mood will discriminate
more accurately between advantageous and disadvantageous environments. Therefore,
they are expected to stay shorter in low-resource environments and stay longer in
high-resource environments. Hence, the exploration-exploitation tradeoff in a negative
mood should depend more on the resource quality of the current environment.
The cognitive tuning hypothesis contrasts with an opposite assumption that a
more positive mood should increase the efficiency of decision-making. This alternative
is a corollary of two theories that emphasize the beneficial effects of positive mood on
information processing. First, the broaden-and-build theory assumes that positive mood
expands attention and broadens the repertoire of possible behaviors, while negative
mood narrows down and limits attention (Fredrickson, 2001). Secondly, in her theory of
positive emotions, Isen (2001) also expects people in a positive mood to work more
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efficiently and find more creative solutions that can offer them advantages in finding
high-resource environments. Since the effect of mood is dependent on the task and the
foraging task has not been tested from the emotional perspective in previous research, it
is difficult to conceive how exactly the expanded attention or creativity could unfold in
the foraging task. Therefore, the current research is necessary to find out whether
negative mood increases or decreases the efficiency of exploration.
The present research
The aim of the current empirical study is to examine how content- and
process-related influences of mood unfold if both resource quality of the environment
and mood are manipulated. First, based on the congruency effect explained by the
mood-as-information theory, we expect people in a negative mood to explore more than
people in a better mood at every level of resource quality. Secondly, under the
assumption of the cognitive tuning hypothesis, participants in a negative mood should
be more sensitive to the resource distribution than others. Cast in data analysis terms,
the mood-as-information hypothesis predicts a main effect of negative mood on the
exploration behavior, whereas the cognitive tuning hypothesis predicts an interaction of
mood and resource quality.
To test the hypotheses, both the mood and the distribution of resources were
factorially manipulated in three experiments. The uncertainty of the resource
distribution varied, being high in Experiment 1 and low in Experiments 2 and 3. The
mood was induced by music and either a pleasant or an unpleasant semantic framing of
the tasks that were otherwise identical in Experiments 1 and 2. To eliminate possible
effects due to the content of tasks, only the music mood manipulation was used in
Experiment 3.
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 7
Experiment 1
Method
Materials and Procedure. The experiment was conducted as an online study
in which we induced a negative or positive mood by a cover story, images, and music in
a between-subjects design. The quality of resources was varied as a within-subjects
random factor. The experiment was programmed in JavaScript and installed on the
personal website of the first author1. The fishing pond task was chosen as the main
experimental paradigm (Mata, Wilke, & Czienskowski, 2009). In this task, participants
have to collect fish from a pond, but can switch to a new pond and incur a cost of
constant travel time (15 s.) between the ponds whenever they decide that the current
pond is too depleted to exploit it in a profitable way. Therefore, people constantly face
the dilemma between exploitation (staying at the current pond and waiting for another
fish) and exploration (moving to a new pond with the hope of finding more fish). The
quality of pond resources was manipulated as a within-subjects factor so that the
number of fish in each new pond was independently drawn from a Poisson distribution
with an average of 10 fish.
The participants were recruited from various Internet sources including social
networks, forums, and online newspapers. After agreeing to a declaration of consent,
the participants filled out a questionnaire with demographic data and answered control
questions. After that, they evaluated their current mood and read the instructions for
the fishing game. Depending on the mood condition, the instruction was either to fish
at ponds or to collect dead fish in a polluted area. To adjust the volume of speakers or
headphones, the participants heard a short piece of music. The mood induction music
also played during the 20-minute game. After the game, the participants answered a
mood questionnaire and described how they decided to switch to a new pond. The next
page contained rating scales for the use of cues for switching decisions such as the
number of fish caught at the pond, the total time at the pond and the waiting time
1 The experiment and the program code are available at http://yuryshevchenko.com/
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since the last catch. Finally, the participants could leave their contact details to take
part in a lottery and write comments about the study. Their responses and behavioral
data were recorded at each phase of the experiment by periodic file transfer to the
server. After the study was completed, five people from 20 participants with the best
results were randomly selected, and each winner received 20 Euro Amazon voucher.
Mood induction materials. A cover story, images, and music were used
together to induce a target mood, as a combination of methods can produce more
intense effects (Kory & D’Mello, 2015). The cover story in the positive mood group
described the situation of fishing on a warm and sunny summer day. In the negative
mood group, we told the participants that the area was heavily polluted and they had
to collect dead fish. In both groups, the aim was to collect as many fish as possible.
We used mood-inducing imagery to decorate ponds in both conditions (see Figure
1). In the negative mood condition, the top of the screen was covered with two images
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Bradley & Lang, 2007): the
upper part of the image “Kids” (№9520, mean valence 2.46, mean arousal 5.41) was on
the left side, the image “Toxic waste” (№9270, mean valence 3.72, mean arousal 5.24)
was on the right side. In the positive mood condition, the upper part of the screen was
covered by two pictures depicting a landscape with white clouds in the blue sky on the
left side and a funny cartoon character with a fish on the right side.
Eight pieces of music (see Appendix A1) were selected from the study by
Mitterschiffthaler, Fu, Dalton, Andrew, and Williams (2007), in which respondents had
chosen happy and sad classical compositions from a database. The order of the musical
pieces was randomized for each participant in our experiment.
Mood manipulation check. A mood manipulation check was carried out by
asking participants before and after the fishing game about their current mood using a
short form of the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS, Watson & Clark,
1999). Participants had to rate 14 emotions on the visual scale that recorded responses
from 0 to 500. The questionnaire contained three groups of emotions: positive emotions
(alert, active, inspired, attentive, interested), negative emotions (afraid, upset, nervous,
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Figure 1 . The fishing task in negative and positive mood groups.
irritable, distressed, disgusted), and joviality (joyful, happy, cheerful). The scores on
each of three scales were later averaged and converted into a percentage scale (0 - 100%).
The fishing game. The fishing game was presented as a sequence of ponds
with different (unknown) amounts of fish. The instruction in the positive mood
condition was: “In the following task you will see a fishing pond. The summer brought
warm and sunny weather, so you go fishing. From time to time fish will appear on the
surface of the pond. Please click on the fish as soon as you see it to catch it. Your goal
is to catch as many fish as possible”. In the negative mood condition, people read the
instruction: “In the following task, you will see a pond. The area around was badly
polluted, so you have to collect dead fish. From time to time dead fish will appear on
the surface of the pond. Please click on the fish as soon as you see it to pick it up. Your
goal is to collect as many fish as possible”. The rest of the instruction was identical for
both conditions: “The more fish you get from the pond, the less fish remain there and
the more time you have to wait. You can go to a new pond if you click on the button
‘New pond’. Note that traveling to a new pond takes some time. Ponds are different in
the amount of fish. There are ponds that contain only a few fish and ponds with a lot of
fish. Some music will be played during the game. Before you start the task, please make
sure that your speakers or headphones are working. Use the test music sample to adjust
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the volume that is comfortable for you”.
The number of fish per pond was determined by a Poisson distribution with an
average of 10 fish. Fish appeared at a rate that linearly depended on the number of fish
in a pond but also included a random error. Using computer simulation we calculated
that the Poisson distribution and the variance in the appearance of fish produced the
mean waiting time for the first fish of 11.31 sec. in the range between 3.90 and 109.30
sec. (SD = 5.14 sec.). A fish popped to the surface of the pond, and a participant had
to click on the image of the fish to catch it. The task has been programmed to end after
20 minutes. We saved participants’ data for each event in the game, such as a click on
the pond or a click on the fish. To prevent participants from reloading the web page, if
a participant refreshed the page, she had to wait for 1 minute to continue the task.
Methods of data analysis. We report all data exclusions (if any), all
manipulations, and all measures in the study. In order to measure exploration behavior,
we used the time spent at each pond. First, the analysis of the residence time has often
been considered in previous studies to show that the resource quality of a pond
influences the exploration decision (Hutchinson, Wilke, & Todd, 2008). Secondly, the
use of aggregated measures such as the number of visited ponds is less conclusive, as the
total number depends largely on the resource quality of the attended ponds, which are
selected randomly for each participant. Therefore, the analysis should take into account
differences between ponds and unequal sample sizes of pond qualities. To meet these
requirements, we applied a linear-mixed model. The log-transformed residence time at
each pond was used as a dependent variable. The main predictors were the mood and
the pond quality.
Participants. The online experiment took place from December 2015 to March
2016. There were five language versions of the fishing task: German, English, Russian,
Korean, and Italian. 264 participants (175 females, 89 males) completed the
experiment2. The average age of the participants was 25.26 years (SD = 8.22).
2 238 participants did not complete the fishing task, but interrupted it by closing the web page. Since
we did not intend to analyse incomplete data, these participants were not included in the final sample,
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Results
Testing for engagement. A common concern in online studies is that the
experimental design lacks control and precision (Ferrer, Grenen, & Taber, 2015). To
ensure that the data were correctly recorded and the participants were fully engaged in
the experiment and understood the instructions correctly, we used the following criteria
to analyze their behavior: the time in the experiment, the number of visited ponds,
missing fish, and the amount of page reloads. To detect multiple participation in the
experiment, the information of the web browser (i.e., cookies) was saved.
Due to a missing Internet connection, two participants stayed in the fishing game
for more than 25 minutes, so they were excluded from the final sample. One participant
visited more than 50 ponds. A detailed examination revealed that she had
misunderstood the instructions, so she was also excluded from the final sample3.
Another criterion for ignoring the task was how often a participant did not click
on the fish when it appeared on the screen. As far as the distribution of the fish miss
was not Gaussian, Median = 3, M = 5.49, SD = 7.21, we applied a non-parametric
Mann-Whitney test to analyze the differences between the mood groups. There was no
significant difference between the negative and the positive mood groups in the number
of missing fish, W = 9179, p = .24. Thus, we did not exclude participants based on the
total number of fish misses, but used the number of fish misses at a pond as a control
variable in the further analysis.
Regarding the number of page reloads, nine participants refreshed the web page
with the task at least once (four participants in the positive mood group). As far as we
had saved the data before reloading, the participants could continue playing at the same
although their data could be stored and considered in the further analysis (see Experiment 2). The
exploratory analysis showed that there was a significant interdependence between the mood condition
and the interruption of the game, χ2 (1) = 4.31, p = .04, suggesting that people in the positive mood
group interrupted the experiment more often (63%) than people in the negative group (37%).
3 The participant visited 61 ponds without catching fish. At the beginning, she made 77 clicks on the
first three ponds and then constantly changed to a new pond.
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pond after one minute, so we did not exclude these participants.
Consequently, the filtering was applied to two participants who stayed in the game
for more than 25 minutes and to one participant who visited more than 50 ponds,
resulting in 261 participants for the final analysis (Table 1).
Table 1
Characteristics of the final sample. Standard deviations are written in parentheses.
Sample
size
Age Females Fish
misses
Visited
ponds
Collected
fish
Time at
a pond in
seconds
Positive
condition
140 24.42
(6.41)
89 5.52
(7.79)
8.12
(5.04)
27.98
(8.46)
129.67
(130.24)
Negative
condition
121 26.25
(9.93)
84 5.45
(6.51)
9.02
(5.59)
28.98
(8.16)
115.54
(121.87)
All 261 25.27
(8.27)
173 5.49
(7.21)
8.54
(5.31)
28.44
(8.32)
122.71
(126.35)
Mood manipulation check. We computed the difference between the pre- and
post-task mood measurements for 258 participants who completed both mood
questionnaires. Independent t-tests were used to analyze the differences between two
groups on each of three emotion scales: positive, negative, and jovial emotions. The
values for the emotions were calculated as average scores on the following scales:
positive emotions (alert, active, inspired, attentive, interested), negative emotions
(afraid, upset, nervous, irritable, distressed, disgusted), and joviality (joyful, happy,
cheerful). The scores are given on a percentage scale (0 – 100%). There were differences
in the decline of positive emotions between the positive group (M = -10.60, SD =
15.67) and the negative group (M = -15.63, SD = 16.96), t (256) = -2.47, p < .05, d =
0.31. The same pattern was observed in the decrease of jovial emotions in the positive
group (M = -7.43, SD = 19.45) and in the negative group (M = -15.08, SD = 17.05), t
(256) = -3.34, p < .01, d = 0.42. The increase in negative emotions was observed only
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in the negative group (M = 5.22, SD = 14.90), while there were no changes in the
positive group (M = -0.05, SD = 12.89), t (256) = 3.05, p < .01, d = 0.38. We
concluded that the mood manipulation was successful because the negative mood
during the task was only induced in the negative group.
Residence time at a pond. 261 participants have changes ponds at least once
in the game. The residence time at a pond was log-transformed to eliminate the
skewness of the distribution. We used lme4 package in R (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, &
Walker, 2015) to perform a linear mixed-effects analysis. To test the
mood-as-information hypothesis, a baseline model (Model 0) and a main effect model
(Model 1) were compared with a Likelihood ratio test (see Appendix A2 for the models’
parameters). The baseline model included the fixed effects of the pond resource quality
and the number of fish misses at the pond. To control for the influence of the initial
emotional state of participants, the individual ratings of negative, positive, and jovial
emotions before the experiment were also included in the model4. The random effects
were modeled for each subject and the interaction between a subject and the pond
quality.
The main effect model was similar to the baseline model, but in addition
contained the fixed effect for the mood manipulation. The Likelihood ratio test between
the baseline and main effect model showed the marginally significant difference, χ2 (1)
= 3.09, p = .08, indicating the presence of the main effect of the mood, b = -0.20, p =
.08 (see Figure 2 for effects’ estimates and Figure 3 for predicted values). In the main
effect model, pond resource quality (i.e., each additional fish) also positively affected the
time spent at a pond, b = 0.04, p < .001, as did the number of fish misses at the pond,
b = 0.08, p < .001. The negative emotions before the task also tended to shorten the
residence time, which was indicated by a marginally significant effect, b = -0.01, p =
4 Comparing simpler versions of the models (without the fixed effects of the number of fish misses at
the pond and the initial emotions ratings) did not change the significance level of the main and
interaction effects (p = .08 and p = .22) and led to identical conclusions. Therefore, we report the
results for the most complex models.
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.08. The effects of the positive and jovial emotions before the task were not statistically
significant (p = .43 and p = .41).
To assess the cognitive tuning hypothesis, the main effect model (Model 1) was
compared with a similar model that additionally included the interaction between the
mood and the pond resource quality (Model 2), which is a standard way to test an
interaction effect (Bates et al., 2015). The interaction model also contained the main
effects, since in models that do not control for the main effects, the significance of
interaction may depend on the levels of predictors chosen for the model (J. Cohen,
Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Rouder, Engelhardt, McCabe, & Morey, 2016). In fact,
purely additive factors can show a significant interaction if the additive main effects are
not controlled for in the analysis. Comparing the models with the likelihood ratio test,
we found that the interaction model does not differ significantly from the main effect
model, χ2(1) = 1.71, p = .19, indicating the lack of interaction between the mood and
the pond resource quality, b = 0.02, p = .195. All interactions between jovial, positive
and negative emotions at the beginning of the experiment with the pond resource
quality were also not significant (p > .10).
Performance analysis. As an exploratory analysis, we checked whether the
main performance indicator, the amount of collected fish, was different depending on
the mood. There were no significant differences between people in the positive (M =
27.98, SD = 8.46) and negative group (M = 28.98, SD = 8.16), t (258) = 0.97, p = .34,
d = 0.12.
5 One might argue that the test of the cognitive tuning hypothesis should be done with an interaction
model without corresponding main effects (Model 3). The interaction effect between the mood
condition and the pond resource quality in Model 3 was not significant, b = 0.01, p = .18. Additionally,
the model fit of Model 3 (AIC = 5978.0, BIC = 6033.5) was worse than the model fits of other models,
corroborating the previous finding that the cognitive tuning hypothesis was not supported by the data.
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Figure 2 . Fixed effects for predictors of the main effect model with the log-transformed
residence time as a dependent variable. The estimates are sorted by effect size.
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Figure 3 . Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals for the residence time
conditioned on fixed and random effects of the main effect model. The pond resource
quality is on the X-scale with two lines depicting the positive and negative mood group.
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Discussion
We found a tendency for participants in the negative mood group to spend less
time at ponds than other participants, which we interpreted as a sign of higher
exploration. Additionally, participants in a more negative emotional state before the
task were more explorative than others. These results support the mood-as-information
hypothesis that implies the congruency effect between mood and evaluation of the
currently accessible environment: People in a negative mood had a more negative
evaluation of the current state, so they explored more than people in a better mood.
The data speak against the alternative idea that negative mood impacts the assessment
of future risks, which in turn increases risk aversion and reduces exploration. With
regard to the process-related influence of mood, there was no significant interaction
between quality of the current pond and mood, and the performance level was similar
for both mood conditions. Hence, participants in a more negative mood were not more
sensitive to environmental differences than those in a better mood, as predicted by the
cognitive tuning hypothesis. The alternative assumption that a positive mood should
improve the decision-making could not be evaluated since the positive group did not
show an increase in the positive mood, although the mood contrast between groups was
found.
The mood measurements after the task revealed a decline of positive mood in
both the positive and negative mood groups. The potential explanation for that may be
the length of the task and that people were feeling bored or tired after playing the
game. However, the principal difference between groups was the increase of negative
emotions in the negative mood group and no significant changes in the negative mood
in the positive mood group. Also, the drop in positive emotions was much larger in the
negative condition. This asymmetry between positive and negative emotions coincides
with the previous findings that negative emotions are easier to elicit than positive ones
(Ferrer et al., 2015).
The support for the mood-as-information theory was only marginally significant
at conventional levels. This may be due to the low motivation to participate in an
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online study and non-compliance behavior, which was also confirmed by the high
drop-out rates. In Experiment 2, to assure participants’ motivation to follow the study’s
instructions, we restricted the sample to university students participating for credits.
Additionally, we wanted to rule out potential floor effects to be responsible for the lack
of an interaction effect. Therefore, we applied another form of resource distribution at
fishing ponds. As indicated in the literature, people are less sensitive to a Poisson
resource distribution than expected in rational models of behavior (Hutchinson et al.,
2008), so the application of resource distributions that are somewhat easier to
discriminate would be a further way to test the predictions of content- and
process-related theoretical approaches.
Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we examined the relationship between mood and exploration
behavior in a different form of resource distribution at ponds. To boost the effect of the
pond quality, the resource distribution of ponds was made more distinguishable in
Experiment 2.
Method
Materials and Procedure. Whereas the manipulation of mood as a
between-subjects factor remained the same, the within-subjects manipulation of the
resource quality of ponds was changed. There were three pond qualities (with zero, ten,
and twenty fish) that were equally likely to occur after a pond change. Compared to
Experiment 1, the distribution of fish per pond in Experiment 2 provided waiting times
for the first fish with a lower standard deviation. No fish were shown at the low-quality
ponds, 10 fish popped up at the ponds of the average quality with the mean waiting
time for the first fish of 10 sec. (SD = 0.96), 20 fish appeared at the ponds of the high
quality with the mean waiting time of 5 sec. (SD = 0.48).
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1, except that participants were
allowed to deliberately stop the fishing game before its end, which prevented data loss.
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When participants pressed the stop button, they proceeded to the questionnaires and
could complete the experiment.
The mood induction material and the fishing task remained essentially the same
as in Experiment 1. To alleviate boredom, we doubled the fish encounter rate and
reduced the travel time between ponds to 7 seconds.
Participants. The second online experiment took place from March 2016 to
June 2016. To ensure data quality, the sample was limited to students from the
University of Mannheim in Germany and the Radboud University Nijmegen in the
Netherlands who took part in the study for participation credits. There were two
language versions of the fishing task: German and Dutch6. 138 people completed the
experiment. Among them, 81 people (43 in the positive mood condition) played the
fishing game till the end, and 57 participants (34 in the positive mood condition) used
the stop button in the fishing game.
Results
Testing for engagement. There were no participants whose time variables
were incorrectly recorded, which could be the indicator for the missing Internet
connection. Concerning the number of visited ponds, there were no outliers. One
participant missed more than 90 fish and was excluded from the analysis. The median
number of missed fish was 3, M = 5.40, SD = 10.55. A Mann-Whitney test indicated
no difference between negative and positive conditions in the number of missed fish, W
= 2453.5, p = .65. Regarding the number of page reloads, three people (two in the
positive mood group) refreshed the fishing game page at least once.
The participants who finished the game missed more fish than the participants
who used the stop button, W = 2896.5, p < .05. Regarding the time in the game and
the number of visited ponds, 81 participants who played the fishing game to the end
spent 20.23 min. in the game (SD = 0.44) and visited 13.58 ponds (SD = 4.82). 57
6 We thank Dieuwertje van de Schoot for translating the task into Dutch language and recruiting
participants at the Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands.
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participants who used the stop button spent 9.85 min. in the game (SD = 5.41) and
visited 8.18 ponds (SD = 5.36). There was no interdependence between the mood
condition and interruption of the game with the stop button, χ2 (1, N = 138) = 0.58, p
= .44. Therefore, we retained participants who used the stop button in the final sample
but included the interruption of the game as a control variable in the further analysis.
There were also 14 participants who interrupted the task by closing the web page
(time in the game, M = 6.31 min., SD = 7.49; the number of visited ponds, M = 4.93,
SD = 5.12). As far as this sample was rather small and mainly consisted of the
participants who did not complete the first mood questionnaire, we excluded them from
the analysis.
Thus, filtering was only applied to the participant who missed more than 90 fish,
resulting in 137 people for analysis (Table 2).
Mood manipulation check. The scores are presented on a percentage scale (0
- 100%). There were no differences in the decline of positive emotions between the
positive group (M = -10.64, SD = 19.23) and the negative group (M = -13.05, SD =
17.32), t (135) = -0.83, p = .45, d = 0.13. However, the decrease in joviality was larger
in the negative group (M = -13.03, SD = 17.61) in comparison with the positive group
(M = -4.58, SD = 18.76), t (135) = -2.69, p < .01, d = 0.46. An increase in negative
emotions was only observed in the negative group (M = 4.92, SD = 11.63), while there
were no changes in the positive group (M = -0.74, SD = 12.01), t (135) = 2.77, p < .01,
d = 0.48. Hence, the mood manipulation was again successful with respect to the
negative mood.
Residence time at a pond. 135 participants have changed ponds at least
once. The same models as in Experiment 1, but including the fixed effect of the
interruption, were applied to the log-transformed time data. The baseline model, the
main effect model, and the interaction effect model were compared using Likelihood
ratio tests (see Appendix A3 for parameters). With regard to the mood-as-information
hypothesis, we found that the main effect model was significantly different from the
baseline model, χ2 (1) = 4.24, p = .039, indicating that the inclusion of the mood
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Table 2
Characteristics of the final sample. Standard deviations are written in parentheses.
Sample
size
Age Females Fish
misses
Visited
ponds
Collected
fish
Time at
a pond in
seconds
Used the stop button
Positive
condition
34 22.50
(6.59)
36 2.94
(4.17)
7.15
(3.62)
33.67
(19.95)
73.96
(65.11)
Negative
condition
23 24.09
(9.91)
27 5.04
(9.18)
9.96
(6.85)
35.87
(24.72)
56.05
(48.42)
Played till the end
Positive
condition
42 20.86
(3.10)
28 4.74
(6.48)
13.40
(5.10)
72.52
(21.18)
84.17
(71.77)
Negative
condition
38 25.37
(11.00)
22 6.11
(8.15)
13.79
(4.62)
76.24
(19.56)
80.06
(68.03)
All 137 23.06
(8.09)
113 4.72
(7.06)
11.41
(5.67)
57.93
(28.68)
82.19
(69.99)
manipulation effect improves the fit of the model. The participants in the negative
condition remained at ponds shorter than the participants in the positive condition, b =
-0.16, p = .037 (see Figures 4 and 5). The pond resource quality also positively affected
the residence time, b = 0.60, p < .001, as well as the number of fish misses at a pond, b
= 0.16, p < .001, and positive emotions at the beginning of the experiment, b = 0.08, p
= .017. However, joviality at the beginning of the experiment was negatively related to
the time at a pond, b = -0.06, p = .033. The participants who completed the task had
longer residence times, b = 0.17, p = .034.
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Figure 4 . Fixed effects for predictors of the main effect model with the log-transformed
residence time as a dependent variable. The estimates are sorted by effect size.
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With respect to the cognitive tuning hypothesis, the main effect model and the
interaction model did not differ in their fit, χ2 (1) = 0.41, p = .52, suggesting that there
was no interaction between the mood condition and the resource quality of a pond, b =
0.04, p = .527. All interactions between jovial, positive and negative emotions at the
beginning of the experiment with the pond resource quality were not significant (p >
.10)8.
7 The interaction effect between the mood condition and the pond resource quality in Model 3 with the
interaction but without corresponding main effects was also not significant, b = -0.02, p = .68.
Moreover, the model fit of Model 3 (AIC = 3084.3, BIC = 3142.0) was worse than the fit of other
models.
8 Comparing simpler versions of the models (without the fixed effects of the number of fish misses at
the pond and the initial emotions ratings) led to identical conclusions. The main effect of the negative
mood was still significant, b = -0.17, p = .044, and the interaction effect remained not significant, b =
0.06, p =.30.
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Figure 5 . Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals for the residence time
conditioned on fixed and random effects of the main effect model. The pond resource
quality is on the X-scale with two lines depicting the positive and negative mood group.
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Performance analysis. Regarding the amount of collected fish, there were no
significant differences between people who finished the task in the positive (M = 72.52,
SD = 21.18) and negative group (M = 76.24, SD = 19.56), t (78) = 0.97, p = .42, d =
0.18. In the group of participants who interrupted the task, the number of collected fish
was also not significantly different: Mpos = 33.67, SDpos = 19.95 vs. Mneg = 35.87,
SDneg = 24.72, t (54) = 0.37, p = .71, d = 0.10.
Discussion
Analyzing the residence time at ponds, we found that participants in the negative
mood explored more than participants in the other condition, which again supported
the mood-as-information account. Finding a statistically significant effect in the sample,
which was smaller than in Experiment 1, may be attributed to the higher compliance
rate and more homogeneous characteristics of university students. For instance, in a
sample with more considerable age differences, exploration can be influenced by reduced
learning performance in old age (Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, & Hertwig, 2011).
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Furthermore, the inclusion of participants who interrupted the task in the analysis can
be informative, as the effect of mood manipulation can dissolve over time and
alternative emotions such as boredom can influence the exploration. The lack of
differences in the interruption rate between conditions speaks against the idea that
people in the negative mood simply did not like or avoided the negative mood
manipulation.
There was no hint to an interaction between quality of the current pond and
mood, so the cognitive tuning hypothesis was not supported by the data. Given the
lack of contrast in the positive mood between groups, the alternative hypothesis that
the positive mood increases the efficiency of exploration cannot be evaluated. As in
Experiment 1, negative emotions increased only in the negative condition, and positive
and jovial emotions decreased in both conditions. Whereas the joviality level dropped
more in the negative mood condition, the decline in positive emotions was not different
between groups. The increased speed of the game can explain the reduced gap in the
loss of positive emotions between negative and positive groups. We conclude that the
fishing task can be a reliable trigger for a negative mood. However, an increase in the
positive mood (i.e., being more alert, active, inspired, attentive, and interested) can
hardly be achieved in the current version of the task. First, participants may already be
in a good mood when they start the experiment. Secondly, the task itself is not a source
of delight for participants but requires cognitive effort to remain vigilant for twenty
minutes.
One possible confound in both Experiments 1 and 2 was the semantic context
involved in the cover story of the fishing task. People in the negative condition were
asked to collect dead fish, which could promote thoughts about death, whereas people
in the positive condition could think about fishing. Hence, apart from mood, semantic
or conceptual priming effects could have caused the main effect in both experiments
rather than the mood itself. A rigorous test for the mood-as-information and the
cognitive tuning hypotheses would be to use only music as a mood manipulation
method but to keep the semantic context of the task constant across conditions. To
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achieve this goal, we replicated Experiment 2 with a modified version of the fishing task
devoid of semantic content.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 was conducted in the laboratory to increase the effect of the mood
manipulation, which was performed with music only. The content of the fishing task has
been transformed into the task of clicking on circles that appear on the board.
Method
Materials and Procedure. The procedure and logic of the main task in
Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2. The fishing game was modified to a
“perception task” in which participants had to remain vigilant to click on each circle
that was shown on the surface of the board (see Figure 6). The instructions were
written in German and were identical in positive and negative conditions: “In the
following task you will see a white square board. From time to time a black circle figure
will appear on the surface of the board. Please click on the circle as soon as you see it
to take it. Your goal is to collect as many circles as possible. The player, who collects
more circles, wins. The more circles you collect on the board, the fewer circles remain
there and the more time you have to wait. You can switch to a new board by clicking
on the ‘New board’ button. Note that changing a board takes some wait time. Boards
are different in the number of circles. There are boards that contain only a few circles
and boards with many circles. Some music will be played during the game. Before you
start the task, please make sure that your speakers or headphones are working. Use the
test piece of music to adjust the volume that is comfortable for you.”
Participants. The laboratory experiment took place at the University of
Mannheim from February 2017 to March 2017. 62 participants (32 in the positive mood
condition) have completed the experiment.
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Figure 6 . The vigilance task in Experiment 3. Participants had to click on the black
circle, as soon as it appeared on the board. The instructions were presented in German.
Results
Testing for engagement. Since Experiments 2 and 3 were conducted in the
same university, we screened for repeated participation and excluded two people who
already took part in Experiment 2. There were no outliers regarding the number of
visited boards and the total time in the task. 40 participants missed at least one circle
in the task. The median of the number of missed circles was 1, M = 1.43, SD = 1.83. A
Mann-Whitney test indicated no differences between the negative and positive group in
the number of missed circles, W = 383.5, p = .31. There were no cases where the task
was interrupted by pressing the stop button.
Thus, filtering was only applied to the participants who had already taken part in
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Experiment 2, which led to 60 people for analysis (Table 3).
Table 3
Characteristics of the final sample. Standard deviations are written in parentheses.
Sample
size
Age Females Circle
misses
Visited
boards
Collected
circles
Time at a
board in
seconds
Positive
condition
30 20.33
(1.60)
26 1.07
(1.08)
11.23
(4.22)
62.17
(23.55)
103.70
(94.03)
Negative
condition
30 20.63
(2.87)
26 1.80
(2.31)
11.43
(5.40)
64.07
(23.56)
94.35
(73.16)
All 60 20.48
(2.31)
52 1.43
(1.83)
11.33
(4.81)
63.12
(23.38)
98.98
(84.20)
Mood manipulation check. The scores are presented on a percentage scale (0
– 100%). There were differences in the decline of positive emotions between the positive
group (M = -5.33, SD = 18.61) and the negative group (M = -15.24, SD = 17.88), t
(58) = -2.10, p < .05, d = 0.54. The decline of joviality was also larger in the negative
group (M = -10.58, SD = 19.13) in comparison with the positive group (M = -1.05, SD
= 15.45), t (58) = -2.12, p < .05, d = 0.55. However, there were no significant
differences in the increase of negative emotions in the negative group (M = 1.17, SD =
9.28) and the positive group (M = -1.71, SD = 10.30), t (58) = 1.14, p = .26, d = 0.29.
Hence, the mood manipulation was only successful in respect to creating a contrast in
positive and jovial emotions between the groups.
Residence time at a board. All participants switched between boards at least
once. The same model as in Experiment 2 was applied to the log-transformed residence
time data. The baseline model, the main effect model, and the interaction effect model
were compared using Likelihood ratio tests (see Appendix A4 for parameters). With
regard to the mood-as-information hypothesis, the main effect model was not
significantly different from the baseline model, χ2 (1) = 0.81, p = .37, showing that the
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inclusion of the mood condition does not improve the fit of the model, b = -0.09, p =
.36. However, the negative emotions at the beginning of the experiment decreased the
residence time, b = -0.03, p < .001 (see Figures 7 and 8). Regarding the cognitive
tuning hypothesis, the main effect model and the interaction model did not differ in
their fit, χ2 (1) = 0.54, p = .46, suggesting that there was no interaction between the
mood condition and the resource quality of a board, b = -0.03, p = .469. All
interactions between joviality, positive and negative mood at the beginning of the
experiment with the board resource quality were not significant (p > .05).
Figure 7 . Fixed effects for predictors of the main effect model with the log-transformed
residence time as a dependent variable. The estimates are sorted by effect size.
0.47 ***
0.20 **
−0.09
−0.03 ***
−0.01
−0.00
Negative mood condition
Negative emotions at the
beginning (10%)
Positive emotions at the
beginning (10%)
Joviality at the
beginning (10%)
Number of circle misses
at the board
Board resource quality
(each additional 10
circles)
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6
The effect size
9 With regard to the model with the interaction without corresponding main effects, the interaction
effect between the mood condition and the board resource quality in Model 3 was not significant, b =
-0.03, p = .27. The fit of Model 3 (AIC = 1407.9, BIC = 1465.5) was worse than the fits of other
models.
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Figure 8 . Predicted values with 95% confidence intervals for the residence time
conditioned on fixed and random effects of the main effect model. The board resource
quality is on the X-scale with two lines depicting the positive and negative mood group.
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Performance analysis. The number of collected circles did not significantly
differ between participants in the positive (M = 62.17, SD = 23.55) and negative group
(M = 64.07, SD = 23.56), t (58) = 0.31, p = .76, d = 0.08.
Joint analysis of the three datasets. Since all three experiments
manipulated the mood in a conceptually identical way (with less pronounced mood
manipulation in Experiment 3), we analyzed the effect of the mood in all three studies
together to increase the statistical power of the tests. The specification of the
linear-mixed model was similar to the interaction model in Experiment 3. Additionally,
a fixed effect of the experiment was estimated.
Confirming the previously found results, both the negative mood manipulation (b
= -0.18, p < .05) and negative emotions at the beginning of the task (b = -0.06, p <
.05) decreased the residence time, which was a sign of a higher exploration (see
Appendix A5 for parameters). Moreover, there was a tendency for positive emotions at
the beginning of the task to increase the residence time, b = 0.05, p = .07. Missing fish
or circles increased the residence time, b = 0.10, p = < .001, which can imply that the
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participants stayed longer at ponds or boards when they did not pay attention to the
task. As expected, the higher pond (board) quality also increased the residence time, b
= 0.06, p < .001. There was still no significant interaction between the mood condition
and pond (board) quality, b = 0, p = .35. The residence time in Experiment 2 (b =
-0.95, p < .001) and Experiment 3 (b = -0.59, p < .001) was shorter than in Experiment
1, reflecting the changes in the speed of the game after Experiment 1.
Discussion
The mood manipulation in Experiment 3 was to a certain extent successful.
Although the music induced changes in positive and jovial emotions, there were no
differences in negative emotions between groups. Perhaps, the influence of music was
not strong enough to put people in a more negative mood, i.e., more afraid, upset,
nervous, irritable, distressed, or disgusted. The variation in these emotions in
Experiments 1 and 2 can be attributed to the use of images and the manipulation of the
task frame (either fishing or collecting dead fish).
With respect to the mood-as-information hypothesis, we found no differences
between positive and negative mood conditions. First, the unsuccessful negative mood
manipulation can explain why we did not observe the mood effect. Secondly, the
laboratory experiment with the smaller sample size (n = 60) had less statistical power
than Experiments 1 and 2. Hence, even if the mood manipulation was successful in
terms of the manipulation check, the effect on exploration behavior was probably too
weak to be detected with this sample size. However, the negative emotions score at the
beginning of the experiment increased the exploration, which is again supported the
mood-as-information hypothesis.
The joint analysis of the data from all three experiments showed that both
negative mood manipulations and negative emotions at the beginning of the task
increased the exploration behavior.
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General Discussion
The current study examined how mood impacts exploration behavior. Previous
research has shown that negative mood increases the length of information search in
sequential decision tasks (von Helversen & Mata, 2012) and that exploratory
decision-making differs between depressed and healthy participants (Blanco, Otto,
Maddox, Beevers, & Love, 2013). The current research has investigated two potential
mechanisms of negative mood that can account for that: the influence of mood on the
evaluation of a currently accessible object and the effect of mood on the processing of
information.
Concerning the evaluation mechanism, experiments 1 and 2 revealed the effect of
higher exploration in the negative mood with respect to the residence times at each
pond. Although the effect in Experiment 1 was only marginally significant, it can be
attributed to the low motivation of the participants, which was also confirmed by high
dropout rates. Furthermore, the effects in experiments 1 and 2 were in the expected
direction, statistical significance notwithstanding. The laboratory Experiment 3, which
used only the music mood manipulation, did not successfully induce a negative mood,
but the emotional state of participants at the beginning of the experiment significantly
influenced the exploration behavior. As predicted by the mood-as-information
hypothesis, people in a more negative mood showed higher exploration. Hence, it is fair
to say that there was evidence in favor of the congruent influence of mood on the
assessment of the current environment in our data, although the expected effect was not
always provoked by the mood manipulation.
We conclude that the mood-as-information mechanism of mood influence
contributes to the exploration behavior, such that negative emotions might promote a
general tendency to explore more, irrespective of the current resource quality. As an
alternative idea, the observed patterns also support the idea that people in a negative
mood might change their decision-making strategies by setting a higher acceptance
threshold. One can speculate that the adaptive value of a negative mood is to make an
organism more sensitive to the amount of currently available rewards. An alternative
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post hoc explanation of the findings could be derived from the motivational differences
between moods: as far as negative mood motivates people to apply efforts to repair a
problematic situation, people in the negative mood invested more efforts into the task
than people in the positive mood. Hence, they were searching only for ponds or boards
of high quality in the experiments. This hypothesis is plausible and should be
investigated in future research.
Our findings suggest that negative mood is unlikely to increase risk aversion and
inhibit exploration, although previous research has discussed this possibility (Johnson &
Tversky, 1983; Loewenstein, Hsee, Weber, & Welch, 2001). One explanation is that the
influence of a negative mood on exploration can depend on the motivation to focus
more on possible rewards or risks, such as sad people can accept higher risks in favor of
high-reward options, but anxious people prefer to avoid risks (Raghunathan & Pham,
1999). The other explanation concerns the structure of the foraging task. While
decisions based on descriptions provide easily accessible information about future risks
and benefits, decisions based on experience can relate the mood to the current condition
rather than to an uncertain future state.
With respect to the process-related influence of mood, the interpretation of our
results is limited by the efficiency of mood manipulation. Irrespective of mood changes
we found no evidence of the impact of mood on information processing. The lack of the
interaction between mood manipulation and pond quality was consistent in all
experiments. To do justice to the process-related emotion theories, we suppose that the
foraging task may not be suitable for identifying the differences in the processing style.
In general, experience-based decisions can be made in different circumstances that do
not depend on more data-driven processes or a larger attention span.
Overall, this study expands our understating of how cognition operates with
different sorts of ecologies, in particular environments that elicit negative emotions. The
findings are informative for the Information foraging theory (Pirolli & Card, 1999) that
postulates similarities between the external search for resources and the search in
memory. If the balance between exploration and exploitation is controlled by common
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neurobehavioral mechanisms across different domains (J. D. Cohen et al., 2007), then
emotional regulation is likely to impact the decisions that people make in other areas.
In line with our finding that more positive emotions are correlated with
exploitation, Hills (2006) suggested that dopamine plays a role in goal-directed
cognition. The high level of dopamine, which is associated with pleasant feelings of
getting a reward, promotes exploitation behavior. On the contrary, when the
dopaminergic activity is low, the behavior is unfocused and fails to persist. From the
evolutionary point of view, dopamine regulation allows an animal to stay longer at
places with higher rewards and start to explore as soon as the level of rewards is going
down.
Mood Induction
We used several mood inductions techniques combined to manipulate the mood
during the task. Whereas the frame of the task was different (either to fish or to collect
the dead fish), the goal and organization of the game were the same, so participants had
to wait and make decisions about switching a pond in both conditions. We found out
that the mood induction was most effective for negative emotions. However, in
Experiments 1 and 2 the participants were feeling less positive at the end, which might
be affected by their performance or the long waiting time at the ponds. In Experiment
3 only the music manipulation of mood was used. Although there were differences in
positive emotions, the music was not enough to induce negative emotions.
Online-experiment
Conducting an online-experiment in addition to a laboratory study has a number
of advantages, as far as it allows to test a hypothesis in geographically and linguistically
diverse populations. An interactive game as the experimental paradigm may diminish
concerns that participants in online studies are not fully engaged in the task. By
analyzing participants’ behavioral data, it is also possible to ensure that participants
understand the instruction and do not misuse an experimental paradigm.
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Further studies have to address drawbacks of online-experiments: high rate of
dropouts, missing data due to technical problems and lack of control over participants’
environment. The possibility of skipping the part of the experimental task can help to
prevent dropouts and save the data if a researcher collects them at the end of the
experiment. Missing information in an online-experiment can be a result of loss of
Internet connection or non-compliance of participants, such as reloading or skipping
web pages. The problem of disconnection can be solved by transferring data to a server
twice: at each event of a task and at the end of the experiment. If the connection is
interrupted during the task, the data is saved at the second transfer. By saving
event-related data, it is also possible to recreate the game, if a participant reloads the
web page or leaves the experiment to come back later. The problem of skipping web
pages can be solved by introducing unique and non-informative web address for each
page, so that participants cannot enter the name of a web page directly into the address
field of a browser. The lack of control over the environment, in which participants take
part in the experiment, can be compensated by collecting information about the
context. The possible options are to ask people which devices they use (phone, tablet,
laptop, stationary computer) and where they are (home, office, transport).
Conclusion
The current research demonstrated that a negative mood increases exploration
behavior in comparison to a more positive mood. This finding supports the idea that an
informative value of mood can be incorporated into the evaluation of a currently
available object, such as people in a negative mood evaluate the environment less
favorably than people in a positive mood. At the same time, there was no evidence of
the impact of mood on the processing of information, i.e., the influence of a negative
mood on the sensitivity to resource distribution in the environment. The effect of mood
may be weakened by the non-compliance behavior of participants in a web study,
requiring future research to improve the methodology of mood manipulation on the
Internet.
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 34
References
Barone, M. J., Miniard, P. W., & Romeo, J. B. (2000). The Influence of Positive Mood
on Brand Extension Evaluations. Journal of Consumer Research, 26 (4), 386–400.
doi: 10.1086/209570
Bates, D., Mächler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-effects
models using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67 (1), 51. doi:
10.18637/jss.v067.i01
Blanco, N. J., Otto, A. R., Maddox, W. T., Beevers, C. G., & Love, B. C. (2013). The
influence of depression symptoms on exploratory decision-making. Cognition,
129 (3), 563–568. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2013.08.018
Bless, H., & Fiedler, K. (2012). Mood and the regulation of information processing and
behavior. In Joseph P. Forgas (Ed.), Affect in social thinking and behavior (pp.
65–84). Psychology Press. doi: 10.4324/9780203720752
Bless, H., Mackie, D. M., & Schwarz, N. (1992). Mood effects on attitude judgments:
Independent effects of mood before and after message elaboration. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 63 (4), 585–595. doi:
10.1037//0022-3514.63.4.585
Bradley, M., & Lang, P. (2007). The International Affective Picture System (IAPS) in
the study of emotion and attention. In J. A. Coan & J. J. Allen (Eds.), Handbook
of emotion elicitation and assessement (pp. 29–46). Oxford University Press.
Cohen, J., Cohen, P., West, S. G., & Aiken, L. S. (2003). Applied Multiple
Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (3rd ed.). Mahwah,
NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cohen, J. B., Pham, M. T., & Andrade, E. B. (2008). The nature and role of affect in
consumer behavior. In C. P. Haugtvedt, P. M. Herr, & F. R. Kardes (Eds.),
Handbook of consumer psychology (pp. 297–348). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. doi:
10.4324/9780203809570
Cohen, J. D., McClure, S. M., & Yu, A. J. (2007). Should I stay or should I go? How
the human brain manages the trade-off between exploitation and exploration.
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 35
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 362 (1481),
933–942. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2007.2098
Damasio, A., & Carvalho, G. B. (2013). The nature of feelings: Evolutionary and
neurobiological origins. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 14 (2), 143–152. doi:
10.1038/nrn3403
Ferrer, R. A., Grenen, E. G., & Taber, J. M. (2015). Effectiveness of Internet-Based
Affect Induction Procedures: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. Emotion,
15 (6), 752–762. doi: 10.1037/emo0000035
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology. The
broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions. The American psychologist, 56 (3),
218–26. doi: 10.1037/0003-066X.56.3.218
Gilbert, D. T., Gill, M. J., & Wilson, T. D. (2002). The future is now: Temporal
correction in affective forecasting. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes, 88 (1), 430–444. doi: 10.1006/obhd.2001.2982
Hills, T. T. (2006). Animal Foraging and the Evolution of Goal-Directed Cognition.
Cognitive Science, 30 (1), 3–41. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_50
Hills, T. T., & Hertwig, R. (2010). Information search in decisions from experience: Do
our patterns of sampling foreshadow our decisions? Psychological Science, 21 (12),
1787–1792. doi: 10.1177/0956797610387443
Hills, T. T., & Pachur, T. (2012). Dynamic search and working memory in social recall.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory and Cognition, 38 (1),
218–228. doi: 10.1037/a0025161
Hutchinson, J. M., Wilke, A., & Todd, P. M. (2008). Patch leaving in humans: can a
generalist adapt its rules to dispersal of items across patches? Animal Behaviour ,
75 (4), 1331–1349. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2007.09.006
Isbell, L. M., & Wyer, R. S. (1999). Correcting for Mood-Induced Bias in the
Evaluation of Political Candidates: The Roles of Intrinsic and Extrinsic
Motivation. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25 (2), 237–249. doi:
10.1177/0146167299025002009
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 36
Isen, A. M. (2001). An Influence of Positive Affect on Decision Making in Complex
Situations: Theoretical Issues With Practical Implications. Journal of Consumer
Psychology, 11 (2), 75–85. doi: 10.1207/S15327663JCP1102_01
Johnson, E. J., & Tversky, A. (1983). Affect, generalization, and the perception of risk.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45 (1), 20–31. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.45.1.20
Kory, J., & D’Mello, S. (2015). Affect Elicitation for Affective Computing. In R. Calvo,
S. D’Mello, J. Gratch, & A. Kappas (Eds.), The oxford handbook of affective
computing (pp. 371–383). Oxford University Press. doi:
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199942237.013.001
Loewenstein, G. F., Hsee, C. K., Weber, E. U., & Welch, N. (2001). Risk as Feelings.
Psychological Bulletin, 127 (2), 267–286. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.127.2.267
Mata, R., Josef, A. K., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., & Hertwig, R. (2011). Age differences
in risky choice: A meta-analysis. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences,
1235 (1), 18–29. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06200.x
Mata, R., Wilke, A., & Czienskowski, U. (2009). Cognitive aging and adaptive foraging
Behavior. Journals of Gerontology - Series B Psychological Sciences and Social
Sciences, 64 (4), 474–481. doi: 10.1093/geronb/gbp035
Mehlhorn, K., Newell, B. R., Todd, P. M., Lee, M. D., Morgan, K., Braithwaite, V. A.,
. . . Gonzalez, C. (2015). Unpacking the exploration-exploitation tradeoff: A
synthesis of human and animal literatures. Decision, 2 (3), 191–215. doi:
10.1037/dec0000033
Mitterschiffthaler, M. T., Fu, C. H. Y., Dalton, J. A., Andrew, C. M., & Williams,
S. C. R. (2007). A functional MRI study of happy and sad affective states
induced by classical music. Human Brain Mapping, 28 (11), 1150–1162. doi:
10.1002/hbm.20337
Pirolli, P., & Card, S. (1999). Information foraging. Psychological Review, 106 (4),
643–675. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.106.4.643
Raghunathan, R., & Pham, M. T. (1999). All Negative Moods Are Not Equal:
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 37
Motivational Influences of Anxiety and Sadness on Decision Making.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 79 (1), 56–77. doi:
10.1006/obhd.1999.2838
Riefer, P., & Love, B. (2015). Unfazed by Both the Bull and Bear: Strategic Exploration
in Dynamic Environments. Games, 6 (3), 251–261. doi: 10.3390/g6030251
Rouder, J. N., Engelhardt, C. R., McCabe, S., & Morey, R. D. (2016). Model
comparison in ANOVA. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 23 (6), 1779–1786.
doi: 10.3758/s13423-016-1026-5
Russell, J. A., & Pratt, G. (1980). A description of the affective quality attributed to
environments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 38 (2), 311–322. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.38.2.311
Saad, G., Eba, A., & Sejean, R. (2009). Sex differences when searching for a mate: A
process-tracing approach. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22 (2), 171–190.
doi: 10.1002/bdm.620
Scherer, K. R. (2005). What are emotions? And how can they be measured? Social
Science Information, 44 (4), 695–729. doi: 10.1177/0539018405058216
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (1983). Mood, misattribution, and judgments of well-being:
Informative and directive functions of affective states. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 45 (3), 513–523. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.45.3.513
Schwarz, N., & Clore, G. L. (2007). Feelings and Phenomenal Experiences. In
A. W. Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic
principles (2nd ed., pp. 385–407). Guilford Press.
von Helversen, B., & Mata, R. (2012). Losing a dime with a satisfied mind: Positive
affect predicts less search in sequential decision making. Psychology and Aging,
27 (4), 825–839. doi: 10.1037/a0027845
von Helversen, B., Wilke, A., Johnson, T., Schmid, G., & Klapp, B. (2011).
Performance Benefits of Depression: Sequential Decision Making in a Healthy
Sample and a Clinically Depressed Sample. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
120 (4), 962–968. doi: 10.1037/a0023238
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 38
Watson, D., & Clark, L. (1999). The PANAS-X Manual for the Positive and Negative
Affect Schedule-Expanded Form. Iowa Research Online.
THE EFFECT OF MOOD ON EXPLORATION 39
Appendix
Table A1
Musical compositions used for mood manipulation
Composer Length
Positive mood condition 19:39
Carmen: Chanson du toreador Bizet 4:59
Allegro - A little night music Mozart 5:50
Blue Danube Strauß 5:43
Radetzky march Strauß 3:05
Negative mood condition 23:38
Adagio in sol minor Albinoni 5:51
Solveig’s song - Grieg Peer Gynt 6:03
Concerto de Aranjuez Rodrigo 6:02
Suite for violin & orchestra A minor Sinding 5:40
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Table A2
Comparison of three models in Experiment 1: Baseline model (model 0), Main effect of
mood manipulation (model 1) and the model 2 with the interaction between mood
manipulation and pond resource quality. Unstandardized regression coefficients are
presented.
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Baseline model Main effect of mood Interaction effect
b CI p b CI p b CI p
Intercept 4.60 4.16 – 5.03 <.001 4.66 4.22 – 5.10 <.001 4.65 4.21 – 5.09 <.001
Negative
emotions
-0.01 -0.01 – 0.00 .081 -0.01 -0.01 – 0.00 .080 -0.01 -0.01 – 0.00 .083
Positive
emotions
0.00 -0.00 – 0.01 .43 0.00 -0.00 – 0.01 .38 0.00 -0.00 – 0.01 .36
Joviality -0.00 -0.01 – 0.00 .41 -0.00 -0.01 – 0.00 .44 -0.00 -0.01 – 0.00 .44
Fish misses 0.08 0.05 – 0.11 <.001 0.08 0.05 – 0.11 <.001 0.08 0.05 – 0.11 <.001
Pond quality 0.04 0.03 – 0.06 <.001 0.04 0.03 – 0.06 <.001 0.03 0.01 – 0.06 <.01
Negative mood -0.20 -0.43 – 0.02 .076 -0.20 -0.42 – 0.03 .089
Negative mood
x Pond quality
0.02 -0.01 – 0.05 .19
Random parts
σ2 1.07 1.07 1.07
τ00 0.65 0.64 0.64
ρ01 0.22 0.28 0.27
N 258 258 258
ICC 0.38 0.38 0.38
Observations 1900 1900 1900
R2 / Ω2
0
.54 / .53 .54 / .53 .54 / .53
AIC 5956.9 5955.8 5956.1
BIC 6012.4 6016.9 6022.7
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Table A3
Comparison of three models in Experiment 2: Baseline model (model 0), Main effect of
mood manipulation (model 1) and the model 2 with the interaction between mood
manipulation and pond resource quality. Unstandardized regression coefficients are
presented.
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Baseline model Main effect of mood Interaction effect
b CI p b CI p b CI p
Intercept 3.78 3.47 – 4.10 <.001 3.88 3.56 – 4.20 <.001 3.87 3.55 – 4.20 <.001
Negative
emotions
0.03 -0.04 – 0.09 .46 0.02 -0.05 – 0.08 .61 0.02 -0.05 – 0.08 .62
Positive
emotions
0.08 0.01 – 0.14 .019 0.08 0.01 – 0.14 .017 0.08 0.01 – 0.14 .017
Joviality -0.05 -0.11 – -0.00 .042 -0.06 -0.11 – -0.00 .033 -0.06 -0.11 – -0.00 .032
Pond quality 0.60 0.54 – 0.66 <.001 0.60 0.54 – 0.66 <.001 0.58 0.50 – 0.66 <.001
Fish misses 0.16 0.12 – 0.19 <.001 0.16 0.12 – 0.19 <.001 0.16 0.12 – 0.19 <.001
Finishing the
experiment
0.17 0.01 – 0.33 .04 0.17 0.01 – 0.33 .034 0.17 0.01 – 0.33 .035
Negative mood -0.16 -0.31 – -0.01 .037 -0.15 -0.31 – 0.01 .059
Negative mood
x Pond quality
0.04 -0.08 – 0.16 .52
Random parts
σ2 0.38 0.38 0.38
τ00 0.16 0.16 0.16
ρ01 0.35 0.35 0.35
N 135 135 135
ICC 0.30 0.29 0.29
Observations 1403 1403 1403
R2 / Ω2
0
.60 / .59 .60 / .59 .60 / .59
AIC 2917.0 2914.7 2916.3
BIC 2974.7 2977.7 2984.5
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Table A4
Comparison of three models in Experiment 3: Baseline model (model 0), Main effect of
mood manipulation (model 1) and the model 2 with the interaction between mood
manipulation and board resource quality. Unstandardized regression coefficients are
presented.
Model 0 Model 1 Model 2
Baseline model Main effect of mood Interaction effect
b CI p b CI p b CI p
Intercept 4.50 4.01 – 4.99 <.001 4.55 4.05 – 5.05 <.001 4.51 4.02 – 5.02 <.001
Negative
emotions
-0.03 -0.05 – -0.01 <.001 -0.03 -0.05 – -0.01 <.001 -0.03 -0.05 – -0.01 <.001
Positive
emotions
-0.01 -0.03 – 0.00 .089 -0.01 -0.03 – 0.00 .086 -0.01 -0.03 – 0.00 .077
Joviality -0.00 -0.01 – 0.01 .96 -0.00 -0.01 – 0.01 .96 -0.00 -0.01 – 0.01 .99
Board quality 0.47 0.38 – 0.57 <.001 0.47 0.38 – 0.56 <.001 0.51 0.38 – 0.63 <.001
Circle misses 0.20 0.05 – 0.35 .007 0.20 0.06 – 0.35 .007 0.20 0.06 – 0.35 .006
Negative mood -0.09 -0.29 – 0.11 .36 -0.00 -0.31 – 0.31 .99
Negative mood
x Board qua-
lity
-0.07 -0.25 – 0.11 .45
Random parts
σ2 0.42 0.42 0.42
τ00 0.25 0.25 0.25
ρ01 -0.85 -0.84 -0.84
N 60 60 60
ICC 0.37 0.37 0.37
Observations 620 620 620
R2 / Ω2
0
.53 / .52 .53 / .52 .53 / .52
AIC 1355.7 1356.9 1358.3
BIC 1413.3 1418.9 1424.8
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Table A5
The model with the interaction between mood manipulation and pond (board) resource
quality. The dependent variable is the log-transformed residence time in all three
experiments (N = 453). Unstandardized regression coefficients are presented.
Interaction model
b CI p
Intercept 4.77 4.42 – 5.12 <.001
Negative
emotions
-0.06 -0.11 – -0.01 .022
Positive
emotions
0.05 -0.00 – 0.10 .067
Joviality -0.03 -0.07 – 0.01 .12
Pond (board) quality 0.05 0.03 – 0.06 <.001
Fish (circle) misses 0.10 0.08 – 0.12 <.001
Negative mood -0.18 -0.33 – -0.04 .014
Negative mood x Pond (board)
quality
-0.00 -0.01 – 0.00 .35
Experiment 2 -0.95 -1.12 – -0.79 <.001
Experiment 3 -0.59 -0.83 – -0.35 <.001
Random parts
σ2 0.73
τ00 0.46
ρ01 -0.56
N 453
ICC 0.39
Observations 3923
R2 / Ω2
0
.54 / .54
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Change and status quo in decisions with defaults: The effect of
incidental emotions depends on the type of default
Yury Shevchenko∗ Bettina von Helversen† Benjamin Scheibehenne†
Abstract
Affective states can change how people react to measures aimed at influencing their decisions such as providing a default
option. Previous research has shown that when defaults maintain the status quo positive mood increases reliance on the
default and negative mood decreases it. Similarly, it has been demonstrated that positive mood enhances the preference
for inaction. We extend this research by investigating how mood states influence reliance on the default if the default leads
to a change, thus pitting preference for status quo against a preference for inaction. Specifically, we tested in an online
study how happiness and sadness influenced reliance on two types of default (1) a default maintaining status quo and (2) a
default inducing change. Our results suggest that the effect of emotions depends on the type of default: people in a happy
mood were more likely than sad people to follow a default when it maintained status quo but less likely to follow a default
when it introduced change. These results are in line with mood maintenance theory.
Keywords: default bias, incidental emotions, status quo, mood induction.
1 Introduction
When introducing a new product, for instance a new cell-
phone plan, marketing companies have different strategies
at hand to influence customers. One powerful instrument
to influence people towards making a specific decision
is to provide a default option (Goldstein, Johnson, Her-
rmann, & Heitmann, 2008; Johnson, Bellman, & Lohse,
2002). Default options are automatically chosen when in-
dividuals make no active choice (Brown&Krishna, 2004).
Defaults are sometimes considered as nudges because they
exert a substantial influence on choice without restricting
decision makers’ freedom to choose (Sunstein & Thaler,
2003). The differing rates of organ donation across Eu-
ropean countries provide an impressive example of the
power of defaults (Davidai, Gilovich, & Ross, 2012; John-
son, & Goldstein, 2003). Although Germany, the Nether-
lands, Belgium and Austria all grant their citizens the right
to freely decide whether they are willing to donate their
organs in the case of a fatal accident, the countries differ
if the default is to be an organ donor (opt-out) or if the
default is not to donate (opt-in). In countries such as Ger-
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many and the Netherlands that have an opt-in policy, or-
gan donation rates are around 20% (Johnson & Goldstein,
2003). In contrast, in Austria and Belgium where there is
an opt-out policy, donation rates frequently exceed 90%
(Davidai et al., 2012; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003).
Although the power of defaults has been demonstrated
in many areas ranging from choices about retirement in-
vestments (Cronqvist & Thaler, 2004; Madrian & Shea,
2001) to energy suppliers (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008)
and consumer goods (Goldstein et al., 2008), they do not
always lead to the desired outcome. For instance, in 2007
Facebook launched a program that displayed members’
purchases by default, forcing users to “opt-out” if they did
not want to share their shopping history. However, after
an immense backlash from irate users, only nine days af-
ter the program’s inception Facebook had to change the
default so that users would have to actively choose to par-
ticipate (Goldstein et al., 2008).
Several theoretical explanations have been offered to
account for the power of defaults and that may provide
insight into when people decide against a default. For
one, it has been suggested that default options are pre-
ferred because they are interpreted as recommendations of
the policy makers, suggesting a socially desired behavior
(McKenzie, Liersch, & Finkelstein, 2006) or a choice de-
signed to meet the requirements of the average customer
(Irwin & Baron, 2001). Secondly, defaults frequently pre-
serve the status quo. Research shows that people often
make choices such that the current state of the world re-
mains intact. This preference has been named the status
quo bias (Masatlioglu & Ok, 2005; Samuelson & Zeck-
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hauser, 1988). For instance, Hartman, Doane, and Woo
(1991) found that people preferred their current electric-
ity service provider to other providers, even if these would
provide a more reliable or cheaper service. Thirdly, de-
faults are usually associated with absence of physical or
mental efforts. Making a decision can be effortful, partic-
ularly when people do not have a preexisting preference
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Thus people may use de-
faults heuristically to reduce the cognitive effort required
to reach a decision. In line with this, most people prefer
options that do not require action as compared to options
they have to actively pursue, and a negative result that oc-
curs as the consequence of an action is often perceived
as more reprehensible than a negative result caused by an
omission (Baron &Ritov, 1994; Prentice &Koehler, 2002;
Ritov & Baron, 1992).
All these theories can explain why people follow a de-
fault if it maintains the current state of the world. How-
ever, if the default introduces a change, as in the Face-
book example, the status quo bias suggests that people
should decide against the default. In contrast, explaining
a default choice in terms of a policy recommendation or
a preference for an omission suggests that people should
follow the default even if it induces change. Thus, de-
pending on the mechanisms underlying the default choice,
the effectiveness of a default may hinge on whether it pro-
motes the status quo or introduces a change. Schweitzer
(1994) provided evidence that the omission and the status
quo bias provide an independent, but similarly sized, in-
fluence on behavior (see also Baron & Ritov, 1994). This
suggests that defaults that introduce change should be less
effective than defaults that maintain the status quo. How-
ever, when pitting both biases against each other Ritov and
Baron (1992) found that people only preferred an option
that upheld the status quo as long as it was the result of
inaction, but opted for change when upholding the status
quo required action. This suggests that the effectiveness of
a default option does not depend on whether it maintains
or changes the current state of the world. Following up on
this issue, the first goal of the current work is to investigate
whether the effect of defaults is reduced when the default
introduces a change or maintains the status quo when the
task involves real decisions.
2 The influence of emotions on de-
fault decisions
Emotions have been shown to exert an important influ-
ence on decision making in general (Aspinwall, 1998; Co-
hen, Pham, & Andrade, 2007; Scheibehenne & von Hel-
versen, 2014) and on decisions involving a default specifi-
cally (Yen & Chuang, 2008; Garg, Inman &Mittal, 2005).
Yen and Chuang (2008) showed that the probability with
which people choose an option that upheld the status quo
increased with positive affect and decreased with negative
affect. The same held true for the option of choosing nei-
ther of two offered options (e.g., two apartments). In a
similar vein, Garg and colleagues (2005) showed that, in
decisions with emotionally difficult trade-offs, angry par-
ticipants showed a stronger preference for the status quo
than sad participants. Here, we aim to extend their re-
search by testing how positive and negative affect influ-
ence how frequently a default is accepted if the default
introduces a change and thus pits the preference for the
status quo against the preference for inaction.
Two prominent theories, directly related to the present
research, provide an explanation of how emotions influ-
ence decision-making: the “affect-as-information” theory
and the “mood-maintenance” theory. These theories yield
predictions on how affect will interact with the two types
of defaults.
2.1 Affect-as-information theory
The affect-as-information theory predicts how emotions
and moods influence information processing. Specifically,
it suggests that people use their current affective condi-
tion to evaluate the state of the world and if their cur-
rent mode of thinking is appropriate (Hunsinger, Isbell &
Clore, 2012; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). For example, nega-
tive affect may signal that the situation is problematic and
therefore the current dominant response should be aban-
doned in favor of a more careful and systematic process-
ing of the available information (Bless et al., 1996). In
support of this theory, people in a negative mood have
been found to rely less on strategies that are often trig-
gered automatically such as scripts and stereotypes (Bless
et al., 1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) and to
process substantive information more carefully (Sinclair,
Mark, & Clore, 1994). In this vein, Garg and colleagues
(2005) suggested that individuals in a sad mood tend to
consider options more closely and show relatively little
bias towards the status quo.
According to the affect-as-information theory, positive
affect may signal that the situation is benign, which per-
mits to follow the currently dominant course of action.
In line with this, past research has found that positive
mood induces a less effortful and more superficial pro-
cessing of information (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack,
1990; Bohner, Chaiken, & Hunyadi, 1994; Park & Banaji,
2000). Furthermore, positive emotions have been shown
to increase reliance on global knowledge structures such
as scripts (Bless et al., 1996), stereotypes (Bodenhausen
et al., 1994), and judgmental heuristics (Ruder & Bless,
2003) and decrease the depth with which people process
substantive information in persuasion and attitude forma-
tion (Batra & Stayman, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989).
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In some situations, the default option may induce a
strong emotional reaction that could serve as a dominant
response. However, research suggests that relying on the
default is usually the dominant course of action (e.g. Gold-
stein, et al., 2008; Johnson, et al., 2002; Ritov & Baron,
1992), and thus may serve as a global knowledge struc-
ture or script people can follow (Yen & Chuang, 2008). In
contrast, deciding against a default is generally perceived
as a decision against the dominant response and has been
characterized as requiring more systematic processing of
information and more effort (Garg, et al. 2005; McKenzie
et al., 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Yen & Chuang,
2008). Thus, to the degree that going with the default is
the dominant response in the task, according to the affect-
as-information theory, positive affect should increase re-
liance on defaults, independent of whether the default is
maintaining the status quo or introducing a change.
2.2 Mood-maintenance theory
In contrast, the “mood-maintenance” theory emphasizes
the importance of emotion regulation and its influence on
decision-making. Specifically, it posits that people are
motivated to experience positive affect (Aspinwall, 1998;
Clark & Isen, 1982; Isen, 1984). Accordingly, people in a
positive mood may strive to maintain this affective state by
choosing options that promise positive consequences (We-
gener & Petty, 1994) and by avoiding losses and high-risk
options (Arkes, Herren, & Isen, 1988; Isen & Geva, 1987).
People in a negative mood may be motivated to “repair”
their mood, for example by choosing options that they
believe will improve their mood, such as hedonic goods
(Garg, Wansink, & Inman, 2007, but see Wegener & Petty,
1994). This suggests that people in a positive mood may
prefer options that maintain the status quo, because they
are seen as less threatening (Riis & Schwarz, 2003) and
thus allow maintaining positive affect. In contrast, people
in a negative mood may prefer a new option to the status
quo because it has the potential to uplift their emotional
state. For instance, Lin and Lin (2009) found that when
choosing between hedonic goods such as food items, peo-
ple show more variety-seeking behavior during a negative
than a positive mood. This also resonates with the finding
by Yen & Chuang (2008) that people in a negative mood
are less willing to choose a status quo option, whereas peo-
ple in a positive mood are more likely to choose a status
quo option.
Correspondingly, the mood-maintenance theory pre-
dicts that people in a positive mood should rely more on
a default if it leads to upholding the current state of the
world, but rely less on a default when it involves change.
In contrast, in a negative mood people should rely more
on a default that involves change and less on a default that
leads to maintaining the status quo.
Table 1: Number of participants in each condition.
Happy
(N=105)
Neutral
(N=101)
Sad
(N=107)
Status quo by default (N=105) 34 35 36
Change by default (N=103) 36 32 35
No default (N=105) 35 34 36
2.3 The present research
The lack of empirical evidence how mood influences deci-
sions in situations where the status quo bias and the omis-
sion bias are pitted against each other prompted us to con-
duct an experiment that involved real choices in which we
manipulated participants’ mood and then presented them
with a choice situation where following a default either
maintained the status quo or introduced a change.
3 Method
3.1 Participants
A total of 336 participants residing in the US were re-
cruited from the online labor market Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) in exchange for a payment of $1. Previous
studies ascertained the reliability of Mturk to obtain high-
quality data (Buhrmester, Kwang, Gosling, 2011; Pao-
lacci, Chandler, Ipeirotis, 2010). Completing the study
required approximately 15 minutes. Twenty-three par-
ticipants did not pass the control questions that checked
whether they had read the instructions and thus were ex-
cluded from the analysis. The final sample consisted of
179 men and 134 women, with a mean age of M = 33.75
years (range 18–66). The majority of participants (about
80%) were White American, with the remaining 20% in-
dicating Hispanic (6%), African American (6%), Asian,
and Native American origins. All research was conducted
in compliance with APA ethical standards.
3.2 Design and Procedure
The study used a 3 x 3 between-subjects experimental
design varying induced affect (happy, neutral, and sad)
and the type of default (“Status quo by default”, “Change
by default”, and “No default”). The type of default was
manipulated by presenting participants with a choice be-
tween two visual perception tasks. Specifically, partici-
pants could choose whether they would like to work on a
task they had worked on before or work on a new task. Par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to one of the nine condi-
tions, resulting in about 30 participants in each condition
(see Table 1).
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After giving their consent to participate in the study,
participants received instructions about the experimental
task and filled out a questionnaire measuring demograph-
ics and their current mood. Additionally, we included
control questions to ensure that participants were paying
attention to the instructions. Next, participants were ran-
domly assigned to one of the two visual perception tasks.
Once they had completed 15 items of the first task, we
manipulated participants’ mood state by showing them a
3 min movie clip, a standard procedure to induce differ-
ent affective states (Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot,
2010; Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). After
watching the movie clip, participants were asked to an-
swer a few questions regarding the content of the movie
and to again rate their current mood. Next, participants
had to choose whether they wanted to continue working on
the same task as before or on a new task. This choice was
our main dependent variable. Instructions for that choice
differed depending on the experimental condition. In the
“no default” control condition, participants were presented
with the two options next to each other and had to select
the option they preferred before they could move on by
pressing the “continue” button. The order in which the
options were presented was counterbalanced. In the “sta-
tus quo by default” condition, participants were told that
they would work on the same task as before if they pressed
the “continue” button but that they could opt out and work
on a new task if they checked a box before they pressed
“continue”. In the “change by default” condition, partici-
pants were told that they would work on a new task if they
pressed the “continue” button but that they could opt out
and work on the same task as before if they checked a box
before they pressed “continue”. After they had completed
the second visual perception task, participants were again
asked to rate their mood.
3.3 Materials
Tasks. Both tasks involved the visual processing of in-
formation. We chose visual perception problems because
they are comparable to tasks that are offered on Amazon
Mechanical Turks. One task involved counting trees. In
this task, participants had to indicate how many trees were
shown on a series of the photos depicting nature scenes. In
the other task, participants saw photos of different types of
buildings (i.e., churches, restaurants, shops) and they had
to provide a one-word “tag” for each photo that best de-
scribed the type of building shown. Both tasks were coun-
terbalanced to allow us to control the relative preference
for the two tasks.
Mood induction. Mood was induced through short
video clips taken from Youtube.com. Participants in the
neutral condition saw a 3 min clip from a documentary
Figure 1: Number of participants in neutral mood condi-
tion (N=101) that choose to stay with the same task or to
change to the new task in the three “type of default” con-
ditions.
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about Norway informing about historical facts and local
customs, in the positive condition they saw a clip with a
compilation of the funniest moments in the comedy movie
Ice Age 2: The Meltdown (2006), and in the negative con-
dition they saw a clip from the film City of Angels (1998,
01:38–01:41) depicting the death of the main character.
Mood questionnaire. To measure participants’ mood
state we asked them to rate their current mood on 10
items taken from the expanded version of the “Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule” (PANAS-X, Watson & Clark,
1999) and the “Differential Emotions Scale” (DES-IV;
Izard, Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993) using a 5-point
answer scale (1=very slightly, 5=extremely). Specifically,
we used 3 items to measure happiness (glad, happy and
joyful), 3 items to measure sadness (downhearted, sad and
gloomy) and 4 further items to measure anger, anxiety,
curiosity and excitement (angry, jittery, curious, and ex-
cited). Participants rated their mood states 3 times: at the
beginning of the experiment, after the mood induction, and
at the end of the experiment.
4 Results
A chi-square test indicated that the random assignment to
one of the two visual perception tasks at the beginning of
the experiment had no significant influence on choice, χ2
(1, 313) = 0.27, p = .60. Therefore, we merged the two
conditions for the subsequent data analyses.
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Figure 2: Level of happiness and sadness for each mood
condition and for each of the three measurement time
points: at the beginning of the experiment, after the mood
induction and at the end of the experiment. Error bars rep-
resent standard errors of the mean.
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4.1 Influence of different types of defaults
As an initial test to see whether the default was more ef-
fective when it maintained the status quo than when it in-
troduced a change, we focused only on participants in the
neutral condition (N = 101). For this group, the default
condition had a strong influence on choice as indicated by
a chi-square test: χ2 (1, 101) = 33.42, p < .001. As il-
lustrated in Figure 1, in the “status quo by default” condi-
tion 83% of participants chose to stay with the same task,
whereas only 13% did so in the “change by default” con-
dition. This suggests that the default was effective regard-
less of whether it maintained the status quo or introduced
a change. In the “no default” condition, participants were
equally likely to choose the same task as before (44%) or
to choose a new task (56%), showing no evidence for a
status quo bias.
4.2 Influence of incidental emotions on par-
ticipants’ choices
In a next step we analyzed the influence of mood state on
participants’ choices. We first report results of the manip-
ulation check of the mood induction and then how mood
influenced participants’ choices when presented with dif-
ferent types of defaults.
Manipulation check. We created two scales to de-
termine participants’ happiness and sadness by averaging
the ratings of the respective items at the three measure-
ment points (Cronbach’s α > .82 for both scales at all time
points).
As illustrated in Figure 2, after the mood induction par-
ticipants in the happy condition were happy (M = 3.27;
SD = 0.95) and not sad (M = 1.12; SD = 0.37), partici-
pants in the neutral condition were somewhat less happy
(M = 2.78; SD = 0.94) and also not sad (M =1.2; SD =
0.45), and participants in the sad condition were not very
happy (M = 1.72; SD = 0.83) and moderately sad (M =
2.52; SD = 1.10). These data are in line with the intended
manipulation of mood although in absolute terms, no ex-
treme levels of emotions were induced.
To test for differences among the experimental condi-
tions, we ran a repeated-measures analysis of variance
with mood condition as a between-subjects factor and
measurement time as a within-subject factor on the happi-
ness and sadness ratings, using Greenhouse–Geisser cor-
rections of the degrees of freedom if necessary. This anal-
ysis indicated a significant main effect of mood condi-
tion for happiness, F(2, 310) = 27.77, p < .001, and for
sadness, F(2, 310) = 59.08, p < .001. Post hoc Tukey’s
HSD tests revealed that participants in the happy condi-
tion were happier than participants in the sad condition, (p
< .001), and in the neutral condition, (p = .003). In the
same vein, participants in the sad condition were sadder
than participants in the happy condition (p < .001), and
the neutral condition (p < .001). Significant interactions
of mood with measurement time indicated that ratings of
happiness, F(3.56, 551.26) = 50.33, p < .01, and of sad-
ness, F(3.73, 578.54) = 67.05, p < .01, changed over time
depending on the mood condition. Importantly, follow up
analyses showed that in the happy condition participants
became more happy, F(1,104) = 10.71 p = .001, and less
sad, F(1,104) = 12.50, p = .001, after the mood manipu-
lation. In contrast, in the sad condition, participants be-
came less happy, F(1,106) = 112, 78, p < .001, and more
sad (F(1,106) = 115.61, p < .001, whereas in the neutral
condition mood did not change (ps > .18). Pairwise con-
trasts after the mood induction confirmed that participants
were happier in the happy condition as compared to the
sad condition, Contrast = 1.55, SE = 0.12, p < .001, and
the neutral condition, Contrast = 0.49, SE = 0.13, p < .001.
Similarly, participants in the sad condition were sadder as
compared to the happy condition, Contrast = 1.40, SE =
0.10, p < .001, and the neutral condition, Contrast = 1.31,
SE = 0.10, p < .001. These results suggest that the mood
manipulation was successful.
The mood induction also influenced excitement and
anger. Post hoc Scheffé tests comparing the three mood
conditions after the mood induction showed that partici-
pants in the sad condition reported being less excited (ps <
.001) and curious (ps < .001), but more angry (ps < .001)
than participants in the neutral or happy condition. Par-
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Table 2: Logistic regression analyses predicting following default behavior.
95% CI for odds ratio
Predictors B (SE) Lower Odds ratio Upper p-value
Constant 0.88 (0.55) .11
Mood 1.26 (0.67) 0.95 3.51 12.98 .06
Default type 0.35 (0.36) 0.70 1.42 2.91 .33
Default type by mood −0.97 (0.44) 0.16 0.38 0.90 .03
Note: N=208, R2(Nagelkerke)= .05. Model χ2(1) = 6.12, p = .11.
Figure 3: Proportion of participants following the default
by type of default and mood condition. Error bars repre-
sent standard errors of the mean.
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ticipants in the happy condition were more excited than
participants in the neutral condition (p = .004), but did not
differ from them in their ratings of anger and curiosity.
There were no differences in how jittery participants felt.
Mean and standard deviations of all affect measures can
be found in the Appendix.
Influence of incidental emotions on following a default.
To analyze whether participants’ mood states influenced
their choices of defaults preserving the status quo and de-
faults introducing a change, we ran a logistic regression
on participants’ choices with mood condition (happy, neu-
tral and sad), type of default (“status quo by default” and
“change by default”), and their interaction as predictors.
As shown in Figure 3, we found a main effect of mood
on the likelihood to follow a default, qualified by a sig-
nificant interaction between the type of default and the in-
duced mood, b = −0.97, Wald χ2(1, 208) = 4.8, p = .03
(see also Table 2), suggesting that the effect of mood de-
pended on the type of default: Participants in a positive
mood were more likely to follow a default maintaining
the status quo, whereas sad participants were more likely
to follow a default introducing change. Additional anal-
yses for each type of default showed that mood affected
whether participants followed the default in the change by
default condition, b = −0.68, SE = 0.33, Wald χ2(1,103)
= 4.12, p = .04, but not in the status quo by default con-
dition, b = 0.29, SE = 0.29, Wald χ2(1,105) = 1.01, p =
.32.
A follow-up analysis showed that participants in the
neutral condition did not differ from participants in the sad
condition (default status quo: χ2 (1, 71) = 1.75, p = .19,
default change: χ2 (1, 67) = 0.02, p = .89) or participants
in the positive condition (default status quo: χ2 (1, 61) =
0.13, p = .71; default change: χ2 (1, 68) = 3.21, p = .07).
5 Discussion
The main goal of this paper was to investigate how the
choice to follow different types of defaults is affected by
incidental affect. We found that the effect of mood de-
pended on the type of default. In particular, when defaults
introduced a change, participants were more likely to fol-
low it when in a sad mood than when in a happy mood.
In contrast, when the default maintained the status quo the
opposite pattern was found.
These results extend the research by Yen and Chuang
(2008) and Garg et al. (2005) to a situation where the
status quo bias and the omission bias are pitted against
each other and real consequences follow — even if the
consequences are of relatively little importance. Yen and
Chuang (2008) reported that positive mood increased the
status quo and the tendency not to choose either of the
offered options, whereas sadness decreased both effects.
When the default maintained the status quo and thus a
preference for an omission and a preference for the status
quo were aligned, we found a similar pattern. However,
when the default induced a change, we found that people
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in the happy condition were more likely to continue with
the old task than sad participants — even though it forced
them to go against the default. This suggests that the ef-
fect of mood on status quo may persist in the face of more
effortful processing.
Participants in a positive and a negative mood did not
differ significantly from participants in a neutral mood. In
particular, neither participants in the happy condition were
more likely to follow a default introducing a status quo
nor were sad participants more likely to follow a default
that induced a change than participants in a neutral mood.
However, the percentage of people following a default in
the neutral condition was already very high, suggesting
that the lack of difference could be caused by a ceiling
effect.
Overall, our results are in line with the idea that mood-
maintenance considerations influence choices involving
defaults. Specifically they resonate with the idea that peo-
ple make decisions to reach or maintain a positive affec-
tive state (e.g., Garg et al., 2007; Isen, 1984). In line with
Lin and Lin (2009) who showed that people in a sad mood
are more willing to try out new alternatives than people
in a positive mood, we found that sad people more fre-
quently chose to follow the default when it introduced a
new option. These results extend the research by Lin and
Lin (2009) and Garg et al. (2007) by showing that a mood
related preference for new alternatives can even be found
in the presence of defaults, one of the most potent nudges
identified in the literature. Furthermore, they suggest that
mood maintenance concerns can also influence decisions
involving options with a low hedonic value.
The degree to which mood-maintenance concerns de-
termine participants’ choices may, however, depend on the
options that are introduced by a default. When the default
introduced a change in our task participants would work
on a new task on which they had only little information
and thus could hope that it would improve their mood.
In contrast, if the default would introduce a change to a
familiar but undesirable option, mood-maintenance con-
cerns should not increase reliance on the default.
In terms of the affect-as-information theory, our results
suggest that mood states did not influence how much peo-
ple relied on the default as a global heuristic to make the
decision. On the one hand this could suggest that the
“affect-as-information” theory played only a minor role
in participants’ decisions. According to this theory, pos-
itive affect signals that the current environment is safe
and it is possible to rely on the currently active think-
ing mode, whereas negative affect signals that a careful
analysis of provided information is required and the cur-
rently active thinking style should be abandoned (Bless &
Fiedler, 2006; Hunsinger et al., 2012). Thus, to the de-
gree that defaults are the dominant response, happy par-
ticipants should have a stronger preference for the default
option than sad participants regardless of the type of de-
fault. However, in our study we found that when the de-
fault introduced change, sad participants were more likely
to follow the default than happy participants. On the other
hand, it is possible that people used other affective cues
than the default to guide their choices. For instance, mood
and emotions can influence how much people rely on task
related affect (e.g. Garg et al., 2005). Thus, if the task
itself provides a strong negative cue and people rely more
on affective cues in positive mood, this could influence
participants’ choices against the default in positive mood.
In our task this seems not very likely though because in
the condition without a default participants were equally
likely to switch tasks, suggesting that both tasks were sim-
ilar attractive or tedious. Nevertheless, in future it would
be useful to measure task related affect such as how diffi-
cult, tedious, or attractive the tasks were perceived. This
would allow ruling out this hypothesis and to test more di-
rectly whether participants switched tasks in order to im-
prove their mood.
Our results indicate a strong effect of the default that
was independent on the specific type of default. Eighty-
three percent of subjects chose the default option when
it promoted the status quo and 87% subjects chose the
default when it promoted change. These results suggest
that the status quo bias played no or only a minor role
for choices involving defaults. This resonates with re-
search showing that people often prefer inaction over ac-
tion when making decisions (e.g., Asch et al., 1994; De-
Scioli, Christner, & Kurzban, 2011). Our results also pro-
vide further evidence to support the idea that the omis-
sion bias is largely responsible for the effect of defaults
on choice (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1992).
One reason that participants followed the default to such
a strong degree could be that both tasks were similarly at-
tractive. Indeed, when no default was provided partici-
pants were roughly equally likely to choose the same task
as before or to choose the new task. Furthermore, par-
ticipants only had to work on the tasks for a short time,
which could have decreased the importance of the deci-
sion. This relatively low importance of the task may have
hindered the development of a status quo bias and it may
have increased reliance on the default. Future research
should replicate our results with more consequential and
emotionally involving decisions.
In sum, our results suggest that defaults have a strong
influence on choice even if they are used to introduce a
change; however, this influence may differ depending on
decision makers’ emotional state. Whereas, defaults main-
taining the status quo are chosen more frequently in a pos-
itive mood, defaults inducing a change may be more easily
accepted in a sad mood.
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Appendix: Overview of the affect measures
Means and Standard Deviations (SD) for the affect measures in the three mood conditions: at the Beginning of the
experiment – after the mood induction – at the end of the experiment.
Scale Statistics Happy (N=105) Neutral (N=101) Sad (N=107)
Happiness Means 3.05 – 3.27 – 2.97 2.73 – 2.78 – 2.58 2.77 – 1.72 – 2.17
SD 1.02 – 0.95 – 1.06 0.89 – 0.94 – 1.01 1.00 – 0.83 – 0.84
Sadness Means 1.25 – 1.12 – 1.12 1.25 – 1.20 – 1.17 1.51 – 2.52 – 1.80
SD 0.55 – 0.37 – 0.36 0.54 – 0.45 – 0.47 0.84 – 1.10 – 0.90
Angry Means 1.14 – 1.11 – 1.10 1.11 – 1.13 – 1.08 1.28 – 1.44 – 1.30
SD 0.54 – 0.42 – 0.44 0.45 – 0.44 – 0.37 0.80 – 0.86 – 0.77
Jittery Means 1.45 – 1.30 – 1.38 1.33 – 1.29 – 1.27 1.50 – 1.41 – 1.40
SD 0.78 – 0.59 – 0.75 0.62 – 0.65 – 0.65 0.91 – 0.81 – 0.80
Curios Means 2.86 – 2.65 – 2.44 2.74 – 2.93 – 2.46 2.92 – 2.01 – 2.06
SD 1.14 – 1.21 – 1.13 1.01 – 1.15 – 1.15 1.09 – 1.03 – 1.04
Excited Means 2.46 – 2.70 – 2.33 2.22 – 2.24 – 1.99 2.38 – 1.55 – 1.67
SD 1.11 – 1.17 – 1.17 1.07 – 1.10 – 1.09 1.00 – 0.72 – 0.86
Running head: NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ONLINE MOOD MANIPULATIONS 1
Non-compliance with online mood manipulations using film clips: How to detect and
control for it
Yury Shevchenko, Arndt Bröder
University of Mannheim
Author Note
Yury Shevchenko, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim; Arndt
Bröder, School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Yury Shevchenko,
School of Social Sciences, University of Mannheim, L13, 15, D-68131 Mannheim,
Germany. E-mail: yshevche@mail.uni-mannheim.de
This research was supported by a research grant of the Center for Doctoral
Studies in Social and Behavioral Sciences (CDSS) at the University of Mannheim
awarded to the first author.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ONLINE MOOD MANIPULATIONS 2
Abstract
The reliability of online mood manipulations is potentially undermined by participants’
non-compliance behavior, e.g., skipping a part of the experiment or switching between
web pages during the mood manipulation. The goal of the current research is to
investigate (1) whether and how mood manipulations are threatened by non-compliance
behavior, (2) whether it is confounded with the induced mood state as predicted by
Affect Regulation Theory, and (3) what measures can be taken to control for this. In
two online-experiments, non-compliance behavior was assessed during the mood
manipulation with movie clips by tracking interruptions of watching and page switches.
The results support the affect regulation hypothesis demonstrating that people
confronted with negative emotional content interrupted watching the video and
switched between pages more often than people with positive content.
Methodologically, this causes a threat to the internal validity of internet-based mood
manipulation studies. To decrease the risk of non-compliance, the current study
recommends to block skipping a part of the mood manipulation, detect page focus
events and measure the time people stay on a page.
Keywords: non-compliance, mood induction, online study
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Non-compliance with online mood manipulations using film clips: How to detect and
control for it
The development of the Internet has opened a new way to conduct psychological
experiments. An online study enables fast data collection, gives access to diverse
population groups, extends the sample size and saves laboratory resources. However, it
also introduces new challenges such as the lack of supervision of participants and
control over the presentation of stimuli (Gureckis et al., 2016; Reips, 2002). The validity
of a web study may be undermined by non-compliance behavior, e.g., skipping a part of
the experiment or switching between web pages during the mood manipulation. As
more researchers use online tools to elicit emotions, it is critical to develop techniques
for detecting and preventing cases of non-compliance. The current research suggests
such a method and assesses how large the effect of non-compliance during a mood
induction procedure is and whether it depends on the emotional state.
The present experimental study employs short videos as a mood induction
method, which is one of the most efficient and widely used means to induce an emotion
both in a laboratory (Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996) and in an online
experiment (Ferrer, Grenen, & Taber, 2015; Gilman et al., 2017). Previous research on
online mood manipulation by movies hardly addressed the problem of the
non-compliance behavior. One simple assessment is to ask people whether they closed
their eyes or looked away during the video (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2007). In
another online study, participants’ engagement was assessed by open-ended accuracy
questions about film content (Gilman et al., 2017). However, participants can guess the
right option or write a vague answer, so the questionnaire does not ensure the reliability
of the mood induction. Moreover, people who recognize the movie that they watched
before can skip the mood manipulation, but answer correctly on the accuracy question.
Residence Time as a Measure of the Non-Compliance Behavior
As a measure of the non-compliance, we propose the residence time – the time
people stay on a web page with the movie clip. The opportunity to interrupt the video
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and proceed to the next part of the experiment depends on the type of the service
provider and the design of the study. The implementation of sophisticated algorithms
that show a continue button only when the video is ended is possible but requires
programming skills. The default option of many survey services (e.g., LimeSurvey,
Unipark) is to embed a video into the web page together with a continue button.
Therefore, one of the purposes of the current experimental study is to analyze whether
people will use the option to proceed without watching the movie clip until the end.
Even if the continue button can be hidden until the video is over, there are no
algorithms that prevent a user from switching to another web page, which might
decrease the mood manipulation effect (if people do not watch the video) or even
reverse it (if people encounter another mood eliciting content). However, the browser
can detect the moment of page defocusing and record the time people spend out of the
page focus (e.g., the PageFocus algorithm in Diedenhofen and Musch (2017) to detect
cheating in online tests).
In summary, the non-compliance behavior measured by the residence time can be
affected by an early quitting or by temporary leave of a page. Both forms represent
avoidance behavior, as participants withdraw from the part of the experiment that
induces emotions.
The Role of Emotions in Non-Compliance Behavior
The emotional content of a movie clip might activate emotion regulation responses
(Gross, 1998). From the perspective of affect regulation theories, people in a negative
mood engage in activities because of their mood-lifting consequences, but people in a
positive mood avoid situations with mood-threatening consequences (Andrade, 2005,
but for a critique see Wegener & Petty, 1994). The affect regulation account predicts
that people will escape from the negative mood manipulation situation to avoid negative
thoughts, but stay within the positive mood manipulation situation to protect their
current good mood induced by a video. Therefore, people in a negative mood condition
should have a higher level of non-compliance than in a positive mood condition.
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The non-compliance also mediates the relationship between the induction
procedure and changes of mood. Since skipping a part of negative mood induction
video occurs because people want to avoid feeling negative emotions, the
non-compliance behavior should attenuate the reported negative emotions at the end of
the experiment in the negative mood group. However, in the positive mood group, the
reason to avoid the mood manipulation would be different. People might perceive the
present environment as mood threatening (e.g., boring or annoying) and escape from
the mood manipulation situation to protect their good mood. Therefore, the reported
positive emotions at the end should not be attenuated by the non-compliance behavior.
To summarize, the purpose of the current research is to investigate (1) whether
and how mood manipulations are threatened by non-compliance behavior, (2) whether
it is confounded with the to-be-induced mood state, and (3) what measures can be
taken to control for this. To achieve these goals, we conducted an online-experiment
where non-compliance behavior was measured during the mood manipulation with
movie clips.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. 472 cases (mood group: 257 positive (54%), 215 negative (46%))
of participation were registered. Because of page reloads, repeated participation, leaving
the experiment before the end, and reported problems with the video, 126 records were
filtered out (see Table A1 in Appendix). The exclusion rate was not different between
mood conditions, χ2 (1, N = 472) = 0.08, p = .77. The final sample comprised 346
participants (see Table 1).
Design. The experiment was conducted online on the website of the first
author1. The mood was manipulated in a between-subjects design, so one group of
participants watched a sad movie clip, the other one watched a funny one. Two forms of
non-compliance behavior that affected the residence time were measured: the
1 The link to the experiments http://yuryshevchenko.com/online-study/emotional-movies/
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Table 1
Sample characteristics
Sample
size
Mean age
(SD)
Females German English
Negative 159 25.87 (8.70) 120 98 61
Positive 187 26.12 (10.54) 144 111 76
All 346 26.01 (9.72) 264 209 137
interruption of the video before its end by clicking the continue button and temporary
leaving of the page. The mood manipulation check was done by comparing the mood
before and after watching the movie clip. The study was approved by the Mannheim
University Ethics Committee.
Procedure. Participants read the general information about the study and the
consent form. After filling in demographic data, they rated their current emotional
state. On the next page with the video, participants were instructed to click the play
button to start the clip which would play for around three minutes. They were asked to
watch the video until the end, and then press the continue button at the bottom of the
page. After the video, the general mood rating question and a more precise
questionnaire with ten different emotions followed. After that, participants had to
answer whether they watched the video before, watched the video until the end and
were distracted by other activities while watching the video. At the last page,
participants could leave an email address if they wished to take part in a lottery.
Mood induction. Positive mood was induced by amusement emotions since
amusement is often correlated with happiness but different from other emotions
(Gilman et al., 2017). We used the scene with Scrat chasing nuts from the movie “Ice
Age: Continental Drift” (2012, 2:30) that was validated in our previous studies.
Negative mood was elicited by showing the scene with the death of Mufasa from the
movie “Lion King” (1994, 3:10) (Rottenberg et al., 2007). We chose sad emotions to
induce negative mood since sadness has a decreased level of arousal (Bonanno, Goorin,
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& Coifman, 2008) and is not associated directly with avoidance motivation as other
high-arousal negative states of anxiety, fear or disgust.
Mood manipulation check. Before and after watching the video, a mood
manipulation check was done by asking participants about their current mood using a
general question on a visual analog scale from “very depressed” to “very elated”
recording answers from 0 to 500. Additionally, after the second general mood question
after the video, participants rated their current mood on ten different emotion scales of
the Positive and Negative Affective Schedule (PANAS, Watson & Clark, 1999). We did
not present this questionnaire before watching the video not to elicit mood regulation
thoughts or demand effects. The analog scale of the PANAS had five marks: “very
slightly or not at all”, “a little”, “moderately”, “quite a bit”, and “very much”, and the
answers were recorded in the range from 0 to 500. Later, the answers were averaged for
the scales of positive (happy, joyful, delighted, and interested) and negative emotions
(downhearted, gloomy, sad, distressed, and angry). One additional item was used to
control for arousal (relaxed).
Results
243 participants (70%) did not interrupt the video and did not temporarily leave
the web page, 47 participants interrupted the video (14%), 49 people temporarily left
the page (14%), and 7 people did both (2%).
Interruption of the mood induction procedure. In general, 54 participants
(16%) spent less time on the video web page than they should to watch all the video.
The number of participants was higher in the negative mood condition (n = 33, 21%)
than in the positive mood condition (n = 21, 11%), χ2 (1, N = 346) = 5.92, p = .014
(see Table 2).
A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was applied to analyze the effect of the mood
manipulation and interruption of the video on the mood score. Since 10 participants
did not fill in the mood questionnaire, the analysis was done for 336 participants. The
mood score was normalized to correspond to a percentage scale from 0 to 100%. The
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Table 2
Residence time in the mood groups. Row percentages are written in parentheses.
The residence time
is shorter than the
length of the video
The residence time
is longer than the
length of the video
Total
Negative 33 (21%) 126 (79%) 159
Positive 21 (11%) 166 (89%) 187
All 54 292 346
analysis showed both main effects of the manipulation, F (1, 332) = 138.84, MSE =
43720, p < .001, and the interruption, F (1, 332) = 6.06, MSE = 2355, p < .05.
Importantly, there was a significant interaction between the manipulation and the
interruption, F (1, 332) = 7.48, MSE = 2355, p < .01. A post-hoc Tukey test showed
that in the negative mood condition people who did not interrupt the video decreased
their mood in comparison with people who interrupted it, p < .01. In the positive mood
condition, there were no significant differences between people who interrupted and who
watched the whole video, p = .95 (see Figure 1).
The separate analysis with positive and negative emotions measured by PANAS
showed that the interaction effect was only significant for negative emotions, F (1, 327)
= 4.14, MSE = 50459, p < .05, but not for positive emotions, F (1, 327) = 0.89, MSE
= 9745, p = .352.
Temporary leave. 56 participants (16%) at least once temporarily left the web
page with the video (Mdn = 12 sec.). There were no differences between the number of
people who did it in the positive (n = 31) and in the negative mood condition (n = 25),
χ
2 (1, N = 346) = 0.05, p = .83. Regarding the mood ratings, a 2 x 2 ANOVA with
main effects of the mood condition and temporary leave showed that only the effect of
mood was significant, F (1, 332) = 134.54, MSE = 43720, p < .001. Neither the effect
2 The number of people for the analysis was 331, since 5 people did not complete the PANAS
questionnaire.
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Figure 1 . The changes in mood dependent on the mood condition and the interruption
of the video (N = 336). The group means and 95% CI are shown. A negative score
indicates that participants declined in mood, a positive score shows that they improved
their mood.
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of the leave nor the interaction between the mood and the leave were significant, F (1,
332) = 0.41, MSE = 135, p = .52 and F (1, 332) = 2.44, MSE = 794, p = .12.
Discussion
In Experiment 1, 30% of the participants who finished the experiment either
interrupted the video or temporarily left the video page. Whereas the temporary leave
was relatively short and did not influence mood ratings, interruption of the video was
different between mood conditions and affected the mood ratings afterward. The results
support the affect regulation hypothesis so that people confronted with the negative
emotional content interrupted watching the video more often than people with the
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positive content. Additionally, the people in the negative mood condition who
interrupted watching the video were less affected by the mood manipulation, while
there were no differences for the positive mood condition.
Regarding the mood manipulation check results, the size of the effect was larger
for the negative (20% decrease) than for the positive mood condition (5% increase).
That result is in line with previous research finding that negative emotions are easier to
elicit than positive ones (Ferrer et al., 2015). However, we did not observe any ceiling
effect for the positive mood score – people in the positive mood condition significantly
increased their mood as well.
Experiment 1 showed that the differences between negative and positive
conditions were more prominent in interrupting the mood manipulation procedure by
clicking the continue button than in the temporary leave of the web page. However,
both forms of non-compliance might be caused by the same avoidance motivation. So if
we hide the continue button until the end of the video, we would expect the increase of
the differences in the temporary leave between conditions. To investigate this
hypothesis, we conducted Experiment 2 where participants could not use the continue
button before the end of the video.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. 208 cases (mood group: 104 positive (50%), 104 negative (50%))
of participation were registered. Filtering was applied to 28 records (see Table A2)
leaving 180 participants for the analysis (see Table 3).
Design and Procedure. The design and procedure of the experiment were
similar to Experiment 1 except the continue button at the web-page with the video was
hidden until the end of the video. Therefore, only one form of non-compliance behavior,
that is a temporary leave of the page, was registered. Additionally, three accuracy
questions about the content of the video were added to examine whether they can
distinguish non-compliance behavior.
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Table 3
Sample characteristics
Sample size Mean age (SD) Females
Negative 89 20.99 (3.11) 73
Positive 91 21.32 (4.18) 84
All 180 21.16 (3.68) 157
Mood induction. Positive mood was manipulated by the fragment with the
character played by Ben Stiller fighting with a dog in the movie “There’s something
about Mary” (1998, 3:25) (Gilman et al., 2017). Negative mood was induced by the
scene with a man losing his wife in a car accident from the movie “Return to me” (2000,
3:25) (Rottenberg et al., 2007).
Mood manipulation check. As in Experiment 1, before and after watching
the video, participants answered a general question about their current mood.
Additionally, they rated their emotions on ten different scales of the PANAS after the
video (Watson & Clark, 1999).
Results
37 participants (21%) temporarily left the web page during the video. The number
of participants was higher in the negative mood condition (n = 25, 29%) than in the
positive mood condition (n = 12, 13%), χ2 (1, N = 180) = 6.00, p = .01 (see Table 4).
As an explorative analysis, we compared the time spent out of the focus of the
web-page between conditions. Since dependent variables were not normally distributed,
a non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test was applied. The length of missing time was
not different between negative and positive conditions, W = 140, p = .90. However,
there was a tendency for participants in the negative condition (Med = 29.8 sec.) to
leave the web-page later than the participants in the positive condition (Med = 7.7
sec.), W = 204, p = .08 (see Figure 2).
A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was applied to analyze the effect of the mood
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Table 4
The temporary leave in the mood groups. Row percentages are written in parentheses.
Stayed on the page Left the page at
least once
Total
Negative 64 (72%) 26 (28%) 89
Positive 79 (87%) 12 (13%) 91
All 143 37 180
manipulation and temporary leave on the mood score. Since two participants did not
fill in the mood questionnaire, the analysis was done for 178 participants. The mood
score was normalized to correspond to a percentage scale from 0 to 100%. The analysis
showed the main effect of the mood manipulation, F (1, 174) = 170.02, MSE = 50188,
p < .001, but there were neither effects of temporary leave, F (1, 174) = 2.34, MSE =
691, p = .13, nor the interaction between the mood condition and temporary leave, F
(1, 174) = 0.14, MSE = 42, p = .71. The separate analysis with positive and negative
emotions measured by PANAS showed no significant interaction effects for negative
emotions, F (1, 174) = 0.67, MSE = 238, p = .42, and for positive emotions, F (1, 174)
= 0.88, MSE = 311, p = .35.
Regarding the results of control and accuracy questions, only one person in the
group of participants who left the web-page admitted being distracted by other
activities while watching the video. Four people (two in the positive and two in the
negative condition) reported technical problems while watching the video, which might
be related to their temporary leaves (see Table A3). The number of people who gave at
least one wrong answer in three accuracy questions was not different in the group who
stayed on the webpage (n = 7, 5%) and who switched between pages (n = 3, 8%), χ2
(1, N = 180) = 0.58, p = .47.
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Figure 2 . The time (in sec.) spent out of the focus of the web-page with the video. Two
vertical bars show the start and the end of the video.
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Discussion
The results of Experiment 2 supported the idea that people in the negative mood
condition avoid the video more often than people in the positive mood condition. This
result is in line with the affect regulation theory that expects people to regulate their
emotions by escaping from the situation with negative emotional content. The finding
conceptually replicates Experiment 1, which showed that people in the negative mood
condition interrupted the video by clicking the continue button more often than people
in the positive condition. Since Experiment 2 was void of the opportunity to interrupt
the video, participants who wanted to withdraw from the negative emotional content
used the chance to switch between web pages.
Additional explorative analysis showed that the participants in the negative mood
condition were leaving the webpage at a later moment than in the positive condition.
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ONLINE MOOD MANIPULATIONS 14
This might be related to the fact that the emotionally adverse event in the negative
condition video (injured wife of the main hero in a hospital) appeared only at 20th
second, whereas the positive condition video did not have any negative episodes and
could be recognized from the beginning as an excerpt from a comedy.
Although there were differences between conditions, the temporary leave did not
affect the mood ratings as the interruption of the video did in Experiment 1. The
possible reasons are that the leave was not long enough to avoid the mood manipulation
or switching to another web page was not sufficient to restore the previous mood.
The answers to accuracy questions were not related to objective measures of the
residence time on the web-page. However, the accuracy questions could filter people
who completely missed the video or, perhaps, did not understand the instructions. As
in Experiment 1, asking participants whether they were distracted during the task could
not guarantee the reliable answer. The motivation to get credit points or participate in
the lottery might prompt participants to give socially desirable responses. Also, the
participants might not recognize their switches back and forth between web pages
during the video as a distraction that they should report.
General Discussion
The current research investigated the non-compliance behavior in an online mood
manipulation with movie clips. The filtering applied to participants with incomplete
data is not enough to tackle the non-compliance behavior. There is a proportion of
participants (30% in Experiment 1 and 21% in Experiment 2), not traceable with
standard measures (e.g., accuracy questions), who do not follow the mood-manipulation
instruction: they interrupt the video by using the continue button or switch between
web pages during the video. This proportion might differ depending on the sample
characteristics. Our experiments used a university sample of students, who participated
for credit points. However, the more heterogeneous and less motivated sample might
result in more cases of non-compliance, as indicated by the higher dropout rates with
less committed samples (Reips, 2002).
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ONLINE MOOD MANIPULATIONS 15
Our research shows that the non-compliance behavior depends on the emotional
content of the mood manipulation. Supporting the affect regulation theoretical account,
participants preferred to avoid negative emotional stimuli more often than positive ones.
The finding is in line with previous research that has demonstrated attentional
deployment strategy of mood regulation, that is to look away of negative stimuli (van
Reekum et al., 2007). In an online study, there are other possible strategies to avoid the
mood manipulation, which are contingent on the design of an online-study, i.e.,
accessibility of the continue button. We recommend hiding the continue button until the
end of a mood manipulation to prevent participants from interrupting the procedure. In
case if the continue button cannot be removed, the residence time on the web page can
be measured and used as a control variable in the analysis. Additionally, the inclusion
of the time of the web page staying in focus into the analysis is an exciting avenue for
future research. Contrary to a laboratory experiment, where a participant is confined to
the use of experimental software, online experiments are executed in the web-browser
environment where participants can transition between multiple windows or tabs.
In conclusion, people might regulate their emotions by avoiding certain mood
eliciting content on the Internet which poses a threat to the internal validity of
Internet-based mood manipulation studies. To decrease these risks, future research
should adopt the following techniques: preventing participants from skipping a part of
the mood manipulation, detecting page focus events, and measuring the time people
stay on a page.
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Appendix
Table A1
Number of excluded participants in Experiment 1
Negative Positive Overall
Beginning N 215 257 472
Page reloads 17 17 34
Repeated participation 2 2 4
Did not answer the intention question 0 0 0
Left at the first mood question 2 8 10
Left during the movie 18 23 41
Left at the second mood question 2 5 7
Left at the emotions questionnaire 13 8 21
Left at the debriefing questions 1 4 5
Left on the final page with emails 1 1 2
Problems with video 0 2 2
Final N 159 187 346
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH ONLINE MOOD MANIPULATIONS 19
Table A2
Number of excluded participants in Experiment 2
Negative Positive Overall
Beginning N 104 104 208
Page reloads 3 2 5
Repeated participation 3 3 6
Did not answer the intention question 3 0 3
Left at the first mood question 2 1 3
Left during the movie 4 6 10
Left at the second mood question 0 0 0
Left at the emotions questionnaire 0 1 1
Left at the accuracy questions about the video 0 0 0
Left at the debriefing questions 0 0 0
Left on the final page with emails 0 0 0
Problems with video 0 0 0
Final N 89 91 180
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Table A3
Number of people who answered positively on the control questions in Experiment 2
The participants
who stayed on the
webpage (n = 143)
The participants
who left the
webpage at least
once (n = 37)
“Have you seen this video
before?”
15 (10%) 3 (8%)
“Have you watched the video
until the end?”
143 (100%) 37 (100%)
“Have you experienced any
technical problems while
watching the video?”
0 (0%) 4 (11%)
“Were you distracted by other
activities while watching the
video?”
3 (2%) 1 (3%)
